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Collective Assemblages of Enunciation
Bodil Marie Stavning Thomsen
Prelude
The question “what is collectivity in terms of immediation?” is important 
to pose in order to get a sense of the extended intensity in expressions 
of virtual forces and in sudden radical changes. Experiences of 
co-composing can be experienced as encounter-events of human/
non-human assemblages of enunciation. They are felt and expressed 
on a collective level of experience. Even if you as a subject are alone 
at another space and place, events as such are felt and experienced 
on a collective level of experience. Immediations change takes place 
affectively-immediately.
The notion of collective experience in immediation’s events might be 
framed as taking place at the level of “the productive unconscious” 
as connected to Deleuze and Guattari’s “schizoanalytic” approach to 
psychoanalysis. The productive unconscious is here an expression of 
the collectively felt joint force of expression and creation. This collective 
unconscious is embedded in the immediation of an event and can be 
felt as a tendency or inclination.
In Lone Bertelsen’s article the “productive unconscious” is connected 
to Félix Guattari’s notion of an “ethico-aesthetic practice” as well as 
to Bracha Ettinger’s notion of a “matrixial unconscious.” The latter 
refers neither to subjectivity, inter-subjectivity nor collectivity but 
to a co-creative relational web that is “wider than relations between 
signifiers or texts and includes the more affective materiality and 
sociality of the ‘real’” (Immediation II, 343) What Guattari and Ettinger 
have in common is the exploration of the unconscious as a plural 
multiplicity in which differentiation operates—even on the level of 
subjectivity, since a constituent force of becoming is experienced as 
a co-emerging of “I and non-I” (in Ettinger’s words). This constituent 
force of the matrixical unconscious thus is “proto-ethical” to what can 
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be experienced as social in affective immediating events. Bertelsen 
explains the forces of a productive unconscious in relation to her own 
experience of differential co-composing in the exploration of the “dual 
site network installation” Intimate Transactions, made by The Transmute 
Collective (with artistic director Keith Armstrong).
Nicole de Brabandere presents her own photographic explorations of 
Suzanne Langer’s writings on the semblance of movement that can be 
virtually experienced by non-moving representations of movement like 
for example a Greek meander. In Semblance and Event: Activist Philosophy 
and the Occurent Arts (2011) Brian Massumi further explores Langer’s 
work in relation to the forces of events. Nicole de Brabandere’s works 
are especially composed to explore how rhythm, space, surface and 
form might affectively spark tensions and thus create semblances of 
transversal movement in- or outside the frame. These works can be 
experienced as immediating micro-events in which the virtual forces 
“come to life” as transversal semblances of movement.
In Erin Manning’s article, writing itself is explored as a collective 
assemblage of fabulations or thoughts-in-motion. This exploration 
of immediation from a schizoanalytic approach sets off from the 
question of how engagement and creative event-making can be valued 
while unfolding rather than in its exhibited, presentational form. The 
question of how to make an event’s unfolding and its living ecologies of 
collective explorations primary to the individuals taking part in it—and 
not to hold on to former events nor to traditional forms of reporting, 
archiving or habits—is key to a continued engagement. Or as stated 
by Manning: “How can an event mark its punctuation in an account 
that continues the work of the event?” One approach to this is to tell 
stories of events in a fabulating manner in which “the power of the 
false” (Deleuze) decomposes linearity, relations of cause and effect, 
mythmaking and makes even time fall off its hinges of chronology—to 
instead take on a folding relation to an event’s passing. Precisely as 
“[a] fabulation’s content can never be seen as limited to the story itself 
” (Immediation II, 388) the immediations of events are on the level of 
futurity more complex than we can describe or represent. The falsifying 
cut of fabulation operates on the level of immediation, and its success 
cannot be measured in its utterances but only by its potential coupling 
of two kinds of time: “the time of the now and the time of the will have 
been. Time becomes operative, experiential” (Immediation II, 389). 
So, a politics of (the need of) fabulation would have to include the 
schizoanalytic as a technique for making apparent “the simultaneity 
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of incompossible presents … the coexistence of not-necessarily true 
pasts.” (Deleuze 1989: 131). This is necessary in order to recognize the 
events potentialities beyond our individual taking part in it—and to 
recognize and valuate an event’s creative and anarchic potentialities.
Lone Bertelsen
The Productive Unconscious, Immediation 
and a New Micropolitics
It seems to me essential to organize new micropolitical and 
microsocial practices, new solidarities, a new gentleness, 
together with new aesthetic and new analytic practices 
regarding the formation of the unconscious.
Félix Guattari (2008: 51)
Schizoanalysis sets out to undo the expressive Oedipal 
unconscious, always artificial, repressive and repressed, 
mediated by the family, in order to attain the immediate 
productive unconscious.
Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari (1983: 98)
The concern in this chapter is with how an “immediate productive 
unconscious” can be attained. The chapter brings the concept of the 
“productive unconscious” into encounter with the work of Bracha L. 
Ettinger and the emerging concept of immediation.1 This encounter 
enables us to more effectively activate a possible basis for a “new 
micropolitics” of resistance and change: what Félix Guattari (1995) 
has called a new ethico-aesthetic practice.2 In the last section of this 
chapter I suggest that the collaborative artwork Intimate Transactions 
is an example of such an ethico-aesthetic practice working along 
the lines of immediation. The artwork it3 self produces a mapping of 
the “immediate productive unconscious” in its full polyphonic and 
ecological sociality. Such a cartographic mapping can be constitutive of 
new micropolitical practices.
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An Immediating Matrixial Unconscious
With the creation of the concepts matrix and metramorphosis, 
Ettinger (2006) thinks a mode of individuation and sociality based on 
encounter and relation. Via the matrixial and metramorphosis she also 
conceptualizes a more “relational” and I would suggest immediating 
unconscious (1992: 195).
For Ettinger the production of subjectivity is relational in an ongoing 
manner. She writes that in “the matrixial perspective the becoming-
together precedes the being-one” (1995a: 30). This “becoming-together” 
is “trans-subjective.”4 It is radically different to the usual way of 
understanding relationality—and with it sociality—in terms of self 
versus other, and thinking of relation as occurring between these more 
“discrete” entities.5
In many ways Lacan conceived of relationality and the social along 
these more conventional lines when, in his early (more structuralist) 
version of the unconscious, he claimed that the “Unconscious is the 
discourse of the Other” and that it is “structured like a language” (Lacan 
in Evans 1996: 133, 218). In a traditional Lacanian understanding of 
the unconscious the subject recognizes itself in “the discourse of the 
Other”—the master signifier of the symbolic, social order.6
Ettinger, like Guattari, provides an alternative to Lacan’s idea of the 
Other and to his early version of both the unconscious and the social 
as understood in linguistic and Oedipal terms. Ettinger rejects the idea 
that “the unconscious is structured like a language” only and that all 
“unconscious processes are either metaphors or metonymies.” Like 
Guattari, she suggests that the early Lacan “too quickly” translated 
Freud’s notion of the unconscious into purely linguistic terms, ruled in 
accordance with the master signifier (1992: 178-201). Ettinger writes 
that “the unconscious is ... structured like a language only in the realm 
of the symbolic Other, but this Other is not all” that participates in 
the production of subjectivity and sociality (1995b: 67-72).7 According 
to Ettinger (2006) “co-emerging I[s] and non-I[s]” (her different 
understanding of the “other”) can gain expression and have an 
unconscious (and social) place beyond that of metaphor or metonymy.8 
This co-emergence where difference is key operates according to what 
she calls “metramorphosis” (my emphasis).
Metramorphosis is about transformative engagement and becoming 
that is not resolved into a “unity” (Huhn 1993: 8). For Ettinger “when 
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changes occur in the borderline between two fields, they produce 
changes in both fields” (1993: 13). It is in this way that they are different 
to metamorphosis: in metramorphosis one becoming is not left behind 
for the sake of the becoming of the other (Huhn 1993: 8; Ettinger 1992: 
200). In Ettinger’s vocabulary the becomings are “co-affective” (2011: 
13). Becoming is necessarily at least “double” (see Deleuze and Guattari 
1987) and I would suggest immediating.9
Immediation then is metramorphic and concerns constitutive and 
affective co-mediation rather than mediation between more discrete 
entities such as self and other. Moreover, what Deleuze and Guattari 
refer to as the “immediate productive unconscious” (and with it 
sociality) is no longer only determined by the signifier or “linguistic 
like laws” or structures but also by affective, metramorphic mapping 
processes (Ettinger 1992: 181).
If metramorphosis concerns simultaneous “differentiation” and 
“co-emergence” then it does not, like “the signifier of signifiers,” bring 
individuation into a purely linguistic and supposedly human social order 
of clear-cut divisions between self/other, subject/world and symbiosis/
differentiation (Ettinger 1992: 178). Metramorphosis is not only about 
direct relations between signifiers or a sliding from one to the other; 
nor is it reducible to the “realm of discursive meaning” (Pollock in 
Ettinger 1996a: 89).
Ettinger (1992) also proposes the notion of the “matrixial” as a feminine 
alternative/parallel to Lacan’s phallic signifier. Metramorphosis, 
including what Ettinger calls “metramorphic borderlinking” (1999: 
18-20), occurs within this “matrixial stratum of subjectivation” (2006: 
64). However, Ettinger writes that even though “we are living mostly in 
the sphere of co-emergence” we “are still conceiving the Unconscious 
as bounded by the contours of a subject’s body.” Yet the “matrixial 
unconscious” is neither individual nor collective nor inter-subjective 
(2009: 15). Rather, it is “trans-subjective” and “co-poietic.” It operates like 
a relational “web”, a creative “co-affective” force (Ettinger 2011: 12-13). 
What Ettinger calls a “matrixial unconscious” is therefore a productive, 
immediating unconscious. It is “wider than” relations between signifiers 
and includes the more “co-affective” sociality and “materiality” of the 
“Real” (Ettinger 1995b: 67; 1992: 196).
The “not-one-ness” of Ettinger’s conceptualizations implies then that 
the unconscious becomes a relation (1992: 178; 1999: 18). It concerns 
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differentiating co-affective encounter that is constitutive. Such a 
constitutive co-emergence, where “differentiation is primary,” usually 
has no place in a more Oedipal social world (Ettinger 1996b: 128). 
Ettinger wants to change this. She writes that “the matrixial stratum of 
subjectivization … proposes … a plural, partial, and shared unconscious” 
that has social “impact.” It has social impact “if,” that is, “we conceive of” 
relation in terms of “co-emerging I and non-I …[immediation] prior to” or I 
would suggest better still instead of “I versus others [mediation]” (1995a: 
22; see also 2006: 64).10
I have suggested that the metramorphic processes occurring in “the 
matrixial stratum of subjectivation” are immediating. Significantly, they 
are also “proto-ethical.” Ettinger (2009) explains that “[a] move toward a 
particular kind of ethicality is enabled by this affective zone.” However, 
the matrixial zone is “proto-ethical” only, because “it enables but doesn’t 
impose an awareness of borderlinking.” It is implied then that what we 
call immediation—like metramorphosis—has a proto-ethical linking 
quality that is enabling.
Immediating metramorphosis does not involve pre-social merger as 
a more Oedipal approach would have it (Ettinger 1992: 199). Rather, 
immediation—if thought together with Ettinger’s concepts—is 
differentiating. Like affect, it is immanently social.11 In fact, for Brian 
Massumi “affect is the ongoing immediation of the social” (2015b: 206). 
And a micropolitical approach must do its work at the level of this 
immanent polyphonic sociality.
Text as Social Space
In The Undercommons Stephano Harney and Fred Moten too are 
concerned with this polyphonic sociality. While neither using the term 
micropolitics nor explicitly engaging with the concept of the productive 
unconscious I would say that what Harney and Moten call study 
concerns ethico-political immediation that is co-constitutive.
In a conversation published recently, when talking about his own 
writing and reading practices, Fred Moten (Moten and Fitzgerald 2015) 
says that what he is drawn to involves “composing … in common—as 
an explicit social practice.” For Moten “composing… in common” does 
not necessarily involve “being in the same place at the same time” and 
this is key because there can be “a kind of presence shared in and as 
displacement.” Polyphonic “shared presence in displacement” can be 
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productive. It can be productive and enabling because it “cuts the way 
we attach certain kinds of events and certain kinds of advancement 
to the individual subject, to his name.” In a conversation with Harney, 
published in The Undercommons, Moten elaborates on this and again 
moves away from approaching a text in terms of sole authorship or 
in terms of intertextuality only. For Moten, a text is much more than 
intertext.12 Moten experiences it as a social space where there is a kind 
of meeting in displacement happening.
Recognizing that text is intertext is one thing. Seeing that a 
text is a social space is another. It’s a deeper way of looking 
at it. To say that it’s a social space is to say that stuff is 
going on: people, things, are meeting there and interacting, 
rubbing off one another, brushing against one another—and 
you enter into that social space, to try to be a part of it. So, 
what I guess I’m trying to say is that the terms are important 
insofar as they allow you, or invite you, or propel you, or 
require you, to enter into that social space. But once you 
enter into that social space, terms are just one part of it, 
and there’s other stuff too. There are things to do, places 
to go, and people to see in reading and writing—and it’s 
about maybe even trying to figure out some kind of ethically 
responsible way to be in that world with other things. 
(Moten in Harney and Moten 2013: 108).
So in reading, writing and study as in social life more generally there are 
ways of becoming-together and co-composing in difference, producing 
change along the way. In that sense “all … work” (even though it does 
not necessarily take place as a “real time” encounter) is an immediating 
collaboration often working beyond the conscious register (see Moten 
2015). This is the case too with Ettinger’s own “artworking” where 
reworked images—often photographs—call through time and invite 
us to enter into an immediating “encounter-event” with the artwork 
(Ettinger 2000; 2009: 3). Ettinger writes:
The art work, the final object, be it the photograph or the 
painting … continues to work through in themselves and 
through themselves, interconnected with us, they always 
continue to connect between themselves and with us and 
with other forces. (Ettinger in Horsefield 2007: 128)
346 Lone Bertelsen
However, too often the many variations of affective “becoming-
together” (“composing … in common—as an explicit social practice”) 
have been colonized, violated or capitalized upon, by an Oedipal 
unconscious, while at the same time often being denied social 
expression by the signifier of the One. With the “productive 
unconscious,” as with “the matrixial unconscious,” it is proposed that 
the Oedipal is not the only possible unconscious. The unconscious can 
be “defamiliarized.”
The Productive Unconscious and Schizoanalytic Cartographies
Guattari is also concerned with the production of new “polyphonic” 
subjectivities that have “not been imagined in advance” according to a 
pre-determined unconscious or an Oedipal family structure (Guattari in 
Ettinger 2002: 243; see also Holland 2012: 314-317). Guattari is not alone 
here. Donna Haraway also wants to reimagine and defamiliarize the 
unconscious. She writes:
I am sick to death of bonding through kinship and “the 
family,” and I long for models of solidarity and human 
unity and difference rooted in friendship, work, partially 
shared purposes, intractable collective pain, inescapable 
mortality, and persistent hope. It’s time to theorize an 
“unfamiliar unconscious,” a different primal scene, where 
everything does not stem from the dramas of identity and 
reproduction. (1997: 265)13
The issue, at least in part, is to resist the reproduction of problematic 
social norms upheld by an Oedipal unconscious based on the model 
of a white, heteronormative European family: a model supporting 
the individuation of a phallocratic and often racist (re)production of 
subjectivity (see Deleuze and Guattari 1983).
In this regard a schizoanalytic approach to the unconscious is not 
about “proper social adaptation” in accordance with “prevailing norms”; 
quite the opposite (Guattari 2009: 195). Tamsin Lorraine writes: 
“Schizoanalysis, rather than tracing all desire to the position of an 
oedipal triangle, wants to attain ‘the immediate productive unconscious’ 
that affects and is affected by the breaks and flows of the larger social 
field” (2002: 7). The unconscious does not have to be that of a “private” 
human subject—“individualized and Oedipal.” Indeed, Guattari calls 
the unconscious “ ‘machinic’ because it is not necessarily centered on 
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human subjectivity” (2009: 198 and 197). He writes that the unconscious 
is not “lodged at the core of every person … but open to social and 
economic interaction” as well as to the media, art, and the general 
chaos of the world. Neither is the unconscious universal. It produces 
itself and is produced differently in particular circumstances. “What 
matters” then “is not the existence of … polarized entities” within a 
“universal structure” of the unconscious but processes of “becomings” 
(Guattari 2009: 150 and 201; see also Clough 2000). Deleuze puts this 
well, writing that the productive “unconscious no longer deals with 
persons and objects, but with trajectories and becomings; it is no 
longer an unconscious of commemoration but one of mobilization, an 
unconscious whose objects take flight rather than remaining buried in 
the ground” (Deleuze in Clough 2000: 135-136).
With this focus on process and becoming we may think of the 
productive unconscious as operating in accordance with what Guattari 
has call a “logic of affects rather than a logic of ” the signifier, discourse 
or “delimited sets” only. A “logic of affects” is both “polyphonic” 
and “co-creative” (Guattari 1995: 9 and 1). If the unconscious too is 
polyphonic—involving co-creative encounter or attunement across 
and between emergent subjectivities—then it must be mapped in its 
productive diagrammatic affectivity. Thus the title of Guattari’s book 
Schizoanalytic Cartographies.
One of the most important aspects of this kind of unconscious is that it 
is not only a symptomatic unconscious, “mediated” by the analyst and 
open to interpretation but, via polyphonic encounter and co-creation, 
an affective and immediating unconscious productive of “social change” 
(Lorraine 2002: 4).
Guattari’s schizoanalytic cartographies are one attempt to engage 
with this immediating unconscious. Here, indeed, for Guattari the 
point is precisely to bring about change—a molecular revolution of the 
“social field” itself. This must involve the creation of “new analytic,” 
social and “aesthetic practices,” something he hopes to activate with 
his schizoanalytic cartographies. In all this Guattari focuses on the 
expressive and “collective assemblages of enunciation,” rather than 
on signification and the individual as such (Guattari 2012: 2). Peter Pál 
Pelbart stresses that for Guattari the unconscious is an actual “function 
of the[se] assemblages” (2013: 185-86). It is not a “structure.” These 
polyphonic assemblages are productive, mobile and creative and must, 
as I mentioned, be mapped in their productivity rather than interpreted 
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(Pelbart 2013: 184-86). Bruno Bosteels points out that for Guattari the 
focus is on this “mapping” not on the “interpretation of symptoms as a 
function of preexisting, latent content.” Again, this is because Guattari is 
interested in “the invention of new” collective assemblages of enunciation 
“capable of” changing “existence” (Guattari in Bosteels 1998: 155-
159).14 The unconscious here becomes productive and future directed. 
It is an unconscious that lends itself to an ethico-aesthic mapping “in 
action” (Guattari in Bosteels 1998: 159). Here, to cite Deleuze: “The map 
expresses the identity of the journey and what one journeys through. It 
merges with its object, when the object itself is movement” (1997: 61).15
Bosteels stresses that “schizoanalytic cartography” does not throw 
a masterful look at the past, to repression or to trauma (1998: 159). 
Instead schizoanalytic cartographies are concerned with “collective 
assemblages of enunciation.” As mentioned, this is a more productive 
approach. It involves a creative diagrammatic “mapping” of desire in the 
production of subjectivity. This mapping affects the “social field” itself 
and the “larger social field” affects it (Lorraine 2002: 7). In sum, rather 
than interpreting, schizoanalytic cartography thus concerns itself with 
“composing … in common—as an explicit social practice.” It maps and 
diagrams the unconscious in a performative, mobile manner that looks 
to the future in order to free “up … fields of virtuality” and potentiality 
(Guattari in Bosteels 1998: 159).
In all this Guattari moves from signification to the refrain because the 
refrain can hold “together partial components without abolishing their 
heterogeneity.” This is important because “[a]mong these components 
are lines of virtuality that are born of the event itself” (Guattari in 
Ettinger 2002: 244). The same can be said of any schizoanalytic 
cartography: new “lines of virtuality” may emerge from each 
cartographic mapping and this is precisely where a “new micropolitics” 
can do its work and enable actualization of more proto-ethical “lines of 
virtuality.”
Intimate Transactions
I would argue that the artwork Intimate Transactions is a schizoanalytic 
cartography “in action”—it is a work that “composes … in common—as 
an explicit social practice” (Moten 2015).16
Intimate Transactions is a “collaborative” and deeply ecological work: 
“it is a dual site networked installation,” created by the Transmute 
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Collective with Keith Armstrong as artistic director (Armstrong n.d; 2005 
and 2006: 12-24). Armstrong (2005) describes Intimate Transactions as 
collaborative, ecological and concerned with relation.17
Intimate Transactions involves the active participation of two human 
participants in “different locations” (two different gallery spaces, when 
I encountered the work). Two people in two different physical locations 
engage with linked “virtual worlds” on large screens (Armstrong n.d.; 
O’Neill 2006: 36-38). In order to navigate the work the two participants 
stand tilted slightly back on (what the artwork’s creators call) “identical 
Bodyshelves.” Lisa O’Neill writes that in order to engage with the work 
the participants move and “roll” their backs against these Bodyshelves. 
They also shift the weight of their bodies on the “mobile” platforms on 
which they stand. This “drives the navigation” (O’Neill 2006: 36).
The movement activates the worlds on the screens—the worlds of the 
non-human “creatures.” The movement on the Bodyshelf also activates 
the participants’ avatars and at times aspects of a joint “virtual world,” 
shared across the two screens in different locations (Armstrong 2006: 
27-30). However, the Bodyshelf does not only pick up and transfer the 
movements of the body on the shelf onto the avatars and creatures 
on the screen. The Bodyshelf also transmits vibrations, based on 
Figure 41, The Transmute Collective, Intimate Transactions, version 3 (2005-8), 
“Participant navigating on Mark III Body Aluminium Shelf, ACMI, Melbourne, 
Australia”. Image David McLeod. Courtesy of Keith Armstrong.
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engagement with the other person’s movements, onto the lower 
back of the body (Ednie-Brown and Mewburn 2006: 80-81). Finally, 
the shelf plays an active part in the “immersive sound-scape,” as the 
“motion in space generate[s] the feedback of the sound” (Webster 
2006: 60 and 67).
In addition to all this—and to me the most intimate quality of the 
work—a rubbery “garment,” with a pink border, is looped around the 
neck, like a “pendant” and strapped loosely to the abdomen (Ednie-
Brown and Mewburn 2006: 81). Inside this garment there is a “device” 
that transmits vibrations, based on the engagement with the creatures 
in the “screen-world[s],” onto the stomachs of the participants (Ednie-
Brown and Mewburn 2006: 81-82; Armstrong 2005; Birringer 2006: 109).
With the vibrations emerging from the “haptic devices” in the Bodyshelf, 
the “immersive sound-scape” and the vibrations felt on the stomach, 
it is not totally clear whose movement we experience (Hamilton and 
Lavery 2006: 7). The two human participants do not see one another 
until briefly at the very “end of the experience” (Armstrong 2005). Yet, 
over time, an intimate feeling of co-creation emerges between the 
Figure 42. The Transmute Collective, Intimate Transactions, version 3 (2005-
8), “Two Participants meet at the end of the 25 min. experience”. Photo Keith 
Armstrong. Courtesy of Keith Armstrong.
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human participants and the non-human creatures. As such Intimate 
Transactions is designed to operate “co-creatively” (Armstrong 2005). 
One experiences a sense of becoming-together and co-composing in 
difference, “as an explicit social practice.”
Pia Ednie-Brown and Inger Mewburn, the creators of the haptic 
components, write about how this co-composed world “vibrates with 
the texture of difference” and about how each participant literally “can 
feel the undeniable difference between us.” They write that through 
these vibrations “each player can feel the directional push of the 
other” person and the creatures as well—their movements vibrate on 
the bodies of the two participants and “the undeniable differences” 
between all creatures in the worlds of the work are “felt” (Ednie-Brown 
and Mewburn 2006: 81 and 87).18
There are different screen-worlds activated at different times in 
Intimate Transactions (Hamilton 2006: 116). At times, participants 
work in their local “screen-spaces,” inhabited by unusual non-human 
creatures and their milieu (Armstrong 2005). At other times, there is 
participation in a “shared virtual” world (Hamilton and Lavery 2006: 4). 
Armstrong (2005) emphasizes the importance of the various virtual 
screen environments. He explains that at one stage of the work it is 
possible for the human participants to work in their local environments 
and impoverish the world of the non-human creatures. The human 
participants can work individually and take away “objects from” the 
non-human creatures in order to “incorporate … these objects into 
their own avatars.” Clearly, Intimate Transactions here engages with 
issues related to over-“consumption” and colonization (Armstrong 
2006: 27). As Armstrong (2005) points out, it is possible not to “work 
collaboratively with the other person.” However, the less one does 
so, and the more one takes away from the world of the non-human 
creatures, the more impoverished the “immersive” world becomes. 
The entire work loses its “vitality” (O’Neill 2006: 41). Non-collaboration 
is thus not encouraged by the very design and operation of this work: 
co-composition is (Armstrong 2005; 2006 and Webster 2006: 66).
In order to re-“enrich” the gallery spaces and “restore” the virtual 
worlds, and to care for the non-human creatures as well as for each 
other and the relation itself, the avatars of the two human participants 
have to “meet” in the “shared-space” and work together in a trans-
subjective collaboration based on what Armstrong (2005) terms 
transversal, “networked and cross-affective processes.” In this shared 
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virtual space the two participants can meet and move together as one 
semi-joined avatar in order to “return” objects to the screen-worlds 
of the creatures and “restore” environments that may have suffered 
overconsumption. This restorative collaboration will re-enliven the entire 
ecology of the work (Armstrong 2006: 26-29; O’Neill 2006: 41).
So the more individualized enunciations of the supposed sovereign or 
narcissistic subject are deterritorialized by the very design of Intimate 
Transactions. The work encourages and enables the creation of new 
“collective assemblages of enunciation” where a polyphonic “becoming-
together precedes the being-one” (Ettinger 1995a: 30). Intimate 
Transactions does not attribute what happens in the more collaborative 
“transactivity” of the event to any individual subject (Birringer 2006: 
109). Causality and responsibility become “distributed,” emerging from 
a larger trans-subjective field. All this is felt through the vibrations on 
the body (Armstrong 2006; Hamilton 2006: 119 and Birringer 2006: 
108-109). Becoming-together, while co-composing in difference, begins to 
emerge as “an explicit social practice.”
Figure 43. The Transmute Collective, Intimate Transactions, version 3 (2005-8), 
“Intimate Transactions Shared body group”. Image Stuart Lawson. Courtesy of 
Keith Armstrong.
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In Intimate Transactions we do not really experience mediation 
between discrete bodies or entities but what has been termed 
affective immediation. Immediation works the “collective assemblages 
of enunciation” as these emerge in the shared virtual world of the 
installation. It diagrams the entire polyphonic ensemble across the 
sensual and perceptual register of the moving bodies (human and non-
human). The collective assemblages are felt and they participate in the 
creation of new trans-subjective individuations that care for the entire 
ecology of the work. This care may well attune with other situations 
after the two participants leave the gallery spaces.
In terms of issues related to sustainability, overconsumption and 
colonization, Intimate Transactions then does not attempt to mediate 
a clearly formulated political message. Rather, Intimate Transactions is 
immediating—the artwork operates at a micropolitical level and works 
the “collective assemblages of enunciation” as these come into being. 
It diagrams them to change the desire of “the social field” itself. I would 
say that Intimate Transactions is a schizoanalytic mapping “in action” 
where new proto-ethical “lines of virtuality” emerge that are born of the 
“encounter-event” itself.
In Intimate Transactions the cartographic mappings encourage 
actualization of habits and techniques that are more amenable to the 
gentleness necessary to collaborative “becoming-together.” I have 
suggested that out of these cartographic actualizations new “lines 
of virtuality” may emerge that can support future individuation of 
an ethico-political care. These “lines of virtuality” operate at a more 
unconscious level of experience. As proposed in this chapter, the 
productivity of this kind of unconscious—a productive unconscious that 
in Intimate Transactions also becomes an ecological unconscious—is not 
a matter of representation or interpretation. Rather what is involved is 
an immediate and, in the case of Intimate Transactions, a micropolitical 
productivity in which the new “lines of virtuality” produced can 
participate in immediating new polyphonic practices. These practices 
would themselves be productive of resistance and change.
Notes
1. According to Alanna Thain (2005) “the original concept of immediation is 
meant to flesh out a non-phenomenological understanding of the body 
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in cinema.” This “entails a critique of the understanding of film as simply a 
second nature or a mediated version of reality”. See also Brunner (2012) and 
Brunner, Manning and Massumi in Massumi (Immediation I, 275-293).
2. Guattari calls for us to readjust. He writes that “[o]nly a profound transfor-
mation of social relations at every level … a ‘molecular revolution’ correlative 
to analytic practices and new micropolitics, will enable such a readjustment” 
(2009: 203).
3. It concerns “relational difference in co-emergence” (Ettinger 1995a: 30).
4. See Massumi (2002) for a more detailed conceptualization of this under-
standing of relationality.
5. Ettinger explains that for Lacan “[s]ubjectivity is discovered in the relation-
ship between self and the signifiers of language, between the subject and 
the discourse of the Other which is an unconscious tissue of chains of dis-
course. By the signifier, every message is connected to an unconscious code 
that is included in the Other” (1992: 184).
6. Ettinger is in part drawing on the later work of Lacan here. See Ettinger 
(1992: 191 and 204) for a discussion of how Freud and Lacan differ in regard 
to the power of visual images in relation to the unconscious.
7. Ettinger writes that the “matrixial Other is not a total Other” (1999: 21).
8. Ettinger considers metramorphosis “a conductive between-link” (1995b: 74).
9. Ettinger (2011: 7) explains that “[i]n the matrixial borderspace … transsub-
jectivity” is “never global, never form[s] a collective unconscious, but … [is] 
…limited each time to a few who participate in an encounter-event: to the 
several. A move toward a particular kind of ethicality is enabled by this af-
fective zone which in itself is only proto-ethical, since it enables but doesn’t 
impose an awareness of borderlinking; recognizing this is a choice, an op-
tion, an offer, a gift. A possibility for resistance is offered to the subject by … 
a tending-toward and a response that are not reactional even though they 
are responsive”.
10. Massumi (2015b: 205) writes that affect “is pure sociality.”
11. Moten is talking about Frantz Fanon’s writing here.
12. See also Haraway (2013: 123-126).
13. Bosteels (1998) gives an extensive account of Guattari’s conceptualization of 
the unconscious and schizoanalytic cartography.
14. Also cited by Bosteels (1998: 167). According to Deleuze this implies that 
“[t]he trajectory merges not only with the subjectivity of those who travel 
through a milieu, but also with the subjectivity of the milieu itself” (1998: 61).
15. Note that sections of my more descriptive account of Intimate Transactions 
here have been published previously in The Fibreculture Journal as a small 
part of a much longer article titled “Affect and Care in Intimate Transactions” 
(see Bertelsen, 2012).
The Productive Unconscious, Immediation and a New Micropolitics 355
16. The other members of the Transmute Collective are Lisa O’Neill and Guy 
Webster. See the full list of collaborators here: http://embodiedmedia.com/
homeartworks/intimate-transactions
17. See also O’Neill (2006: 41-42) and Webster (2006: 66).
Nicole de Brabandere
Edging Semblance
Proposition: freeze a gradation in the instant of photographic capture, 
align the position of image fragments on the surface of the composition 
so that edge and image mutually inform. The intense tension between 
image and edge co-compose as image fragments accumulate and cover 
the entire surface of each composition. The shape of the images or 
the contour of their edges, either aligns with or juxtaposes the virtual 
vectors of the image gradations, making felt differential elasticities, 
speeds and frictions—edge moves image into position, and vice-versa. 
The tension between surface and image, form and edge resonates 
with the referential, igniting a diversity of remembered pasts in the 
present. Liquid seeps fastest along the edge of the image of differential 
absorption through a sponge; the image of a stretched balloon gently 
pulls the ground of the image that frames it, settling uneven tensions 
onto the surface of composition; the round edges of the image of a 
pulling pant seam compel the accumulating composition to pivot over 
itself, further pulling the fabric into bunching pleats; the torn edge of 
tape grips at the image of its own contrast, slowing the fast dissolve 
of the roll of tape as it slips out of highlight. These intense relations of 
virtual dynamism set the pace for stirring form, image and edge into 
topographical excesses that resonate with the choreographic—the 
relation between ground and surface, form and edge activates time 
in varying mixes of tendencies to movement and their anticipation. In 
turn, the resulting compositions do not contain the intensities that give 
force to their divergent forms. As the emergent form of the composition 
folds diverse inhabited pasts into precise relations in the present, 
these emergent relations continue to inform how one inhabits diverse 
technical ecologies after the fact. The dynamics of movement coming 
into form, and vice-versa, further differentiate as words feel for the 
contrasts, intensities and transversal movements of attention with and 
through the compositions:
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The image of a partially wet sponge is composed into a topography that 
seems to seep variable wetness between the sharp edges of cropped 
photographs and the volume of sponge. The image of flattened foam 
cuts the movement of directional grain onto the visible surface while 
threatening to draw the water that settles on the bottom-facing side 
of the sponge image into it. The tonal gradation that goes from dry 
minty foam to soft, waterlogged green is fixed into form but comes 
into tension with image orientations that invert, mirror and reverse the 
flow. As the sharp, cropped edges of individual images align into flush 
geometries on the image surface they also seem to press deep into 
seeping absorption, drawing differential wetness to the surface.
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Black duct tape still stuck to the roll is photographed, in incremental 
instances as it rolls towards and away from the single-sided light source. 
The variable illuminations of the tape roll surface are cropped into 
strips, objectifying the light that burnishes its surface in a gradation, 
somewhere between grey scale and litmus test. The strips are 
assembled diagonally, and cover the entire surface of the composition. 
The broken tape seems to catch the light, setting the subtle difference 
between each strip into relief, where they otherwise align in seamless 
parallel over the surface, and where the tips without reflection blur 
into a homogenous consistency. The rolling rolls of tape pull out of 
indifference in the snagging light, between the crispness of a tear and 
the rounding surface of the roll that smears streaks between highlight 
and shadow. Now the photographic instant returns focus to the cresting 
a glint on broken ends of tape before again peeling away into the 
recomposing depths of edgeless, blackening sight.
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The pivotal nexus of a pant seem, rippling at the edges from the tension 
of being worn on legs stretched to step back in pivot, are cut into the 
shape of a round disk. The image sample is copied repeatedly so that 
it fills the space of the composition with a dance of layering, turning 
and pivoting circles. The pulling surface of the pants seem to pull 
the composition into form in a spiraling movement inwards, as if the 
wearer were dancing a series of turns on an image surface that doubled 
as a slick ballroom floor. The composition turns a corporeal that is 
anchored in pivot, in the sequenced pull of fabric flexing, twisting the 
surface into form.
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Empty orange balloon skins stretch out and hold still, over a stiff 
white ground, for the instant of photographic capture. Each image 
is a cropped strip that borders the length of the gently thinning and 
widening orange contour, while severing the ends. The surface of the 
collage copies and pivots the strips over top of each other, holding them 
in multi-directional tension. The white photographic borders of the 
strips blend into the white ground of the blank white canvas, but reveal 
starkly visible edges at the site of overlap, where they seem to press the 
image tightly into place. At the same time, the layered images also seem 
to pull outwards from the elastic ends, suspending time between the 
permanence of the composition and the anticipation of quick release. 
The persistent oscillation between tensions on the surface holds the 
image in an endless snap.
Erin Manning
Experimenting Immediation: Collaboration 
and the Politics of Fabulation
A Laboratory for Thought in Motion
When I proposed SenseLab in 2003, my hope was to create an 
environment that would learn, over time, how to create conditions for 
new forms of collaboration across art, philosophy and the political. This 
laboratory for thought in motion was a speculative proposition that 
required collective engagement, and so a first call was sent in 2004. 
This call included a question that remains at the heart of our collective 
practice: what kinds of events can we craft that are capable of creating 
a living ecology that values forms of engagement that trouble the 
mode of self-presentation of the conference and the art exhibition, the 
two major ways in which we are taught to share our work? Instead of 
foregrounding finished work, could we instead come together with the 
techniques that move our process, collaborate at this incipient stage 
rather than at the phase where form is already revealing itself? In this 
middling of the process, what kinds of conditions could be invented that 
would facilitate a shifting back and forth between our individual work 
and a collective field of making-thinking that didn’t know in advance 
where it could lead? What kinds of collective practices could be created 
that were moved not by the institution, not by membership in an 
organization, but by an appetite for the anarchic share of the event’s 
coming to form? How could this anarchic share be oriented toward an 
affirmative politics moved not by optimism (or pessimism) but by the 
schizz that reorients process?
SenseLab was never conceived as a site, though it has found 
landings over the years, first in other peoples’ labs1 and eventually 
at Concordia University in Montreal. In 2012, it began to proliferate, 
finding temporary sites in Australia, in Europe, In Brazil and in the 
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US, temporary because the hope is that SenseLab never really learns 
how to site. To know too well how to site is to become an institution. 
SenseLab’s nightmare is to know itself too well.
But anything that persists over time risks eventually narrating itself, 
and SenseLab is no exception. How to keep open and lively the process 
of subtracting SenseLab from its own singular specificity, its ways of 
knowing “itself”? There have been many configurations and populations 
over the years, and each of them has defined SenseLab in ways 
that make a global narration of intelligibility impossible. And so the 
attempt here to bring SenseLab into narration must always be seen as 
carrying with it a certain ineffability of expression. Throughout these 
uneasy narrations, SenseLab must be seen less as a form than as the 
conceptual persona it orients, a conceptual persona that carries living 
problems, not their solutions. For conceptual personae carry not the 
truth of the narration, but its power of the false.2
The danger of any narration is that it mythologizes, that it builds 
institutions to hold narratives in place. What I propose here, in 
the name of experimenting immediation, is an account that I hope 
demythologizes as quickly as it enters into a shape, an account oriented 
not by a subject-participant so much as by an emergent collectivity 
always reinventing the stakes that bring it into uneasy encounter. 
For SenseLab is about more-than human comings-together, more-
than human in the sense that what comes into formation as event is 
an ecology of practices, more-than human in the sense that what is 
planned is not set in advance of the event’s coming to be, but, as Moten 
and Harney might say, “fugitively planned,” the welling event’s own 
emergent organization playing a key role in what ensues.
This emphasis on the more-than human, on the capacity for the event 
to activate a quality of participation that doesn’t rely solely on the 
human, became increasingly important as SenseLab grew and became 
more literate. The more we told our story, the more it became clear that 
we were in danger of creating a collective that could only know itself 
from the inside. To know oneself from the inside is to believe that the 
constitution of the event is directly linked to the people who are visible 
in its formation. But events are not like this: they are troubled and 
energized by affective tonalities that infiltrate their bounds, oriented 
by the push and pull of ecologies brought simultaneously into being. 
And so we started inventing techniques to make felt the proliferation 
of tendencies and consistencies that make up events, working hard to 
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become attuned to forms of participation that complicate both notions 
of individual subjectivity and of human-centric organization. Moving, 
for instance, from the forest to the city in the 2012 event Generating the 
Impossible3 was an attempt to feel the effects of how an environmental 
surrounds also composes and participates in the process of making-
thinking. How, we wondered, would what began to take form in the 
forest come to expression in the city? What kinds of schisms would 
emerge in the transversality of transduction? Conceiving transduction – 
a shift that creates a new process – as key to an affirmative politics that 
sites in the doing, it became urgent to consider how events themselves 
craft bodies, how they create emergent bodyings that are composed of 
and compose with the ecologies that move through them.
The focus on the more-than human was also geared toward challenging 
the category of the personal. When the personal organizes experience, 
two main tendencies emerge. First, there is an infiltration of identity 
politics which tend to amplify not what the emergent collectivity can do, 
but what personal stakes are understood to be present even before the 
project takes form. While these personal stakes no doubt make some 
kind of contribution in the event, SenseLab’s approach is to initially 
background them in favour of allowing the event itself to foreground 
how it mobilizes political, aesthetic and philosophical problems. The 
second tendency of the personal is toward the creation of what is too 
often a normative psychologization that privileges individual narratives. 
SenseLab turns instead to a schizoanalytic approach which focuses on 
the group-subject, the agglomeration of collective forces in the event. 
With attention to how group-subjects both come into formation and 
express their collectivity, we work from the perspective of what an 
emergent constellation can do rather than what individual participants 
owe the event and are owed by it. Our main point of emphasis is that 
SenseLab is a project that exceeds any individual participant: the 
project should always be more-than the sum of its parts. This is no easy 
task: the uncertainty of emergent collectivity, where the production of 
subjectivity is understood as immanent to the event, inevitably breeds 
anxiety and anxiety tends to solidify personal stakes. How to escape 
from the positioning of the personal before it takes hold?
The Free Radical
The concept of the free radical was brought into the mix in 2012 to 
begin to address this question of how to work collectively with a focus 
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on emergent collectivity and the production of subjectivity. The free 
radical came in through the event discussed above, Generating the 
Impossible, an event whose focus was on affective attunement and 
altereconomies of exchange.4 The free radical, as we envisaged it, would 
infiltrate the event’s interstices, keeping the event from hardening 
around positions. Operating transversally to the practices of making-
thinking orienting the event, the free radical would punctually unglue 
any position-taking. It would do the work of a trickster around the 
inevitable personalization, creating opportunities for the event to find 
new orientations capable of diffusing the kind of stabilization that 
breeds eventual institutionalization. The hope was that the free radical, 
despite (and because of) its deeply unsettling tendencies, would make 
it possible to create a culture of affirmation that didn’t fall prey to a 
desire to settle the event into a culture of consensus, or its by-product, 
critique. Working from the perspective of the anarchic, thinking 
anarchy both in terms the anarchic share of the event (those merest 
of existences that seed future processes without necessarily taking 
form as such), and from the perspective that an event always exceeds 
the bounds of prescribed spacetimes of organization, a concept was 
needed to orient transversally, bringing to the anarchic the force of an 
affirmative politics. The concept of the free radical allowed us to bring 
an intercessor5 into the mix who would assist us in making felt how 
the anarchic schizzed through the event. While we did have a person 
in mind for this first exploration of the free radical, the concept was 
also conceived in a broader way. Affinity groups that might be capable 
of both incorporating and sustaining the force of free-radicality were 
composed in advance of our coming together, and platforms for relation 
for seeding affective attunement to the event were proposed. With the 
free radical as concept, proposition, and intercessor, the question was: 
what does the creative dissonance of the anarchic share of experience 
in the making do for the event as it unfolds? How does a resonant 
field of experience that includes the merest of existences affect 
attunement to the event? What might attention become, under these 
circumstances? With the benefit of hindsight, I would say that these 
were early steps toward developing techniques for what we have come 
to call minor gestures, those emergent forces of variation that shift how 
an event comes to pass.
The free radical cuts across the event to open it to where else it could 
go. Always operative, the free radical jumps into fissures, activating 
their potential to create new directionalities that alter what an event can 
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do. Affirmative and joyful, the figure of the free radical is nonetheless 
uneasy-making in its anarchic tendencies. For its technique is to open 
things up, to explode them. With this come closures as new paths are 
taken up: there is much reorienting to do when the ground shifts. The 
free radical has no care for sites that claim their ground.
SenseLab has never had membership. Membership would make the 
free radical a member, which would, of course, destroy its potential for 
intercession. The free radical must be able to become every member, 
and every tendency in the event must free radicalize itself.
The issue of membership nonetheless rears its head. Despite there 
being no actual membership, it is inevitable that certain cultures 
take hold and, over time, embody a history of what it can mean to 
be involved at SenseLab, which can lead to feelings of exclusion for 
newcomers. Uncertainty can be powerful, especially in the context of 
the kind of practice that is built with an emphasis on not-knowing-in-
advance. Tensions can emerge. But with the intercession also comes 
great enthusiasm and joy: there is nothing like the clearing of the air 
that can come from a step sideways. We make this part of our practice: 
what makes an event-based orientation powerful is precisely what cuts 
across it. All newcomers bring with them a quality of intercession. The 
culture of SenseLab actively works to collaborate with the transversality 
this engenders.
This raises an interesting issue: how to work between the activation 
of what enters from elsewhere and the inheritances that come from 
working together over time? There is no question that the force of 
inheritance makes a difference: a practice that takes techniques 
seriously and works with the enabling constraints of a structured 
improvisation over years inevitably develops orientations that are 
singular. SenseLab in no way supports an ethos of “anything goes.” This 
is the case for material intervention as much as for concept invention. 
We commit to what we learn together and we stay with the learning 
for extended periods to experiment with where it can take us. There 
are practices that underlie this commitment to the thickness of an 
evolving process. For instance, it is our practice to read closely from 
philosophical texts. Reading groups are structured to prevent debate. 
What is important is how the text does its work: we read out loud and 
stick to the propositions operative in the materiality of expression of 
the text at hand. This approach allows all newcomers to feel included, 
whether or not they have any philosophical background. The same 
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is true for movement experimentation and material exploration. 
Our investment in a politics of affirmation does not mean having no 
constraints. It means working-with, sitting-with the singular ways in 
which materials unfold and activate nodes of process. The first thing 
that would undo this would be a culture of critique and competition.6 
And so we work to avoid any tendency to move in that direction, 
including any attempt to engage with general ideas. We are aware 
that the culture of academia loves general ideas, and we resist this 
tendency to speak in ways that generalize experience: what interests 
us is always a commitment to how. How does the thinking do its work, 
here, now? How do the materials activate a transversality? How does 
the movement shift the conditions of the bodying?
That said, there is no question that leaving the space of intercession 
open is vital: very often events have been reoriented by new arrivals 
precisely because these newcomers are not informed by the history 
of our ongoing practice. And so, over the past fifteen years, we have 
worked to hone an event-based practice of welcoming difference that 
carries the consistency of an ethos. It is not our practice to discuss “our” 
way. What we do instead is try to hone a mode of listening to the event 
as it unfolds. The hope is always that the newcomer can feel the stakes 
at hand and can participate in them directly. It is beautiful to watch how 
often this happens, how often a newcomer arrives in the middling to 
reorient what came before in ways desperately needed. Almost every 
day there is an intercession, every intercession shifts the conditions 
of what we call SenseLab. It would therefore be fair to say that the 
intercession of the sideways entry is as much part of the inheritance of 
SenseLab as the years of experimentation redirected by the inflexion 
the newcomer proposes.
No decision-making bodies external to the process exist at SenseLab. 
We have no governing body, no committee for overseeing activities. 
This developed organically from a desire to work from within the event’s 
own conditionings. What has resulted is a politics of immediation, 
which, by extension is always also a politics of affirmation.7 Affirmation 
is understood here in the Nietzschean sense: active, not reactive. 
Affirmation is not consensus, that most flattening of practices, but 
nor is it anything goes. In an always shifting register of emergent 
collectivity, SenseLab moves where the experiment takes it, casting 
propositions aside without looking back if they don’t do their work. We 
practice saying “yes” but seek not to attend to personal stakes above 
what the event can do. Of course “this is how we do things” is still heard: 
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difference is not necessarily easy to attune to, especially in moments of 
stress. It is a radical proposition to remain open to new tendencies all 
the time. Free radicalization inevitably gets watered down by the fear of 
losing our footing. And yet we persist because we know that the desire 
for continuity, for the recognition of the past in the present, is a real 
danger as regards the ability to remain attuned to the differential at the 
heart of event-based propositions.
This is a challenge all political formations face. How to keep the edges 
open to the elements in ways that enliven those in the midst without 
creating such a strong tempest of uncertainty that collaborators drift 
away or collapse? How to build into the sociality that emerges over time 
enough porousness that it remains open to the fray? For it is only in the 
fray that new weaves become visible.
SenseLab lives with all of these contradictions. We often contend 
with failure. The transitions are messy. Growing pains are deep and 
often agonizing.
Immediation
Our current event series is called Immediations. With the force of the 
free radical active as intercessor, and close attention paid to the way 
the minor gesture affects event-ecologies, this series8 asks how else the 
event can tell its story? What kinds of knowledges are alive in the event 
and how are they passed on? How can we move beyond mediation, or 
reporting, in the passage from force to form? How can we compose 
collectively, working both with past and emergent techniques, without 
holding fast to the security of habits, material or conceptual? How 
do we differentiate between the close encounter with materials and 
concepts, that encounter that allows us, over time, to become even 
more attuned to their potential, and the fear of trying something 
different? While finding ways to narrate experience, how do we refrain 
from mythologizing it? How can the immediacy of the event cut through 
the certainty of a certain belonging-together, a return to the figure of 
the individual? How can the anarchic share of an emergent collectivity 
based on appetite make itself felt without falling into the kinds of social 
camps facilitated by practices of inclusion and exclusion?
Immediation is a technique more than it is a descriptor. It is what 
moves the event into another register. A politics of fabulation invariably 
accompanies it. Fabulation is altogether different from a practice of 
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mythologization: it is that tendency in the telling that resists organizing 
the event into the kind of consumable bite-sized description that would 
narrate it as a linear arc. This kind of telling:
free[s] [fiction] from the model of truth which penetrates 
it, and […] rediscover[s] the pure and simple function of 
fabulation […]. What is opposed to fiction is not the real; 
it is not the truth which is always that of the masters 
or colonizers; it is the fabulatory function of the poor, 
in so far as it gives the false the power which makes it 
into a memory, a legend, a monster (Deleuze 1989: 150, 
translation modified).9
Inheritor of oral practices of story-telling, fabulation is how the 
trickster speaks. As the voice of the free radical, fabulation attunes 
to the difference between those kinds of narratives that hold the 
event hostage and those that breed openings. It’s not that these more 
normative narratives don’t enter the world: they do. Our task is to 
craft the conditions for events that resist this kind of telling, opting 
instead for a fabulation that undermines the very question of an event’s 
localization in a single place, toward predictable ends, activating not 
the truth of a myth framed by individual accounts, but its power of the 
false, the power of the event to claim its falsification from itself. With 
the power of the false, time begins to err, undermining the imposition of 
continuity. Time as metric is disrupted, but not just that: time folds.
The free radical activates the power of the false in the event. Acting 
as intercessor, it cuts into what is moving the event and opens that 
movement to uneasy rhythms. These rhythms are uneasy because 
their paths are not yet drawn, and because these paths are both 
synchronous and dissonant, more multiplicity of cut than site. The free 
radical pushes against them to feel where else they can lead.
What the free radical can do is make appear a minor tendency in the 
event and move that tendency into a becoming-gesture that shape-
shifts the tonality of the event. The free radical does this by activating 
a schizz in the event. This schizoanalytic gesture involves setting the 
event’s myth-making orientations in direct confrontation with their 
power of the false, making felt the story’s own unmaking of itself. With 
the power of the false a sense of what else enters the event, allowing the 
contours of a still-transitioning to be felt. The challenge is to not try to 
make this passage, this transition intelligible. Its force is precisely that 
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it cannot be organized into an all-encompassing narrative. The work: to 
create the conditions for enough elasticity in the event for the story to 
emerge again differently, told not only in words but also in the language 
of the ineffable. “Language […] is always ambiguous as to the exact 
proposition which it indicates. Spoken language is merely a series of 
squeaks” (Whitehead 1978: 264).
Fabulation tells in a way that moves with time’s unweaving. Sensitive 
to the squeaks of language, to language at the edge of comprehension, 
fabulation is moved less by the necessity to explain than by the 
realization, always come to anew, that telling is a form of liveness 
completely connected to the event’s own emergence. Fabulation’s 
telling cannot be separated out from how the narration shifts the 
terms of the event. Stories become intensive magnitudes rather 
than extensive place-holders. They tell at the limit of what can be 
known, their work a falsifying of what constitutes the knowable. This 
falsification is not of the order of a simple untruth: the power of the 
false is about another kind of truth altogether, a truth of the event in 
its inevitable permutation. Fabulation speaks in the mouths of the 
many, its utterance collective. “An act of fabulation which would not 
be a return to myth but a production of collective utterances capable 
of raising misery to a strange positivity, the invention of a people” 
(Deleuze 1989: 222).
The push to experimentation in the event can be textured by fabulation, 
orienting the event in novel ways. When this happens, fabulation acts 
as point of inflection, making felt the kind of vertigo that emerges of 
necessity when perspectives are transversalized and time-signatures 
that hold accounts in place begin to blur. Fabulation tells into this 
blurring, pushing futurity into presentness in ways that allow time to 
become dechronologized. Mediation is not what is at stake here: the 
task of the mediator is precisely to keep the horizon line. Fabulation 
does the opposite: it mobilizes the not-yet already alive in the interstices 
and makes it reverberate. It catches free radicals at work, activating 
a worlding that keeps the event uncertain as to where its points of 
reference lie. It articulates a doing in the thinking that makes felt how 
the telling falsifies time’s linearity.
The power of the false, the capacity for fabulation to challenge what 
a personalized accounting might want to invent as the event’s truth, 
is deeply unsettling. Much easier would be to formalize a frame for 
the event in the name of some kind of truth. Or to create myths that 
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solidify it from the inside. But both of these tendencies undermine 
the very practice of what an event can do and what a more-than 
human approach can catalyze. Much more difficult, but also richer, is 
to engage directly in the event’s interstices, in those schizzes where 
desynchronized truths are crafted for the uneasy telling. “Fabulation is 
not an impersonal myth, but neither is it a personal fiction: it is a word 
in act, a speech-act through which the character never ceases to cross 
the boundary which would separate his private business from politics, 
and which itself produces collective utterances” (Deleuze 1989: 222, 
translation modified).
To not cease to cross involves a punctuality. The event never ceases to 
create a limit through which a certain telling takes place that produces 
a collectivity of utterance. That is to say: the event invariably narrates 
itself. The event tells itself in the ways in which it composes with the 
ecologies of practices that are its emergent surrounds. It tells itself 
in its reorienting by the free radical. It tells itself in the ways in which 
it transitions and cuts. For the event transitions more than it places, 
passaging experience. In this passaging, a “people” is invented, Deleuze 
suggests, a worlding that is more-than the humans who also compose 
it. With fabulation, this worlding opens itself each time anew to the 
passaging. This is where the event, as Whitehead might say, most feels 
the concern for its unfolding.10 This is where it emergently attunes to 
worlds of its making. Fabulation makes felt this worlding, this ecology, 
which will always, by necessity, exceed its capacity to be told. This 
telling, at the heart of all events, is a punctual limit, altered at every turn 
by what the event immediates.
Tigeresque
In November 2014, a SenseLab gathering was organized in Australia. It 
was composed of two propositions, one held north of Melbourne in the 
rural town of Avoca, the other held in Sydney. The first proposition was 
made in conjunction with Lyndal Jones’s Avoca Project.11
The Avoca Project (2005-2016) worked across a community, a house 
(Watford House), and the question of sustainability as oriented by how 
an artful approach can alter the conditions of everyday living. How, 
Jones wondered, might the house become an image of potential and 
resilience, and how would such an approach have effects that might 
leak into the community?12
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SenseLab arrived toward the end of this process, a decade into Watford 
House’s transformation. The proposition for the SenseLab-Avoca 
encounter was to see how SenseLab’s approach to creating conditions 
for more-than human forms of collaboration might compose with the 
Avoca Project. By then the final phase of the Avoca Project had begun: a 
Chinese garden in the old sheep yards next to the house had recently 
been landscaped. Described by Jones as a project that “draws attention 
to the lack of public gardens in Avoca [...] and acknowledges the 
important Chinese contribution to the town from the 1850s, when many 
thousands settled in the area after the gold rush,” the garden, entitled 
“Garden of Fire and Water,” punctuated a decade-long inquiry into 
sustainability by designing directly with the underground flows of water. 
This self-sustaining garden underscored “that to live-with is an ethos 
that requires attending to the existing sites of potential,” signing the 
Avoca Project with a final act that would continue to make sustainability 
in the region felt, even without direct human intervention.13
The garden is exquisite. It overlooks the flood plain and 
the Avoca river, foregrounding the role water plays in 
this arid town.
The central water element has been created as a wetland 
that cleans and uses the stormwater from the main street. 
Plants were selected that directly reference China and 
thrive in this climate, framed within indigenous and native 
plantings to situate the garden firmly into this landscape of 
River Red Gums.14
SenseLab’s arrival coincided with the launch of the garden. The only 
directions we received in advance of our arrival was that we were to 
bring formal wear: there would be a cocktail party for the garden. In 
true SenseLab form, we saw ourselves as guests of the garden. In our 
months-long preparation for the SenseLab-Avoca encounter we spoke 
often about how best to fulfill our role as guest of honour for the 
gardens: it was the surrounds we most fabulated about.
No other plans had been set: the question of the event itself was the 
operative problem. Could SenseLab encounter the Avoca Project such 
that an event might take place? And if so, would the event be capable 
of bringing into focus an emergent proposition that could enliven what 
was already moving at Avoca? Could SenseLab bring the force of a lure 
that might activate the anarchic share in the transversality of the two 
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projects? And if so, what kind of proposition might be made that both 
included us and exceeded us?
To approach the question of event-creation rigorously involves a long 
preparation. This preparation is not about planning content in advance, 
as though the activity could be focalized through a pre-set frame. That 
would be to disregard the force of the event’s own capacity to orient 
experience. What is needed instead is a procedure allied to what Moten 
and Harney call “fugitive planning,” an orientation toward the conditions 
that seed process that remains sensitive to the emergent quality of the 
event’s own forces of organization.
In the undercommons [...] the means, which is to say the 
planners, are still part of the plan. And the plan is to invent 
the means in a common experiment launched from any 
kitchen, any back porch, any basement, any hall, any park 
bench, any improvised party, every night. [...] [P]lanning in 
the undercommons is not an activity, not fishing or dancing 
or teaching or loving, but the ceaseless experiment with 
the futurial presence of the forms of life that make such 
activities possible (2013: 74-75).
At the SenseLab, a technique for approaching this kind of fugitive 
planning involves experimenting with what we call “enabling 
constraints.” For a year preceding any event, we work to test out the 
malleability of constraints, exploring to what degree they close down or 
open up a process. Enabling constraints proposed for a gathering such 
as that in Australia might include ways of entering into the unknown 
territory of new vegetation, which might involve research on local flora 
and fauna, animal and insect life; research on ecologies of practice, 
on concepts such as the more-than human or the nonhuman; on local 
environmental practices. Or it might involve exploring experimental 
movement to see how different qualities of bodying best respond to 
emergent propositions. Or it might involve material experimentation 
that creates approximations of proximity in relation to other artistic 
practices. To keep this at the level of the fugitive, and to work with 
the force of the propositional rather than with the framing of the 
organizational, our year-long work is more a guide than a setting-into-
place. For what we know of the event is that it modulates on the run, 
and with this incipient movement, enabling constraints invariably 
have to be modulated. Fugitive planning is about creating a flexibility 
of thought and action which is robust enough to be realigned on the 
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fly. It’s never enough to import an enabling constraint from one event 
to another: the preparation is an investment in honing techniques to 
create a sensitivity that will come in handy when faced with the singular 
conditions that enable or disable the event.
Despite rigorous exploration in advance of landing, however, nothing 
had prepared us for the uneasy way the Avoca Project disoriented us. It 
turned out that the cocktail party was for the locals, not for the garden 
(also for the garden, just not in the sense we’d fabulated). And the 
house strangely seemed to know where it stood (our fabulation has 
assumed it was less steady on its foundations). The jetlag didn’t help. 
Here we were, 35 of us from several continents, faced with a project 
difficult to encounter well in such a short period. Paradoxes loomed: 
there was a sense, conceptually at least, that Watford House welcomed 
an intercession toward new ways of thinking sustainability. But there 
was also a sense that we had arrived too late – that this particular arc 
of Watford House and the Avoca Project had run its cycle, including the 
garden, which was now ready to be presented. Another arc was on its 
way, but here we were, at the interstice, unsure how to compose with 
what we entered into.
SenseLab didn’t want to be a visitor to a project already framed nor did 
the Avoca Project simply want to host us. The problem was that neither 
of us yet had techniques to creatively compose with the ineffability 
of the emerging arc. What SenseLab thought would be enabling 
constraints turned out to be disabling. We wandered around, at a 
loss. Part of the problem was that things were more set than we had 
imagined – the house was beautifully appointed, much more “house” 
than “experiment,” the surrounds were well maintained, and the 
project itself was well-established in relation to a town that had now 
been interacting with the work for a decade. Everything was gorgeous, 
including the work the Avoca Project had been able to do with issues of 
sustainability and community. The problem was not the Avoca Project 
itself. The issue was one of composition – how to create an emergent 
collectivity where cracks are not easily felt, where the collaboration 
does not seem urgently needed, or needed at all. Despite our not 
wanting the position, we felt like visitors, tourists. As mentioned above, 
this was Jones’s nightmare: more than once she told us that she didn’t 
want us to see Watford House as a bed and breakfast. She wanted us 
to be free in our approach to it, she wanted us to invent with it. But it 
was a house that had well-established needs and habits. Jones knew 
its functioning better than we did, and she knew the environment in 
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ways that tired Canadians, Brazilians and Europeans couldn’t possibly 
know. And so despite best intentions, the encounter began with frames, 
and with rules. The rules made sense, and were necessary, given the 
complex water systems of an arid location, but to begin with rules 
always sets in place a certain passive-active hierarchy. Passivity, once 
settled into the weave of a gathering, is hard to overcome, dampening 
the force of the kind of potential necessary for the emergence of a 
collectivity created in the event.
An impasse could be felt. A certain waiting took hold. Would we be 
able to move beyond being visitors to being participants in a process? 
Would the cracks appear? Activities were proposed by a number of 
us – movement experimentation, sound propositions, conceptual 
discussions. We followed and participated. Wonderful meals were 
cooked. But mediation still trumped immediation. Time felt linear. 
People were on call, waiting to be told what would happen next.
The first two days were dominated by scattered gatherings made 
interesting by the skills of the leaders. We learned things, we talked, 
we explored. Individual projects were seeded. There was joy in being 
together. New friendships began to form. But there was not yet a 
sense that something with its own consistency was being generated, 
something capable of weaving the Avoca Project through it, moving the 
encounter with SenseLab toward a collaboration that would affect both 
in ways unexpected. There was some despair. And with the cocktail 
party approaching, there was some anxiety about where to move next.
A group gathered at the local pub began to fabulate. The Avoca Project, 
the group decided, had a story – it just needed to be told differently so 
that SenseLab could connect to it. If we could figure out how that telling 
could happen, we were sure to find cracks. So far, the stories the Avoca 
Project had told SenseLab were spoken as though they already knew 
their way. What the Avoca Project didn’t know how to tell SenseLab was 
how the Avoca Project fabulated, how the deeper recesses of more-than 
human activity affected it, how the power of the false ran through it. 
The Chinese Garden, we decided, was key. This garden which could 
stem flows and capture them for its sustainability had a story to tell 
about how geological time composes with event-time, how the time 
of an art project composes with the time of worlds in the making. We 
would stage an investigation to find out what it knew.
Experimenting Immediation: Collaboration and the Politics of Fabulation 375
For the six of us around the table, the promise of a fabulatory 
investigation was immediately a release from the concern which had 
been clouding our experience: now, rather than fitting into a project 
already defined, we could initiate a joyful encounter with what else 
Watford House and the Chinese Garden could be. Certain characters 
immediately emerged: the fish (what was the link between the fish tank 
in Watford house and the fish brought by a resident of Avoca to the 
cocktail party?); the possum (what kinds of skylines were the possums 
creating and how far were they willing to go to create new navigational 
strategies?); the tunnel (what kind of underground passage did the 
water flows create and how might these connect Watford House to 
other worlds?). We spoke to villagers. We checked with each other. We 
spoke to Jones. No one took us very seriously.
But another kind of perception had been awakened, and some of us 
were now seeing fish everywhere. On the day before our time at Avoca 
was to end, with fish on the brain, a few of us decided we needed to 
return to conceptual exploration. A spontaneous reading group was 
organized around Brian Massumi’s book What Animals Teach Us About 
Politics. This hadn’t been planned, but it turned out that several of 
the participants happened to have the newly published book in their 
luggage. We decided to begin by reading a passage out loud (for those 
who didn’t have the book) and go from there. This was the passage:
Think of a child playing the animal. It is certainly easy to 
sentimentalize the scene. But what if we take it seriously— 
that is, look to the aspects of it that are truly ludic in the 
most creative sense. Simondon writes that the child’s 
consciousness of the animal involves far more than the 
simple recognition of its substantial form. One look at a 
tiger, however fleeting and incomplete, whether it be in the 
zoo or in a book or in a film or video, and presto! the child is 
tigerized. Transformation-in-place. The perception itself is a 
vital gesture. The child immediately sets about, not imitating 
the tiger’s substantial form as he saw it, but rather giving it 
life— giving it more life. The child plays the tiger in situations 
in which the child has never seen a tiger. More than that, it 
plays the tiger in situations no tiger has ever seen, in which 
no earthly tiger has ever set paw. The child immediately 
launches itself into a movement of surpassing the given, 
remaining remarkably faithful to the theme of the tiger, not 
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in its conventionality but from the angle of its processual 
potentiality.
Remaining processually faithful to a vital theme has 
nothing to do with reproducing it. On the contrary, it involves 
giving it a new interpretation, in the musical sense of 
performing a new variation on it. The child does not imitate 
the visible corporeal form of the tiger. It prolongs the tiger’s 
style of activity, transposed into the movements of the 
child’s own corporeality. What the child caught a glimpse of 
was the dynamism of the tiger, as a form of life. The child 
saw the tiger’s vitality affect: the potentially creative powers 
of life enveloped in the visible corporeal form. The tiger’s 
vitality affect passes through what a formal analysis might 
isolate as its corporeal form. But it never coincides with 
that visible form. The life’s powers that come to expression 
through the form’s deformations sweep the form up within 
their own supernormal dynamism, which moves through the 
given situation, toward others further down the line. This 
transsituational movement is in excess over the form. It is the 
very movement of the visually given form’s processual self-
surpassing. This is what the child saw— all of it, in a glimpse; 
all in a flash. Not just a generic animal shape: a singular 
vital movement sweepingly immanent to the visible form. 
What children see: the immanence of a life. Not “the” tiger: 
tigritude. Children do not just catch sight of a tiger form. 
They have an intuitively aesthetic vision of the tigeresque as 
a dynamic form of life. It is this they transpose when they 
play animal. Not onto their own form but into their own vital 
movements. [...] Across the serial variations, tigritude begins 
to escape. It begins to surpass given situations in which we 
might reasonably expect a tiger to find itself, and the modes 
of importance those situations present. The tensions of 
tigeresque corporeality in- forms the childlike corporeality 
in play. It immanently animates it— and is animated by it 
in return. The replay series stretches out the tigeresque 
tensions, prolonging them into a transindividual tensor. The 
situational tensions put into play undergo an inventively 
deforming pressure that vectorizes them in the direction 
of the supernormal. Tigritude takes flight. The givens of the 
tigeresque situation, as conventionally known, are surpassed, 
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following exploratory tensors extrapolating from the child’s 
enthusiasm of the body (Massumi 2014: 86).
Animals were emerging everywhere – fish, possums, and now the 
enthusiasm of the body activated by a tigeresque encounter with a 
book. The fish, the possum, and the tiger were not, as Massumi makes 
clear, given forms. They were forces, vitality affects. The emerging 
investigation, and now the collective reading, was not bringing them, as 
animals, to life: it was activating experience such that it might now be 
capable of becoming transsituational, in excess of this moment, of this 
form. The Avoca Project was becoming self-surpassing. Of course all of 
this was still very tenuous, but the seeds for a shift were there. Which is 
why one reading could not be enough: the next and last day we decided 
to return to the passage again, despite being very short on time.
By now the tigeresque was making its way into the weave of the event. 
Something was doing. And then, a strange event occurred. Someone 
decided to spray-paint the desert lawn bright orange with these words: 
“To avoid predetermination create a field with at least three elements.” 
The graffiti – an engagement with the tigeresque quality of the more-
than in Massumi’s text – sought to highlight the necessity of emergent 
collectivity, but it did so at grave risk. The landscape we left behind 
was scarred and would remain so until the next rain, a year in Watford 
House’s future.
The orange spray paint didn’t quite register. To this day, I’m not sure 
why. We were busy, the event hadn’t quite taken place (the encounter 
remaining a gathering rather than exceeding the sum of its parts) 
and the time spent together had been challenging – interesting and 
even joyful at times, but heavy with misunderstandings and uneasy 
encounters. There was laundry to do, and cleanup, and the grounds 
were large. Many of us walked by the large expanse of bright orange 
words, but somehow no one reacted. Until we were gone.
It was an hour or so into the drive toward Melbourne when someone 
in the car with us mentioned the grass, and the orange spray-paint. We 
gasped. Surely this hadn’t been a good idea? But if it did happen, it must 
have been condoned? I felt uneasy.
A few hours later, the first text message arrived. I could feel the 
rawness. And I knew the risk of answering: the event, still uneasily 
coming into itself, could too easily be reduced to the personal. The 
desire to single out an individual and blame them for the act was 
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potent, even in the wake of a gathering that had collectivity and 
collaboration as its aim. What would an apology mean in this context? 
Wouldn’t an inevitable hierarchy be introduced through the act of taking 
charge, as though the event happened in my name?
As I was thinking this through, I received a note from the 
investigation. It read:
Fishy Business November 26 2014
Regarding other fishy business ... It was such a well designed 
urgency to get to the kangaroos on Tuesday night that I fear 
that I was unable to clearly tell of all that I uncovered. […]. I too 
am suspicious of the architects ... they are very consumed by 
the taking of measurements and spinning stories about cloaks. 
I had one of them in the car on the way home but I couldn’t 
detect any deviation within the story to catch them in the act 
... my jury is still out. There is something going on with those 
possums ... however, when one was scratching at the back of my 
tent it was pretending to be a wombat, then a kangaroo, not a 
fish ... I suspect it may be yet another diversionary tactic!
[…]
There are a couple of anomalies that I stumbled upon... how 
[redacted] knew about the fish being flying fish is beyond me. 
Likewise with [redacted] ... he knew that the fish ate the Chinese. 
Perhaps [redacted] has been informed through some pragmatic 
instructions (bequeathed recipes?) for the preparation of the 
fish meals ... if this is the case, the usefulness of this information 
is likely to be questionable so further effort here may not 
be worthwhile.
[…]
This is all that I managed to gather over the few days in Avoca. 
I hope that it is helpful and that we might finally uncover and 
understand what has really been going on at the house and 
garden. One last detail I noticed is the difference between 
orange fish and fish of other colours. The fish on the bag is 
green ... and remember we were not sure how the actual real 
fish appear.
Cheers and all the best,
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The way forward was clear: rather than dealing with the text message 
directly, responding one-on-one to a group issue, a collective response 
was called for. I decided to open up the investigation beyond the six 
initial members. This was the first message sent. 18 people were copied.
The Investigation Nov 27 2014
Dear co-investigators,
I’ve put this list together carefully. I think there are a few 
missing. Mattie? Indira? Aphra? I’ll trust you to know where to 
send it next.
I’ve had a studied report from [redacted]. Since some of it is 
confidential, I will only touch on the salient issues.
We’ve left Avoca.
Orange spray paint may contaminate the soil in the guise of 
philosophy (or was philosophy left to contaminate?). We fear 
this may have repercussions. Is Celine a double agent?
The green fish has turned into an outline. There is a strong 
memory of its greenness. Fish meal still seems to be a 
strong clue.
[…] The vortex is awfully close (and yet [redacted] 
guards the fish).
If the fish are the outline, the semblance is near.
The tunnel entrances seem to have been masked by the tents. 
I’ve seen a picture. It’s possible that you will get access to that 
image. She holds a clue.
[redacted] again: she finds the holes.
Why is [redacted] measuring? I’ve included you here, 
though there is some concern about whose side you’re on. 
Architects are very suspect in this scenario of dissimulated 
gardens and covered-up tunnels. We will need a copy of the 
architectural plans.
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[redacted], after investigative reporting, you have come out 
more Australian than Chinese. This makes you a fish, I think. 
We’re keeping you onboard for now. I know you think you 
are a meerkat. We’re not sure where you are going with this. 
Please elaborate.
Something about [redacted], [redacted] and fire. I wonder 
whether [redacted] isn’t also implicated. I’d like to hear more. 
And about rabbits. Did [redacted] think eating them would 
make them less of a pest in Australia? Is there a parallel with 
the Chinese?
For now, [redacted] must be treated with caution. She knows 
more than she admits.
Yours truly,
And then, the next day, with 8 more people copied, but 2 deleted:
Incoming Cargo Nov 28 2014
Investigation #11
I am opening up the investigation a bit. Have heard from my 
co-investigator that some of the details can now be leaked.
1. [redacted]: imPOSSible defense??? Is that what you’ve been 
working at for the past year? I am seriously concerned about 
both the absence of goldfish in your writing (who were you 
trying to fool) and the fact that you actually thought this 
defense could happen on dry land. It’s time to come clean. 
[redacted]: thanks for the clues. Good that you’re onto her.
2. As I mentioned in the last message (investigation #8), we’ve 
done quite a lot of close scrutiny of the facts, and [redacted] 
comes up clean (though in the discussion tonight with [redacted] 
and [redacted], it was pretty much established as a given that 
she’s at least a double agent). Double is of course a semblance.
3. We still haven’t gotten to the bottom of the disabling of 
sustainability through orange. Is that to bring back the goldfish?
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4. I’ve heard something about the bottom of tents. It’s worrying 
as concerns the vortex. Why hasn’t [redacted] been added 
to this list?
5. Sydney seems to be part of the vortex. Or the semblance. Am 
investigating further.
6. 3 clues in images. Note the mesh (boat?) hanging 
from the bridge.
8. Very concerned about [redacted], who tried to steer my 
attention from the mesh. Everyone just turns directly toward 
the Sydney opera house (I know better). Got a bit of his eyes, but 
was reluctant to take the glasses off.
9. Is that the ark?
Yours truly,
And the next day:
Incoming Cargo Nov 29 2014
I can still feel the delicate brushing of goldfish fins and tails 
against my cheeks. They have a strange attunement with my 
heart flutters. Despite appearances I haven’t left the Avoca 
vortex. [redacted] knows this and is helping me not get sucked 
in too deeply and drown. That is the real reason he had to stay 
in Melbourne. [redacted] is making sure that the tunnel has 
wi-fi, and through her angelic connection she utters revealing 
philosophical statements that help me think into staying afloat.
[redacted] - we know that you are pretending to know little 
about this vortex tunnel, but it became clear as I measured up 
the House that you have at least one fishing line tied to your 
finger that traces out its turbulence. I am guessing you want 
us to admit what we know before you confess. There are many 
lines that I measured up, and not all of them were perceptible 
by the laser measuring device.
[redacted] and [redacted] have other antennae – [redacted] 
is organic, [redacted] is elastic. Each has different insights. 
[redacted] slips under tents and feels out what they hide, but 
she doesn’t seem ready to tell us everything. Perhaps she is 
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crafting a new escape hole? I think [redacted] knows the cure 
for [redacted] contaminating paint, which is making the tunnel 
smell fluorescent, like a blinding light up my nostrils. [redacted]: 
please help.
[redacted] is with me in the vortex, and I can tell you that she 
has a special connection with the blind white tower, which 
played a major role in past Avoca fabulations. She retreats 
there on occasion, half way between the Chinese garden and 
the House, to do some measuring up. Her plan is beautifully 
simple. [redacted] tells me that the possums are indeed staying 
in contact with [redacted], who has her own very special 
connection into the vortex tunnel. Keep a wide eye on her.
In the vortex with the fish, [redacted], and the possums, I can 
now reveal that there is also a giraffe. [redacted] is channeling 
the meerkat. Will they arrive soon? I think they could have 
something to tell about the giraffe. [redacted] knows something 
about a winking tiger, and I am expecting to find out more 
about this on Monday.
I get the sense that [redacted] feathers in the Chinese garden 
have something to tell us about a wise bird somewhere in the 
vortex. I have been trying to get my chicken to help me trace the 
bird-esque, as we vortex together in the garden, but she was 
quite busy listening to earwigs.
Yesterday [redacted] and [redacted] led the way to a clue that 
has gone by unnoticed: the logs. Two massive logs out the front 
of the House. [redacted] is the double of the Log Lady, and 
speaks the logs’ giant, doubled up words. As the Log Lady said 
in episode 8 of Twin Peaks:
“Can you see through a wall? Can you see through human skin? 
X-rays see through solid, or so-called solid objects. There are 
things in life that exist, and yet our eyes cannot see them. Have 
you ever seen something . . . that others cannot see? Why are 
some things kept from our vision?”
Now think about how that statement might be doubled! 
[redacted] has good reason for not revealing everything.
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After some investigative work this morning I discovered that 
[redacted] is also called [redacted]. She is a double agent to 
be sure, and may be essential to this investigative trail. I think 
she knows about the flutters of the fish, and her deep micro-
attention to connective tissue is very much required.
Could it be that the vortex is not only full of creatures, but is 
the very creature we all need to know? As [redacted] said, I had 
a premonition of the vortex before we arrived at Avoca: The 
House the Vortex Built, was already in my mind. The goldfishy 
flutters in my heart might be the hole I need to measure up 
before I can offer any more clues.
Yours,
A few missives later, now 42 responses in, many of them arriving in the 
nonlinear swirl only gmail conversations can create. 24 people copied.
Incoming Cargo Nov 29 2014
Oh no. More fish? What is this about green fish?
I couldn’t help overreading so I have to point out the following... 
Those fish were clearly orange (apart from the four almost 
invisible small black ones...and one is already beginning to 
change colour I notice...) For me it was all orange and now it is 
the seepage of orange that remains...
So there are the fish. Well, I still see orange despite this mention 
of green. And then there is the striped orange of the tiger as you 
noted [redacted], the one who moved into the balcony room 
on Tuesday and now refuses to leave. Little [redacted], who 
is entirely at home lying with the fish seems also comfortable 
hanging out in this tigeresque space. More animals she seems to 
be saying. We need better representation amongst the 64 long 
legs in the forests of the night.
Don’t you think that is a strange coincidence? 64 legs. Because 
‘64’ was already there on every door before those 64 legs 
appeared. It was the long orangy-reddy stripe on the doors. 
Did you see it? The sign ‘64: Before Completion’? (I didn’t like to 
mention it but, talking of ‘before completion’, those slices of fish 
that suddenly appeared in the kitchen, then on our plates, were 
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altogether too close to orange in their pinkness. I did go in and 
count and was relieved to find that all eight were still there in 
the other room, swimming easily. Phew. I don’t think they knew 
what was going on.
And then in the hardness of midday there is orange all over 
the ground on the struggling grass apron in front of the house. 
I’m relieved to read that some of you also noticed it. Hard to 
decipher though, hard to know what it is doing there. Some 
strange message of pain that has seeped up from China 
perhaps. One day when it rains later next year, it will wash 
away I think. Or perhaps it will burn to bare earth if the whole 
house is consumed by the orange of summer fire before the bell 
can be rung and we desperately count people at the gate. We 
will need 64 long legs, four short ones, many fins. [redacted], 
does that measuring device count legs as well?
The tiger will not be counted of course. It will simply refuse to 
leave, that tiger, even though it knows well enough about the 
call of the bell. It stays, entirely comfortable, up there in the 
balcony room. The possums, however, are wary. As they should 
be. To make sure they realize this is a new dispensation, stones 
have been thrown against the tiny orange flames that bring 
them out of the shadows. And there is the smell of urine still 
there as a declaration of war.
And the hard-orange of the pomegranate blossoms suddenly 
seen in a back garden now without weeds, and the yellowy-
orange of the much desired mango that appeared right at the 
end. So, of course there must also be double agents (which 
changes the leg count) for all this to have occurred. And perhaps 
a vortex or two. Anything is possible. Everything has changed.
Yours,
And so it continued, from November 26 to December 4, investigators 
added and withdrawn, writing not only from Australia but also from 
Berlin, and Montreal, 90 pages in all. Everything had changed, as the 
November 29 message announced. Something else had begun to 
happen, and with it, an event was taking form.
The investigation that became the fabulation was never really 
interested in the past. It was interested in creating a time that could 
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compose with futurities in the making. To create an event, these 
futurities must be there in germ. When we arrived at Watford House, 
there wasn’t yet in the collective a sensitivity to how else the project 
could expose itself, how else it could be known. As is often the case, 
the stark presentness of a strange encounter took precedence over its 
fissures of futurity. None of us really knew where to look, and how to 
compose with what we might find lurking between garden and house, 
house and village, past and future. And so, the group fissured into small 
clumps, the focus more activity-based than event-orienting: someone 
created an architectural plan of the house; a few people cleared the 
garden of weeds; some cooked and cleaned; some prepared a site for 
peeing into mason jars to steer the possums away from the fruit trees; 
some visited the garden and the surrounds; some went for a walk along 
the flood plain; some spoke to villagers; some sat at the pub; some 
skyped home; some slept.
It is the fabulation that finally did the work of shifting the gathering 
toward an emergent collectivity, making it an event. It did so by making 
the cracks felt, and by creating opportunities to enter them. Where 
other constraints had been disabling, the fabulation was enabling 
precisely because it captured us in the act, in a middling of expression 
where the anguish of the orange schizz and all that it carried could be 
addressed by other means. The fabulation allowed the collectivity in 
germ to express itself and to invent worlds for that expression. While 
names were used in the text as it moved across the network, there 
came with the force of the fabulatory gesture a sense of the impersonal 
– all voices made a difference, as they do in investigations. Even a 
missive from Berlin from someone who had no idea where exactly 
Avoca was shifted the orientation, adding a new crack to the puzzle.
The fabulation followed us to Sydney, where the second SenseLab 
proposition – this one focused on knots of thought and experimenting 
with the minor gesture – was beginning. Many people now gathered 
who had not been to Avoca, but still, the fabulation, printed on 
large pieces of paper and taped to the wall, accompanied us for the 
next 8 days as we worked in the large UNSW Art and Design gallery. 
Few people read it as a whole, but its presence made a difference, 
particularly as we collectively tried to give voice to our uneasiness about 
how narratives are made – the demonstrations for Michael Brown’s 
death were happening simultaneously in Ferguson.
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The telling is an event, and its capacity to impersonalize is key, even 
(and perhaps especially) in cases where it feels most urgent to direct 
blame toward the personal. This tension between the personal and the 
impersonal was felt keenly in the wake of the grass graffiti. Despite the 
fabulation’s gaining momentum, and its growing ability to reorient the 
field, some participants nonetheless felt that the individual who had 
painted the grass should apologize for what was considered by some 
to be a violent act, and so, when she resisted making the act her own, 
they blamed her for not taking responsibility. And, by extension, they 
blamed SenseLab. What was overlooked, however, in this painful play 
of accusation, was the force of enthusiasm of the body, the tigritude, 
that was moved to paint orange, that was moved to schizz the event. For 
the painted grass was the cut, the schizz that allowed the schizoanalytic 
gesture of the fabulation to take place.
It is noteworthy that the words themselves the spray-paint highlighted 
were never returned to in the discussion of who was to blame. Despite 
the force of the fabulation, the marked landscape was remembered 
by those most undone by the graffiti only as a scar. What this reaction 
neglected was that the writing called for nothing less than that 
multiplicity orient the field. This wasn’t a personal act, and this is what 
the fabulation, despite a great uneasiness, was able to make apparent. 
The orange had already been seeping long before the spray-paint 
foregrounded it. What the words did was orient the orange, move the 
orange tigeresquely toward fish and fire, toward tents and Bea the 
dog, toward the vortex and 64 legs and pomegranate flowers and 
mangoes, not all of them orange, but all of them carried by an oranging 
spell. The fabulation activated the vortex, opening the breach toward 
a creative limit where new worlds could be inhabited. The fabulation 
made it possible for the collective to begin to emerge as collective. It 
immediated collectivity, transforming personal stakes into the fraught 
field of group subjectivity.
Collectivity extends beyond a moment in time. This was the strength of 
the SenseLab-Avoca Project encounter: that it invented itself through the 
fabulation, in the passage of a time more durational than chronological. 
A year later, returning to Australia, I met with Jones. It was time, we 
decided, to return to our collaborator, Watford House, and to see 
what the SenseLab-Avoca Project encounter had been able to do. The 
conversation was tentative. Had the Avoca Project benefitted as much as 
SenseLab had? Had the politics of fabulation and its immediating power 
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also made a difference for the Avoca Project, or did the orange simply 
leave a scar that spoke of non-attunement in a field of difference?
The story began to fabulate once more as we listened to each other, 
alive in the knowledge that we were both speaking as intercessors to 
a participation alive with the more-than human, ventriloquists for a 
group-subject still in transformation. It was a rich conversation, a real 
attunement. And in the event of this exchange, which happened over 
several days, with many rebeginnings, we heard the story once more. 
And it had morphed, already different than what could ever have been 
known, would ever be known. This is the power of the false.
It was not a scar, it turns out. The rain washed away the paint shortly 
after we left, and in any case it had never, it turns out, been spray-
paint, but water-soluble marker paint. In the end, the actual graffiti 
seemed less important than the agony of collaborating with forces that 
exceeded us. The orange words were not so much what was left behind 
as what would be reactivated, return after return. This is also the power 
of the false. The schizz would always be a schizz in time. A memory 
of orange, of turmoil, a swirling collective composition, a tentative 
encounter with the fragility at the heart of all collective actions – this is 
what would continue in the schizzing. What was left burning through 
the soil, on the Avoca landscape, was not so much, in retrospect at least, 
the writing on the grass. What was left was an uneasy story ripe for the 
telling. But, like all fabulations, nothing we will write will ever have been 
quite true. So perhaps it is important to end with this one last image, 
one that was kept from me at the time because of my horror of snakes.
For months before our arrival at Avoca, I worried about snakes. Jones, 
like all those I ask, promised me that snakes were actually quite shy and 
would be unlikely to show themselves. I wasn’t convinced: everywhere 
I go these animals that horrify me at the most nonconscious level seem 
to appear to greet me, to my snake-lover-friends’ delight.
I didn’t see a snake at Avoca. But it turns out a snake did appear, 
camouflaged in our trace, standing guard at the entry to the house: 
the day after we left, a tiger snake was seen resting amidst the orange 
stripes of the lawn. Snake and stripe, tigeresque. The more-than human 
in all its animality, lingering in the n+1 of the field’s incessant necessity 
to tell it otherwise.
The politics of fabulation is this capacity to make felt the force of 
immediation at its most impersonal limit. The fabulation at Avoca was 
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not “about” anything, not about the orange “spray” paint or even the 
tiger-snake-fish that marked the passage of our disappearance. But it 
was the orange that schizzed the fabulation into motion. The politics 
of fabulation composes with the schizz. Without the schizz there is no 
event. A fabulation’s content can never be seen as limited to the story 
itself – fabulation is the affective field that makes composition possible, 
bringing thinking into act. In a political register, this suggests that there 
is potential in fabulation to get beyond the kind of narration that holds 
things in place, opening them to the what else that also beckons. All 
events are more complex than they seem, and modes of encounter that 
play, tigeresquely, with that complexity can and do change their course.
Beyond Myth-Making
Fabulation is vulnerable to capture. Its other, myth-making, is always 
at its heels, seducing us with the promise of intelligibility. How to keep 
the wildness of fabulation active in the retelling and reorienting of our 
everyday practices? “This is how it is,” we say, or at least how it’s been, 
its having-been constitutive of what will be capable of coming to be. 
And we’re not altogether wrong. It is like this. Today, or yesterday. But 
it was also much more, in a flash. Already, another shape has begun to 
take form, a shape relationally attuned to the inheritance of the “it is.” 
What myth-making tendencies will have missed in the description of 
what things do when they shape each other will always have been the 
relational field, the inheritance not of form but of formative force.
[W]hether explicitly or not, narration always refers to a 
system of judgement: even when acquittal takes place due 
to the benefit of the doubt, or when the guilty is so only 
because of fate. Falsifying narration, by contrast, frees 
itself from this system; it shatters the system of judgement 
because the power of the false (not error or doubt) affects 
the investigator and the witness as much as the person 
presumed guilty (Deleuze 1989: 133).
The kind of telling which does justice to the event in its ongoing capacity 
for metamorphosis can only emerge from the event itself and be 
told in the squeaks of the event’s own perpetually falsifying forms of 
articulation, in its ticcingflapping.
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Falsifying narration in the name of the event’s capacity for 
metamorphosis is uncomfortable because it refuses to settle the event. 
Everything is affected.
The point is that the elements themselves are constantly 
changing with the relations of time into which they 
enter, and the terms with their connections. Narration 
is constantly being completely modified, in each of its 
episodes, not according to subjective variations, but as a 
consequence of disconnected places and dechronologized 
moments (Deleuze 1989: 133).
With the power of the false, the event has multiplied, its schisms made 
palpable: “contrary to the form of the true which is unifying […] the 
power of the false cannot be separated from an irreducible multiplicity” 
(1989: 133).
This multiplicity is serial. “The power of the false exists only from the 
perspective of a series of powers, always referring to each other and 
passing into one another” (Deleuze 1989: 133). The event has schizzed 
and with it the certainty of what it might have been or what it might 
become. The event has immediated, an immediation that is already 
part of a series, a series that is always more than the sum of us, always 
more-than human. The event is never just the one it has become in its 
actualization: it is also the many of fabulation’s polyvalent accounting.
The cut in the event, its schizz, never lends itself to an overview. 
Schizoanalysis never happens once and for all. Its felt effects are 
rhyzomatic, undermining the sense that there might be a knowability 
that keeps everything in perspective. Fabulation as a technique of 
immediation makes felt the durational force of the cut, makes resonate 
an experiential time that doesn’t know how to be counted. For while the 
cut is absolutely punctual, immediate, it cleaves the event in ways that 
recalibrate it, immediating. This couples two kinds of time: the time of 
the now and the time of the will have been. Time becomes operative, 
experiential. Time folds.
Emergency
But what of the urgency, even the sense of emergency, at the heart of 
the now of immediation? Social Justice activists know this problem well. 
Everything matters, all the time, the body poised to leap, the nervous 
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system on high alert. Enthusiasm, excitement, and then, too often, 
chaos, or entropy, or inertia. Absolute movement caught in the vortex 
of everything the event could become. Madness. Burnout.
This state of extreme overactivation is familiar to all who experiment 
with emergent collectivity. The event takes us, its absolute movement 
swirling us within an unbounded spacetime that is often temporally and 
spatially at odds with the rhythms of the everyday. No points of reliance 
are available. Perspective is long gone. The body becomes warrior, 
tense with anticipation, thick with the trauma of what have now become 
life and death stakes. Adrenal overexertion, there is no calm here where 
the event has become us.
Too often, in the face of this overlap of focused momentum and deep 
exhaustion, an uneasy shift happens toward the personal. “I can’t do 
it anymore,” we hear ourselves say, as though this were all about us. 
The shaping of emergent collectivity has been reduced to our cells. 
The event, we believe, needs us to continue. A new kind of “personal is 
political” emerges in this intense constellation where the edges where 
politics and life and art and philosophy co-compose are overridden by a 
sense of breathless engagement: the state of emergency overcomes us.
The stakes are enormous, and many of us feel them today. Avoca’s 
fabulation did not have these stakes, but the concurrent event of 
Michael Brown’s death did, and we felt it. Urgency was not misplaced. 
The weight of the world we compose with, a world of austerity and 
neoliberalism and racism and exclusion which every day undervalues 
what collective living can be, is a heavy burden to bear. Many of us 
wake daily with an almost hopeless feeling of urgency, the body 
poised in a state of acute tension. As months (and centuries) of attacks 
against black life continue, as more gun violence erupts and wars are 
fought, as austerity measures undermine our everyday existences and 
climate change threatens to foreclose the future, as settler-colonialism 
persists, as we continue to watch the horrifying accounts of refugees 
streaming across borders looking for a safe landing, how does collective 
experimentation make any kind of difference?
This is a question SenseLab struggles with. But whenever we come 
face to face with it (again) we remind each other that collective 
experimentation is not a choice. It’s a mode of survival. For it is 
experimentation around techniques for group subjectivity that provides 
ways to reenter the political from another angle. A politics of fabulation 
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seems important in this context. Political events are often lived in the 
time span of media events – acutely here and then completely gone. 
The political is lived as staccato rather than as durational, one violent 
act overshadowing the next. But as all activists will attest to, the work 
continues even when the attention wanes, and it is often in the waning 
that the exhaustion settles in, despondency taking over as the status 
quo returns.
How the collective makes a difference is often not part of the telling. 
What is told is told in the sound bites of new myth-making strategies, 
the complexity of fabulation too unwieldy for the Facebook like. But 
the fabulations are there – the work is to draw them out. What kinds 
of techniques might be invented to assist us in orienting urgency away 
from a constant state of emergency? How might we bend our practices 
toward the desynchronous time of fabulation, even while we are living 
the emergency? What might emergent collectivity be capable of in this 
context? What kind of acts are called for? What can we do collectively so 
that the merest of existences also make themselves felt?
The primacy of action has been rightly criticized as connected to capital, 
as tending to operate in tandem with the accelerated time of capital’s 
constant need to forecast the newest new.15 SenseLab asks: what other 
modes of activity are alive in the act? What kind of telling accompanies 
what Massumi calls bare activity, activity not simply understood in 
terms of its spatial extension but in its intensive magnitude?16 Can we 
attune to the zigzag movement that cuts across the front line and create 
with the intensity of a side line? Is there a way to rally across different 
qualities of line? Can we make the line a field?
A durational field is always immediating. The question of how to 
compose with the capacitation of the field in act is the one the SenseLab 
most contends with. How to know when our bodies need to be counted 
(which lines actually need us to be standing there, numbered amongst 
those also marking the occasion)? How to know where subtraction is 
more important, where our presence must be backgrounded in lieu 
of other qualities of action? How, in the mix, to always foreground the 
more-than human? How to live the modulation of the act such that we 
don’t simply fall prey to capital’s mandate that we do more, be more, 
bending to capital’s infinite need for surplus and accumulation? How to 
keep the enthusiasm of the body transversal, beyond capture? How to 
compose with altereconomies in ways that do their work through the 
creative fissures of capital’s leakages without turning these acts into 
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moral imperatives? How to create time for emergent collectivity in a 
world that asks so much of our time, of our too-human time?
Emergent collectivities are series. There is never one emergent 
collectivity. The work of group subjectivity involves a sensitivity to 
transversality, to the schizz that cuts across the now of experience in 
the making. Schizoanalytic techniques are necessary, and they have 
to be invented each time anew, cutting across lines where they form, 
inflecting them, redrawing them, thickening them. What kinds of 
collective practices can we invent that complicate participation across 
this seriality?
SenseLab seeks to immediate where lines are composed, where 
they cross, where they perish. Free radicals are key: activated in 
the telling, in the relation, motivated by the power of the false, the 
free radical exposes the variability in experience, replacing and 
superseding “the form of the true,” by making felt “the simultaneity of 
incompossible presents,” “the coexistence of not-necessarily true pasts” 
(Deleuze 1989: 131).
To create openings for free radicality, techniques will always need to 
be invented that are capable of creating the conditions, in the event, 
for the activation of its fabulatory tendencies. This will mean attending 
to the pulse of immediation. By making palpable the durational field 
that catches futurity in the making, the anarchic share of the event’s 
persistence in the fold of time will become operational.
Emergency lives in the urgency of now, this time, this only time. No 
practice can function always in the state of emergency. The work of 
the free radical is to supplement the necessary pull of emergency, to 
compose with the complex time differential of the act. Emergency is 
with us, and it is here to stay.17 How to work with the doubling of time 
this calls forth – the time of the now and the time of sustained action? 
How to make sustainable, in a more-than human register, the acute 
sense that all is in the balance? How to not become rigidified by the 
tension that comes with the sense that there can never be enough 
action to turn the tides? All scales of action are present in the flash of 
tigritude. How can the act of activism produce an enthusiasm of the 
body that carries, in a flash, all these scales, all these durations?
Perhaps the first step is to recall that the flash is transductive: it is not 
that the child becomes a tiger, or that the child imitates a tiger. It is 
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that the child immediatingly connects to the dynamism of the tiger’s 
enthusiasm of the body: the child activates the form of life of tigritude.
A politics of fabulation does nothing less. It composes at all scales 
of existence, activating the dynamism of experience in the making. 
Cutting across more normative tellings, it transversalizes experience. It 
invents it. And in so doing, it allows the edges of the political to resonate 
differently, collectively, durationally.
The force of immediation in a politics of fabulation does this: it takes us 
out of the centre. It opens the present to its schizz. And it teaches us not 
only that “I” is another, but that the event is not me (Deleuze 1989: 153).
SenseLab has appetite. It creates itself around practices that tune 
toward an affinity for the interstices that compose across art, politics 
and philosophy. It wants to be nomadic. It wants to activate the 
transversal contours of a life in the making, a mode of existence that 
can only know itself through the falsifications it will become allied to 
and will then leave behind. This coming and going takes continual work, 
especially the going. We have to learn, again and again, how to subtract 
ourselves, how to do this work without becoming subsumed by it. How 
a practice does its work, how a practice creates the conditions for an 
emergent collectivity, has to be reinvented each time anew, and with 
this, our role in it, our place in it has to reinvented as well. It can never 
be solely about how we did it before. And it can never really be about 
us. This does not mean that what has come before has no importance. 
It means that we work from a beginning always rich with inheritances 
that remain open to deviation.
Experimenting immediation is shape-shifting: tigeresque. Free radical 
intercession produces an enthusiasm of the body. We are not the centre 
of experience, tigritude is, vitality affects are. It is here that we must 
begin, shifting from our belief that we are the center, composing instead 
with other scales and tempos, with the minor gestures of geological 
time, affective time, event-time.
To know time differently is to feel how the more-than of existence 
composes us, composes with us. The political is never within reach. 
To have reached it is to have organized it into myth. To be politically 
engaged, to open up fields of emergent collectivity is not to have willed 
them into existence, but to have been moved by them, to have been 
composed by them. Our task: to become schizoanalytic experimentors 
at the edges of experience where the intercession of the free radical 
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unbinds linear narration, freeing the bonds of time prescribed. Our 
task: to become sensitive to a composing-with that will never tell the 
true story of how emergent collectivity briefly came to expression. Our 
task: to move at the rhythm of free radicals who affirm the schizz of 
immediation. Our task: to destroy, with all the force of the free radical, 
that which too easily conforms to our image, to our need to recognize 
ourselves in the work we do.
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They move at different rhythms. Three times at different speeds, in 
different durations, the first in conversation, capricious in the bordering 
of a ficto-critical genre, the second alive with the flash of the unruly that 
comes when dialogue finds its own pace, narrating across a border that 
is both character and more-than character, schizo-personal, the third a 
propositional genre that crosses the fictiō and the novella, a fictiōnella 
that refuses to recount even as it plays in time, with time.
To cross the genre, to move across what philosophy can do in the 
interstices of a fabulation, true or not, is a practice of immediation. 
Deviations from mediatory impulses are necessary to think across and 
capture not the explanation of a feeling, but the force of its arising. 
“Most people watch the ceiling as I probe their bellies. But this young 
woman hasn’t taken her eyes off me. A fixed, wide-eyed stare bores 
into the side of my face. I sense a frozen stillness as my hand rests 
over her taut navel. She stops breathing. The deer is hiding in a grove 
of trees, holding dead still until the bear lumbers past” (Sempert, 
Immediation II, 402).
This force is told in the interval, Justy Phillips might say, felt in the lag 
where the telling unknows itself. Each story, each text, encounters the 
lag differently, its rhythm activating the quality of what survives into 
the telling. While Mattie Sempert participates in an encounter with the 
twist of the acupuncture needle and the icy toes, Phillips probes the 
complex passage between feeling and felt where past moves toward 
an experiencing of the present, “a processual engagement with the 
eventing of everyday life” (Phillips, Immediation II, 432). Two rhythms 
co-composing. A qualitative difference is felt here in the force of what 
can be heard and what must be said. For Sempert, the needle does the 
saying in a way that always shifts the conditions of what can and must 
be said. A schism of time is also at stake: the acupuncture needle is 
always felt before the feeling, its promised zing an agitation before the 
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twist. The story encounters the twist and writes with it, time captivated 
by the dynamic force of a homeostasis undone.
Sher Doruff works at the nerve end of the erratic edge of all systems. 
“Immediate!” White Betty yelled. “Diagram goddamn it!” “Bacon 
it!” “Or Vega-bacon it.” (Doruff, Immediation II, 425). This time, the 
force of immediation not between times lingering on the edge of 
their overlapping, but immediation activating the overlappings of 
simultaneities, paradoxes. Time as the haphazard quality of the 
oversaying in the saying. What we hear in Doruff’s narrative is heard in 
the scramble of many voices speaking at once. “The air in their shared 
warehouse studio was thick with imploding drama. They all felt it but 
were reluctant to name it. RED. Gone. BLUE missing. GREEN empty. Left 
without the foundational RGB they were conceptually, scientifically, 
politically and philosophically bereft. Voided. Limp” (Doruff, 
Immediation II, 424).
Rhythm and immediation co-compose. Rhythm activates the fabulatory 
share that allows immediation to make its work felt. For immediation 
cannot be described, or defined. It can only be activated, changing the 
conditions of the fields it brings into relation. Language is not always 
its favourite tool—it can impose mediatory tendencies hard to discard. 
Immediation does its work best when language bends.
Fabulation’s telling is an event. This event is an attunement to the 
divergent forces that refuse to be bent into shape. The telling does not 
straighten them: it foregrounds their capacity to shapeshift.
A protopolitics lingers here, in the different rhythms for the telling. 
This is a politics of immediation, a politics that gathers in the turbulent 
unsayings of immediated tellings. This is a politics of the sayings in 
the said that can barely be heard but are nonetheless felt. A politics of 
the becoming-body, a bodying always in transition, worlding through 
the rhythm-events that populate the lines. Why a politics? Because 
immediation alters the conditions of existence, making palpable what 
otherwise escapes the register of value. It matters, these stories say, it 
matters that you learn to listen to what remains unsayable in the said. 
It matters that the transversal lines trouble the orientation to knowing. 
Immediation matters, and its materiality, how it comes to expression, 
also matters.
Mattie Sempert, Justy Phillips and Sher Doruff take us into the 
mattering. They take us to the uneasy site of language’s composition 
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where an encounter can be felt between meaning and quality of tone, 
where what is said and how it is heard work together to create the force 
of an account, here, now. This is the practice of immediation, this ability 
to make felt, in the event, how words create worlds. When worlds resist 
mediation, when language really does the work of creating a field of 
expression, a force for the telling emerges that shifts the conditions 
of experience toward worlds as yet unfelt. It is here, in the event 
that refuses to script experience, that a politics of immediation most 
intensively does its work.
Mattie Sempert
Navel Gazing, or, The Immanent Twist
You never reach the Body without Organs, you can’t reach it, 
you are forever attaining it, it is a limit. People ask, So what 
is this BwO?—But you’re already on it, scurrying like vermin, 
groping like a blind person, or running like a lunatic: desert 
traveller and nomad of the steppes. On it we sleep, live our 
waking lives, fight—fight and are fought—seek our place, 
experience untold happiness and fabulous defeats; on it we 
penetrate and are penetrated; on it we love
Deleuze and Guattari (1987: 150)
A friend told me recently that she’s kept the desiccated cords of her 
three children.
In a hidden shoebox? I forgot to ask.
What happened to my umbilical cord will always be a mystery. 
Most likely my mother bundled it into my dirty nappy. Her farm 
girl pragmatism wouldn’t have allowed any sentiment over our 
shared remnant.
However, I do know that during my birth, my mother, out of it on gas, 
recalled meeting St. Peter at the Pearly Gates. He was very pleasant and 
welcoming, she’d say, recycling the story over the years. But while she 
was conversing with St. Pete I made my way out of her yawning vagina, 
stretched to the point of tearing. Forceps must have gripped my soft 
temporal bones. I can still feel a dent above my left temple.
Is that original shock, the violent separation, held, like a miasma, 
inside our navels?
“The becoming-body,” writes Erin Manning, “has no fixed form. It is 
an exfoliating body” (2009a: 124). Perhaps like the suspended state of 
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becoming-snake, when it is in-between skins. One has been sloughed 
off and the re-assembling of another has not yet emerged. The snake, 
between skins, has lost its form. The becoming-body is a virtual body. 
It is de-territorialized, “free of the fixed relations that contain a body all 
the while exposing it to new organizations” (2005: 67). Becoming-bodies 
are re-assembling all the time, in process and in relationship with other 
assemblages. Exfoliating is a doing, a verbing, an action. To shed the 
restrictive skin of a binary allows for becomings to unfold. Movement 
and rhythm exfoliate, says Manning. And for total exfoliation: laughter 
(2009a: 21).
Most people watch the ceiling as I probe their bellies. But this young 
woman hasn’t taken her eyes off me. A fixed, wide-eyed stare bores into 
the side of my face. I sense a frozen stillness as my hand rests over her 
taut navel. She stops breathing. The deer is hiding in a grove of trees, 
holding dead still until the bear lumbers past.
I glance over at her deep red stockings draped over the side of the chair 
that still hold the shape of her feet. More of a venous shade of red, I 
decide. There’s a hint of blue. It was only ten minutes ago that I passed 
her standing at the reception desk, her long red legs capped by a vinyl 
black mini-skirt, feet planted in ankle high black boots with severe 
zippers on the side.
I remove my hand from her navel and do the rest of my information 
gathering over her abdomen. Temperature. Tone. Areas of tension. Skin 
texture. No scars, moles, or other irregularities. Only a few scattered 
freckles. Her ribcage is on the narrow side, indicating a relatively 
weak constitution. My hand moves with a sure, swift touch, conveying 
confidence born from exploring hundreds of bellies over the years.
Her chief complaint is tight shoulders. Too much computer work, she 
tells me. But I know it comes from a deeper tension, a deeper source.
When I move away from her navel, she relaxes. Move it back over, and 
she tenses up again. Like the tree falling in the woods, does her navel 
relax when no one is probing? Judging from her taut musculature, 
including her neck muscles stretched like guy-wires to the point of 
snapping, I don’t think so.
Her middle is clenched. Tight.
When I remove my hand, the side of my face relaxes. The deer comes 
out of hiding and watches the bear shrink in the distance.
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She’s here for her tight shoulder muscles, not her belly. I move up 
towards her head and press my fingers into the muscles on the top of 
her shoulders. Cement.
“In this Japanese style of acupuncture we treat your whole body starting 
from your abdomen,” I say, as I move around to the other side of the 
table to check the top of her other shoulder, which is also hard as 
cement. I press my fingers in again.
“We see a connection between your tight shoulders and the tension in 
your belly.”
I notice a thin layer of foundation on her face, discretely blended into 
her neck. A tiny crater, left by an absent nose ring, stands out. Her black 
eyebrows nearly meet at a crease in the middle. Long earlobes. A sign of 
longevity, according to the Chinese.
As she follows my face, the fear-bulge appears again. My cheek tenses. 
I look square at her, into the stunned stare. The carefully applied 
make-up suddenly makes her more vulnerable to me. Removing my 
hand, I make sure my face and voice are soft.
“We need to free up your belly in order for your shoulders to loosen.”
She gives a little quick nod, but I don’t think she has any idea 
what I mean.
Her body is like a gated community surrounded with razor wire and 
sirens. I move away to jot down my findings in her fresh folder. And 
consider a way in. Maybe I should take the steering wheel and drive 
straight for the barbed-wired barricade, headfirst into her fear. Or make 
the white-coated decision of The Expert and disregard her frightened 
state, her naked vulnerability, however much she’s tried to conceal it.
And what of informed consent? I’ve witnessed plenty of tears over the 
years, the moment of sweet relief when held-back feelings give way to 
a rupture. And several times the unrestrained sobs on the treatment 
table when a belly’s come unbuttoned, when the clenched fist opens 
and blood floods back to the source. The disoriented stupor of having 
finally let go, but not knowing how to fill up all the fresh free space. I 
do know this: too much energy is bound up in watching, in holding it all 
together, in concealment.
The clinched core. Fisted feelings. Anxiety circling a small room looking 
for a way out.
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Without the oppositional tensions of a binary to keep it intact, when 
skin is neither on nor off, what can the becoming-body do? Deleuze 
took up Spinoza’s idea of immanence: Not only don’t we know what a 
body can do; we don’t know what our bodies will do from moment to 
moment. “Spinoza never ceases to be astonished by the body: not of 
having a body, but at what the body is capable of. Bodies are defined 
not by their genus and species, nor by their origins and functions, but 
by what they can do, the affects they are capable of, in passion as in 
action” (Deleuze and Parnet 1987: 74). By rebuking binaries, possibilities 
open up. Becomings are potentiated by the rub of difference, 
juxtaposition and paradox, and aspire to ambiguity. Difference is 
affirmed, celebrated even. Elizabeth Grosz, a philosopher devoted 
to re-thinking the body, notes that Deleuze and Guattari’s “notion 
of the body as a discontinuous, nontotalizable series of processes, 
organs, flows, energies, corporeal substances and incorporeal events, 
speeds and durations, may be of great value to feminists attempting 
to reconceive bodies outside the binary oppositions imposed on the 
body by the mind/body, nature/culture, subject/object and interior/
exterior oppositions” (1994: 164). By taking up the challenge to contest 
binaries, such as the Western habit of privileging the mind over the 
body, somato-phobia—or fear of the body—can be looked at square 
in the face. This could be an antidote for the centuries-old splitting 
Cartesian headache: to step into Deleuze and Guattari’s world, made up 
of thousands of wide-open undulating plateaus where the body and the 
mind can roam, aimless, together as one.
Our umbilicus. The site where the original lifeline, the chewy cord, 
connected to mother. The odd pucker of dense tissue left over once the 
shrivelled-up lifeless cord falls off like a withered leaf falls off a tree.
Maybe the wail of a newborn baby comes out as a grieving protest to 
getting cast from the Mother ship. The shocking finality of the lifeline’s 
snip, never to return. I recall the nightmare I had as a child after 
watching 2001: A Space Odyssey (1968): that astronaut floating, forever 
alone, into deep space, into infinity. The cold sweat of horror turning 
quickly into dread, which is still not far away inside me.
Could it be that our navels hold that memory? The shock of the snip 
leaving the trace of our first unforgivable wounding? Could that be why 
so many people have an aversion to having their navels touched?
Belly button. Our belly’s button.
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Push a button. Don’t push my buttons.
A button gathers and holds two surfaces together.
Deleuze and Guattari took up the term Body Without Organs from 
Antonin Artaud, another Spinozist, who invented the term as a means 
to free himself from the disgust and hatred he held for his own body. 
“Man is sick because he is badly constructed [...] when you have made 
him a body without organs, then you have delivered him from all his 
automatic reactions and restored him his true freedom.” (Artaud 1988: 
79). Deleuze and Guattari folded Artaud’s term into their philosophy, 
having the BwO insinuate a deeper, hidden reality. For them, the BwO 
embodies a virtual space outside the hard edges of well-formed wholes 
constructed from functioning parts. “Then,” says Artaud, with the 
conceptual evisceration complete, “you will teach him to dance wrong 
side out as in the frenzy of dance halls and this wrong side out will be 
his real place” (1988: 570-571).
But to “dance wrong side out” isn’t enough, suggests Rosi Braidotti: “To 
switch to Spinoza is a switch to the radical materiality of the body: the 
entire body thinks. You don’t think with the mind, you think with the 
entire fleshed existence.” Therein lays the inescapable human rub, the 
same one from which Artaud sought freedom: “You cannot step outside 
the slab of matter that you inhabit,” adds Braidotti (Vermeulen and 
Braidotti 2014).
“How’s your sleep?” I ask as I move over to the treatment cart. Time to 
get the flow started.
“Is it going to hurt?” Her voice is pinched, small.
I head towards her feet with a packet of pins.
“Not really, they’re so fine and thin,” I say. To tell her there’s no pain 
isn’t the truth. Sometimes the zing can be felt as pain. I start to peel the 
packet open.
“It’s a shame they’re called needles because it conjures up injections.”
Anticipation thickens the air in the room.
“If it makes you feel any better, when I was little I was terrified of getting 
my shots. And now I’m an acupuncturist.” Most people respond with a 
surprised really? She says nothing.
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I touch her toes. Icy. I also notice her feet aren’t flopping out at a 
relaxed angle from her hips. Hip joints can often mirror shoulder joints. 
Both are holding on tight in this client. Her glute muscles are probably 
also clenched.
“I wouldn’t say it hurts, but you can feel a little tingly sensation. 
Acupuncture is about getting things flowing again, like flicking little 
switches, and...”
“You’re not going to put one in my stomach are you?” Her voice 
cuts through the thickness, taking up space. The air moves. Good. 
She’s got spunk.
I press my warm hands into her icy arches, pulling her attention down 
to her feet. Better not head for the barricade, at least not today. Do I 
risk another rattled meltdown? And what of informed consent? Tell her: 
Sorry, but there’s a chance you’ll have a sobbing attack if I go straight to 
your clenched navel. Are you up for that? Unbutton it and underneath 
is access to another land of possibility. The unblinking grip of your 
implosion-habit is a familiar, steady presence. Exhausting, but familiar. 
Keep it all contained, quiet, camouflaged.
Anxiety circles the room faster, faster. Frantic. Got to be a way out.
Forces are always at play, even in stasis, in stillness. Another way of 
putting it, says Brian Massumi, is that “positionality is an emergent 
quality of movement. The distinction between stasis and motion 
that replaces the opposition between literal and figurative from this 
perspective is not a logical binarism. It follows the modes by which 
realities pass into each other. ‘Passing into’ is not a binarism. They are 
dynamic unities” (2002: 8). Moving forces– earthbound and material, 
animate and inanimate, human and inhuman—rub, crash, scrape, 
caress, explode, and fuse, as dynamic unities. The swirl of forces on and 
against surfaces pass into each other.
The new materialists conceptualize “traversing the fluxes” (Dolphijn 
and van der Tuin 2012: 86) as a strategic move away from dualisms. 
Grosz comments on Deleuze and Guattari’s elemental—or molecular in 
their terminology—conception of the body, which “implies a clear move 
toward imperceptibility […] their work is like an acidic dissolution of 
the body, and the subject along with it” (Kaufman 2012: 52). Cartesian 
thinking has benignly neglected matter with its preoccupation with the 
mind. As a relational ontology, the perspective of the new materialists 
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allows for the immanent enfolding of matter and meaning (Dolphijn, 
van der Tuin 2012: 48). This re-conception of matter tolerates, 
encourages even, an apparent oxymoron, such as movement in stasis. 
The endless possibilities of becoming create a power so potent it is 
capable of defying the classical laws of physics.
The forces created by the actions of multiplicities can yank free of 
binary constraints by twisting around into the middle, and pass 
into each other.
I gently prod a spot on the inside of her ankle, a particular spot on the 
body that can manifest the fear-bulge. The long held fixed stare.
“Is this tender?”
She goes frozen again, and winces. Just the feedback I need. But I want 
her to acknowledge it more directly.
“Does it feel sharp when I press it? Or more like a bruise?” I 
press it again.
“Sharp.”
“And this spot?” I reach over and press into the same spot on 
her left ankle.
“Ow. That’s worse.”
Swiftly, I tap a needle into one of the ankle spots.
“There, it’s in. Did that hurt?”
Silence. The air in the room circulates again.
“Is that it?” Her tone is incredulous, on the edge of a laugh.
“Yep, that’s it. Now, remember how I said acupuncture is like flicking 
little switches and getting things flowing better?”
The pinched voice reappears: “Ah, huh.”
“Just let me know when you feel a tingly sensation.” Very, oh so very 
gently I give the needle a minuscule twirl, barely a whisper.
“Ew! I felt it down to my big toe. Like a tingle of electricity.”
“Yes. That’s the switch getting flicked on.”
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I’ve already moved to her other foot and tap another in. I don’t bother 
tweaking the second spot. One zing is enough to start the shift, to 
initiate the drop.
I move up to the head-end of the treatment table. She’s looking 
at the ceiling. Trillions of cells in her body are starting to hum and 
head towards equilibrium, like bees reforming a hive. The fear-
bulge disappears.
“How’re you doing?”
“Good. I feel really... good,” she responds, dropping down into free flow. 
Dynamic homeostasis is just around the corner. She closes her eyes.
I place my hand just under her navel. She doesn’t flinch.
“Take in a big breath, and fill up my hand.”
She does, with surprising ease.
“And keep doing it several times, okay?”
Once free of the dualist structure of oppositional thinking, 
territorialized bodies—the literal body, as well as social, economic, 
political bodies—can find ways to challenge power disequilibrium. 
With the binary straightjacket removed, we can find out what our 
becoming-bodies are capable of doing. One option is to leave the stuffy, 
preoccupied interiors of psychoanalysis, and roam on the surfaces of 
our intermingling, (organ)less assemblages. We can contest Freud’s 
phallocentrism. And the pinched negativity of desire understood as an 
insatiable lack. Desire as something missing. Instead, desire, according 
to Deleuze and Guattari, is defined as a “process of production without 
reference to any exterior agency; desire is a process of experimentation 
on a plane of immanence” (Deleuze 2005: 63). Their philosophy is 
one of affirmation: desire is reconceived as abundance, as excess. A 
plentitude. Our assemblages are in movement, in action, in processes of 
making. Not looking to fill a hole. “The BwO is never yours or mine. It is 
always a body” (1987: 164).
No external agent: the BwO refuses to be owned.
Birth is shocking, simple enough. Once outside the womb the air 
pressure changes, forcing the tiny heart flap to snap shut. In the 
time it takes for the lungs to inflate, the mysterious morphing from 
amphibious creature to land mammal takes place.
Navel Gazing, or, The Immanent Twist 409
Cast out into a sea of blue scrubs, machines bleeping, the perilous 
journey outside the womb begins. The unnecessary slap on the bottom 
that was done in the old days. Vernix, like a thin smear of wet scrambled 
eggs, gets rubbed off by a scratchy towel. A needle prick on the base 
of a fresh heel. Add blinding lights, the cold embrace of metal, and this 
beginning outside the womb is enough for any creature to want to turn 
around and crawl back inside the Mother ship.
But to return inside is impossible. Docking to the breast is the next 
best option.
Deleuze returns to the middle as a source of becoming: “It is in the 
middle where one finds the becoming, the movement, the velocity, the 
vortex. The middle is not the mean, but on the contrary, an excess. It 
is by the middle that things push” (1993: 208). Events pass through the 
middle, in transit, neither here nor there.
Activist-philosophers of change, Manning and Massumi, say that each 
centre-point of movement, also known as the any-point, “twists around 
into the middle. In the middle, the immanent limits are in abstract 
superposition” (2014: 42).
Midway, betwixt and between. The middle holds it together, just.
“Touch resets the any-point of movement,” they add (54).
“Your hand is really hot.”
I snap back into the room.
“Yeah, they do warm up.”
My left index finger marks a spot a couple of inches below her navel.
“How about I tap one in here?”
“Okay,” she says, hardly hesitating.
Several thousand years ago, the ancient Chinese scanned the night 
sky for the North Pole Star, the prominent constellation used as a 
coordinate to chart the heavens. They considered it the fixed point 
around which everything orbited. As it is above, so it is below, they said, 
extending the celestial guidepost into the body, fixing it in the space just 
below the navel.
As long as we can locate our Pole Star, it doesn’t matter how far we 
venture across the horizon. But if we lose our way, by a tangle of fear or 
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a flare of rage, a few calm, focused belly-breaths will lead us to back to 
the hub—our body’s night sky. Yes, there it is. Homeward bound, back 
to our source.
Perhaps touch, in resetting the any-point of movement, also resets 
potential? “Potential is abstract by nature,” Manning and Massumi 
continue, “in the sense of not yet being this or that, here nor there. 
What is abstract feeling, if not thought?” (2014: 41). Perhaps, also, home 
is found “in the immanent twist” (41). In one moment, one breath.
One touch—one twirl of a needle—immediating the forces at work: in 
the middling.
My left finger continues to mark the way in, easily found on the south 
side of the small rise in the flesh below her navel. This fleshy gateway 
into the Pole Star is always there, no matter if the surface terrain is a 
large mound or flattened surface. A pale freckle, like a faint nebula, sits 
next to her entrance.
Placing the metal guide tube on the spot, I give the top of the needle a 
quick tap. It pierces the skin, and the portal opens. The needle sinks just 
under the surface. A few gentle twirls send down slow ripples. I feel a 
tiny tug. Contact.
Returning to the desk to light the moxa, I hold the tip of the cigar-
shaped stick over the candle flame waiting for the dense punk to 
smoulder. Her breathing is slow. The flame’s wobble is mesmerising.
My mother, while giving birth to me, possibly had either a profound, 
drug-induced dissociative episode or a near-death experience. Did the 
experience also get embedded in me? Maybe it helps to explain my 
love of flying, of watching clouds, or my phobic terror of tight spaces. 
Does my navel hold that memory? Maybe that’s why my friend saved 
her babies’ shrivelled cords to secretly hold like a talisman, preserving 
the connection. The pain and the ecstasy, forever mummified, hidden 
in a shoebox.
For my becomings to become becomings requires my “series of 
assemblages”—me, that is, in Deleuze’s terminology—to relate with 
other assemblages—human, animate or inanimate—whereby my 
molecules affectively morph with whatever it is I’m in the process of 
becoming. As I think-feel into the density of flesh, through the gooey 
interstitial tissue, I listen for an opening. I refuse to collude with this or 
that thinking, side-stepping the binary pothole. My sense-perceptions 
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stay focussed, attuned. My listening finger is becoming-needle. Like 
how a painter think-feels through colour, or how a dancer think-feels 
through movement. My becoming-needle think-feels through flesh. I 
find the grain of things through the movement of feeling-forward.
Exfoliating on the cutting edge of a skin’s assemblage, I twirl internal 
whirls and alter the surface, alter the flow within.
Our realities pass into each other by twisting into the middle.
Her feet are flopped out, relaxed. She sinks deeper onto the table. 
Trillions of cells are happily humming as yin and yang doe-see-doe 
around her Pole Star.
Blowing on the moxa pole’s cherry-red ember, I move back to the table 
and hold the burning stick an inch or so over her skin around where the 
needle is planted. She hardly stirs.
“You’ll feel some warmth below your navel,” I say. She exhales, lets out 
a barely audible moan. The guy-wires on her neck go slack. Her head 
slumps slightly to the side.
As the heat is conducted down the needle, it sends her source a strong 
reminder: Burn bright, hold fast, keep her oriented. As the heat seeps 
deeper, a message orbits back to her: Here’s your energetic core, 
located under your umbilicus-stem, its coals smouldering, providing the 
light whenever you need to find your way home.
My thoughts return earthbound: Will you feel lost unclenched? Are you 
ready to spill from your middling in your immanent twist?
Deleuze and Guattari offer a prescription for healthy BwO:
This is how it should be done. Lodge yourself on a stratum, experiment 
with the opportunities it offers, find an advantageous place on it, find 
potential movements of deterritorialization, possible lines of flight, 
experience them, produce flow conjunctions here and there, try out 
continua of intensities segment by segment, have a small plot of new 
land at all times. It is through a meticulous relation with the strata 
that one succeeds in freeing lines of flight, causing conjugated flows 
to pass and escape and bringing forth continuous intensities for a 
BwO (1987:161).
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Hovering my open palm over her skin, I feel the warm glow coming from 
underneath. Enough moxa. Just a few more minutes and I’ll take out 
the needles.
A few gurgles, a tell-tale sound of relaxation, come from her belly.
After placing the moxa back on the treatment cart, I sit to 
finish my notes.
More gurgles emerge, sounding like a long line of trapped air bubbles 
finally freed, rush to the surface.
“The BwO is permeated by unformed, unstable matter, by flows of 
all directions, by free intensities or nomadic singularities, by mad or 
transitory particles” (1987: 40), they reassure us.
The stockings sag. The foot’s shape is gone.
Sher Doruff
Last Year at Betty and Bob’s: An Adventure
Part One
1. TAP Netting
Delicate neon signage snaked a curvilinear path over the archway 
entrance. The fluorescent, mercury blue script read – The Arcades 
Project. Once through the Romanesque passageway, the interior sphere 
of the brick and mortar high-rise was straight out of Blade Runner. The 
cavernous central vestibule had the excavated feeling of a gaping hole. 
Seventy vertiginous meters overhead, a filthy skylight dribbled patches 
of bright to the atrium below. Like other vertical shopping complexes 
of this type, boutiques, service centers and dining establishments lined 
the stacked walkways of browsing floors. Unlike other malls, this place 
was un-littered with potted palms, fast food kiosks and inflatable kiddie 
castles. Bob craned his neck to see a riot of drab looming up, down 
and sideways.
A gaudy arabesque of rusting iron railing decorated the perimeter 
of each floor. The only means of transport between levels required 
scrambling. Huge sways of gritty cargo netting hung from the rafters of 
the corniced ceiling to the ground floor. Rope ladders of various widths 
dangled between the bannisters. An entrepreneurial climbing center 
had scattered colourful bolt-on handholds along the large structural 
pillars and southwest wall for patrons preferring even more precarious 
ascents and descents. Rappelling from the top floor for a speedy 
departure was an option. Gazing upwards from the central commons 
tended to upset Bob’s gastric juices. The pukey sensation only lasted a 
few seconds. He closed his eyes momentarily to regain his equilibrium.
Shopping or dining in The Arcades Project or TAP as it was called by 
patrons and critics alike, required guts, patience, agility and, most 
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importantly, commitment. All emphasis was on the ‘getting there’ rather 
than the ‘got.’ During the 90¢ ‘netting’ transits, visitors carried personals 
and purchases on their backs, tied around their waists or in small 
bags held between their molars. A single industrial elevator, reserved 
for the transportation of commodities only, purred and clanked as 
the building’s ubiquitous soundtrack. The monotony of its rattle as 
products moved with little effort from supplier to vendor amidst the 
stench of human sweat was reminiscent of assembly line reek in ancient 
Fordist factories. In the four corners of this formidable deco cum 
gothic interior shaft, Bob watched with mantra-like concentration the 
mechanical transport of heavy boxes and crates of consumables as his 
fellow bipeds enacted a sardonic politics of verticality.
This was TAP’s wacko marketing plan.
Advertised as the antidote to online shopping and accelerated lifestyles, 
‘netting’ at TAP had become a spectacular symbol of resistance 
to mindless consumerism, a bio-friendly alternative to heedless 
consumption. TAP was a flâneur mecca, flaunting perusal and barter 
over buying and selling; soft voyeurism over hard commerce. The 
retailers assembled here were necessarily quirky. Mom and pop 
establishments, antique stores, craft boutiques, tailoring services, 
shoe repair shops and soda fountains found their place among the 
bespoke app makers, solar cell service centers and kinky lingerie shops. 
Franchise establishments were prohibited.
Curiosity cabinets had been the rage for the past six months. 
Entrepreneurial merchants enthusiastically hoofed one-off aka ‘unique’ 
items as a balm for a surplus saturated public. Vision enhancing devices 
such as magnifying lenses, kaleidoscopes, diffractive pince-nez and 
scalable (1x200) monocles were peddled as must-have Idler Implements 
for the window watcher’s toolbox. For a tide had turned. Even outside 
TAP’s fortress exterior, on chic-encrusted high street, value and its 
objects were in a far from equilibrium state.
The Society of the Spectral
Bob had come to the TAP to lunch with the ladies at Walter’s, a fourth 
floor slowfood joint that boasted the best pea shoot salads in town. As 
advertised, heart-pumping exhilaration upon arrival would intensify the 
epicurean experience. Bob reached the balustrade of the restaurant 
damp with expectation, his taste buds aroused and ready.
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The ladies in question were a feral feminist artist group he’d associated 
with for many years. They called themselves The Bettys. As yet the only 
male member, he often functioned as querulous pet and scapegoat. 
He’d long enjoyed the lively irreverent conversation from this cadre of 
distinctive voices, a mix of generations, ethnic backgrounds, skillsets 
and interests. He was demurely proud of his long-term acceptance 
in their sect.
Bob had survived the Betty’s lesbian separatist phase as a mute 
cross-dresser, sneaking chameleon-like into women only festivals and 
public toilets, fastidiously covering his prominent adam’s apple with 
a turtleneck dickey. The Bettys felt a rush of subversive naughtiness 
during that time, disobeying their own strident political rulebook by 
harbouring straight male flesh in their perfectly idiomatic, crudely 
graffittied Volkswagon bus. Though Bob’s African-American heritage 
and performance artist temperament helped to assuage his acceptance 
in this particular flock of agitators, his sex betrayed him on numerous 
occasions. The details of these anecdotes remain undisclosed. Lady 
Luck on their side, the B’s + Bob soldiered on unscathed through the 
turbulent waters of second wave feminist politics.
That was then. As the teeming walls of TAP attest, women had long 
since taken the reins of attitude between their teeth with the diligence 
of worker ants. The Betty’s carpe diem tactics seized the opportunity 
this location offered. Hip to the prog politics of TAP’s ‘un-management,’ 
they embraced a cheerleader role in perpetuating the unfathomable 
by upending the phrase once pejoratively associated with the hunting/
gathering habits of the second sex. Having done what they do, a large 
banner, black capital letters on a commie red cloth, hangs like an 
altarpiece from the upper esplanade of the Arcade.
The Bs played their role in setting the ironic yet zealously affirmative 
tone that had come to exemplify this strange place. Like their 
Situationist ancestors, they were inclined to display their worldview on 
posters, graffiti, banners and street art. Ritually lunching every year 
on the anniversary of the STYD banner installation, they discussed the 
pervasive long-term effects of their whimsy; the palpable change in 
consumer habits, the heartbreaking collateral damage. And each year, 
as they amassed to celebrate, the getting there proved perilously s-l-o-
w-e-r. But that was the thrill of it. The risk. The high stakes of political 
counterpoint. The manifestation of the manifesto. As the years rolled 
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by, these annual displays of self-congratulation always included the 
scouting of dining options on more easily accessible floors.
*
They lunched heartily, savouring the fresh vegetables, lubricants and 
animated conversation. On this occasion Bob sat between Yellow 
Betty the younger and White Betty the elder who, dressed in a sweat-
drenched pink jogging outfit, exclaimed during the prosecco toast 
that this was most definitely her final appearance at TAP. “I can’t get it 
up anymore” she roared while dusting her kale and carrot salad with 
marinated sesame seeds. Sitting across the table from Bob were Violet, 
Orange and Red Betty respectively. Devoted to their anonymity, RB and 
OB wore form-fitting latex rat masks with supple mouth holes.
Dongles, dangles and dinner
Leaning across the table in rapt attention, Bob jostled the glasses, 
plates and utensils in his peripersonal space. On his right arm he 
wore seven layers of brightly coloured bakelite bracelets, his recurring 
fashion statement at Betty happenings. Though a poised and gesturally 
articulate man, managing this dangly obtrusive presence while dining 
was a feat he’d yet to master. Absorbed in a Red Betty anecdote about 
her younger brother’s target practice on wild bunnies, he toppled his 
wine glass. A smooth Pinot Noir with a cranberry aftertaste trickled 
from the table to the floor.
“Shit. Sorry about that. I, I didn’t notice the… damn, well anyway…” 
Bob sopped up the spilled wine with a napkin. “Please go on, you were 
talking about the gauge of the gun…” “It’s OK Betty Bob, the wine, 
there’s more,… Yeah, the gauge of those pellets, I remember this factoid 
and I have no idea why. 4.4 mm.” Red Betty demonstrated the size of 
the pellet by mapping a tiny space between her thumb and index finger. 
“On the big side for BB’s” she said. “On the tiny side for rabbit shit” 
Yellow Betty added. “My little bro never killed an animal but he sure did 
serve out some pain to more than a few. There was this one gray bunny, 
we called him Harvey coz he would just appear and disappear. Poof! 
Like that. My brother would draw a bead on him from feet or so and 
then Poof! he was gone. I saw this with my own eyes more than once. 
I told my brother, ‘Bobby,’ I said, ‘this is a sign.’ I told him the rabbits 
were sentient beings and he should shoot at beer bottles or coke cans, 
something with a logo on it but not bunnies and toads. He was never 
Last Year at Betty and Bob’s: An Adventure 417
very good at listening to advice when he was ten. A real brat he was 
then. Anyway…” On a roll, RB took a dramatically timed sip from her 
wine glass and continued. “…one fine spring day, Harvey hopped into 
the yard and up on to the porch where Bobby was playing checkers with 
himself. He was unarmed coz his pet Daisy Red Ryder BB Repeater rifle 
was propped in a corner of the toolshed out back. Harvey hopped right 
on to his boots and sat there all Buddha like. It was crazy. My brother 
didn’t move a muscle. Couldn’t. The wind stopped … dead silence … and 
then, after maybe two minutes, ten minutes, Poof! as usual, Harvey 
vanished. Presto! Just like in a magician’s trick…. but for real you know 
what I mean…?”
Bob was attentive as he traced a dribble of red wine on the white 
tablecloth with his pinky. “Wow. Impressive. You sure?” He cynically 
added, “Was there a puff of smoke?”
Red Betty hesitated a moment, ignoring his incredulity. “We’ve talked 
about this many times since, me and Bobby, and we both remember 
it almost the same. He talks about the weight of the rabbit on his feet. 
Heavy. I couldn’t feel that, the cement-like plop of this rabbit presence, 
but I looked into Harvey’s eyes, riveted. Yeah, riveted to my seat. I swear 
I had one of those epiphanic moments. You know, like seeing god or 
all of a sudden understanding something that’s not supposed to be 
understandable. Like love or death or intuition.” “Or prehension.” White 
Betty sullenly piped in.
Bob’s scepticism was percolating like his grandmother’s coffeepot. 
“Yeah, OK… and what exactly did it feel like, this, uh, spiritual moment? 
This revelation?”
Red Betty let out a long breath as her lips flubbered.
“It felt like Nothing escaping.”
Bam-ba-lam
Bob oscillated between two tags. At the Bettys’ inception he made the 
obvious choice of the nom de guerre ‘Black Betty’ but it stuck like a 
lump in his throat. Long since released from the gender ruse, he was 
assuredly male - handsome, lusty, impeccably tailored in peculiarly 
artful layers of mismatch. His appearance was an ongoing performance. 
The others casually referred to him as Betty Bob. This twist had a 
certain twang to it they all thought hilarious but he felt the accented 
418 Sher Doruff
nick simultaneously marginalized his gender and mocked his ancestral 
past. He took this jibe in relative good humour but the ongoing debate 
over his inclusion in ‘The Palette’ still irked him. Indeed, black as a color 
sits outside the chromatic spectrum. It’s either All or Nothing, void or 
unity. An art school graduate he knew just enough about the additive 
and subtractive color systems to be disoriented by the contradictory 
functions of black and white.
Back in the day when the Bs first initiated their color tags, Bob could 
have chosen Green as his identifier, a central component in the 
spectrum, but it required a bold commitment to a political affiliation 
that had not yet captured his interest. Blue, his favourite colour, was 
appropriated by a Betty now missing in action; disappeared. Her 
history with the group was vaguely lit though she had inspired a 
percentile bump in global veganism several years back. Something 
about an earworm jingle she’d penned for an ad campaign. This feat 
was considered a triumph in an off year for the Bettys. Though they 
held hope for Blue’s return, like a super athlete’s numbered jersey, 
the color was retired in her memory. Through the years, numerous 
interns had dibs on the in-betweens. Turquoise. Pink. Chartreuse. 
Mauve. Vermillion. They all concurred that subjective specificity across 
the visible spectrum yields plenty; a Zeno’s arrow of Color, infinite 
perceptual divisibility between hues. A recent digital artist recruit 
insisted on breaking the B’s own boundaries by going Infrared. Her 
request was in equal parts annoying and exhilarating, a mutational 
gesture bursting with a prescience that insured the group’s survival 
in the long term. They awaited an Ultraviolet. Perhaps a millennial 
would venture into the outer reaches of the electromagnetic spectrum, 
breaching the constraints of color altogether, going Radio, X-Ray, 
Micro, Cosmic.
Bob, the reluctant Black Betty, had thoroughly researched the 
secondary historical connotations his name carried – musket, liquor 
bottle, bullwhip, woman, prostitute, prison wagon – allusions carved 
into folklore by Lead Belly’s chain gang work song. ( Jump steady Black 
Betty bam-ba-lam. Whoa Black Betty bam-ba-lam.) An object of serious 
anthropological study, this immortalized ‘Black Betty’ was indefinitely 
writ. No hermeneutic consensus had been struck on her account. 
Thus, both his formal and informal tags, ‘Black Betty’ and ‘Betty Bob’ 
unremittingly referred to a troubled disposif.
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He could work this angle surely. Race. Alterity. Inequality. Bias. Hatred. 
Slavery. Life experience had primed him slick for nuanced argument. 
He had a gift for persuasive oratory when dressed for the occasion. 
Left to his own imaginings however, his thoughts usually wandered into 
abstract, flighty terrain. A sober if dreamy man, Bob preferred plumbing 
the physics of light and metaphysics of color to unfurling the polemics 
of decolonial relations between black, brown, red, yellow and white. 
The rainbow flag was too literal for his taste. Even as he tended to his 
philosophical tendencies there was little escape from the magnetic pull 
of his fugitive legend. The Bettys urged him to get his priorities in order.
At home, a wall near his bed hosted a material witness of his existential 
dilemmas. Here hung a hand-painted ‘Black is Beautiful’ poster he’d 
inherited from his great-grandmother of the extinct Panther tribe. 
The tension between the brilliant simplicity of its message and its 
convoluted legacy haunted him. Holding its fading, fragile countenance 
nakedly in his hands had overtaxed his sensations so he’d carefully 
covered the dog-eared construction paper in two full rolls of kitchen 
plastic wrap. The unwavering calligraphy of the three adamant words 
refracted through the bundle of transparent layers, now nearly 
unreadable, obscured and buried beneath stratums of light.
Manifesto Epitaph
Following the lively reunion meal the Bs hugged, high-fived and 
mentally prepared for their departure with one minute of huddled 
silent concentration. This custom had been Blue Betty’s initiative, an 
impulsive semi-terrified gesture concluding their first celebratory TAP 
meal many years past. The surviving Bettys continued the tradition, 
partially in Blue’s honour, partially because it was a damn good idea 
to take a deep breath before committing one’s body to the task. Team 
sport had got this ritual right.
As any seasoned sailor will tell you rope descents can be deceptively 
difficult, especially on cargo net constructions that flex on every foot 
and handhold. Gravity’s insistence, an obstacle on the way up, is just 
as hostile on the way down. Many opt to rappel at TAP as it’s a quick 
descent and the pelvic harness has its unquestionably kinky allure. 
Single rope journeys require another type of skill. Legs wrapped around 
a wobbly strand of hemp or a swath of aerial silk, one foot threaded 
to support the body’s ascent and slow its descent, this procedure 
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is popular with firemen, pole dancers, acrobats and young boys. 
Negotiating the knotted, fluctuating instability of the communal Netting 
is more dangerous in its unpredictability. It requires a certain spidery 
athletic finesse but more importantly, it demands a versatile response-
ability to contingent conditions. The Netting is always otherwise, like the 
Nasdaq or the weather on K2. Networking techniques are often hard 
won. Trust functions instrumentally. Red, Violet, Yellow, Orange, Black 
Betty and the in-betweens have always preferred this, some would say, 
more challenging collaborative route.
In their farewell huddle, OB broke the solemn mood with a hearty, 
horribly clichéd “You go grrls!” They groaned then whooped in unison 
as they began their return to ground level, butt-skimming the waist 
high railing, one leg secured on the safe side, the other dangling the 
void. Carefully finding toeholds on the unstable rope, they hoisted their 
aging bodies over the barrier. Affable Red Betty was as always, wearing 
her rat mask and infectiously pos attitude. In one enthusiastic move, 
following a bravada wave to Yellow Betty carefully descending to her 
right, her left foot missed a notch in the netting. Having elected to wear 
her new stilettos, thinking the heel would hook securely around the 
hemp thongs like a boot in a stirrup, she had neglected to factor in the 
slick danger of her stylish footwear’s polished soles.
She slipped one meter, then eighteen.
2. Red Betty’s Black/Whiteout
It took approximately 1.83 seconds for Red Betty to break apart on 
the cold marble floor of TAP’s interior vestibule. She dropped silently, 
her scream resounding internally, throughout the soft tissue of her 
imperceptibly accelerating body. A lot can happen in 1.83 seconds at an 
average falling speed of 17kph/40mph. The accumulated light and dark 
of her forty-two years flashed in stroboscopic flurry.
“Bets, get in here and do the dishes.”
“Sis, you seen my BB gun?”
“Mmmm, I love you darling.”
“Don’t stop…”
“Happy New Year!”
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“Help me!”
“God, no!”





It’s doubtful any pair of eyes saw the tick from 286 to 287 as Red Betty’s 
statistical moment was calculated.
*
The Arcades Project hosted a real-time line item on the dynamic Umwelt 
that is the Worldometers homepage. On this stroboscopic seizure-
inducing multi-ticker array of faux coordinates and unadulterated 
portend, TAP held its place as a near static three-digit antidote to the 
ruthless advance of advance. Nestled alongside the global update of 
births and deaths, military expenditure, energy consumed and forests 
lost, TAP’s digital counter recorded the on-site demise of its patrons. 
Accumulating at a creep, TAP’s incrementally slow pace was nonetheless 
chilling, a reminder of desperate conviction clamouring for air in the 
throes of an anthropocene death spiral.
The mesmerizing worldometer beat of environmental and demographic 
data appeals to news junkies with entangled interests: a longing for 
homeostasis on the one hand and a desire for an exhilarating far 
from equilibrium rush on the other. TAP ticker-watchers are harder to 
pigeonhole. Catastrophe addicts, conspiracy theorists, rubberneckers, 
anti-consumerists, rock climbers, rock stars, queers, artists, Betty 
groupies, greenies, vegans, economists, socialists, stockbrokers, fifth 
wave feminists, neo-futurists, eulogy hobbyists, undercommoners, 
gamblers - the gamut. TAP’s own website hosted ‘In Memorium’ pages 
of dropped shoppers, those who risked their lives for an untenable 
cause, for the transcendental displacement of capitalist hegemony 
everywhere. Here, martyr videos of the desperate and the doomed 
were posted alongside photo archives of the accidentally dropped 
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ones, those for whom conviction proved fatal. This digital graveyard 
proliferated with affirming life images uploaded by family and 
friends. The Dylan riff “She knows there’s no success like failure and 
that failure’s no success at all” was popular. Many offered eulogistic 
banalities. “May she rest in peace” was by far the most common and the 
most ‘unliked.’ Red Betty, when once a living, breathing eulogist herself, 
preferred more creative adages. Her “RIP & DIFFRACT” gif went viral 
upon her passing.
She’d been an avid worldometer observer, hypnotized by the insistence 
of the counter’s progress. The tockless tick, tick, tick, tick, tick. She 
had no idea what exactly to do with this barrage of accumulating data. 
She’d tweeted “Whoa horsey, slow the fuck down. I wanna smell what 
remains of the roadkill” to hysterical confusion among her followers at 
#popupworld. As her color boldly announced, her leftwing leanings 
literally left her a misplaced contemporary on a planet where the 
horizontal political spectrum no longer held traction, left and right 
convolving into a meaningless ideological stalemate. The once well-
defined, color-coded political spectrum had dissipated, exemplified 
by the co-opting of Revolutionary Red by neoliberal political parties. 
Resistance would require encryption.
Once upon a time as a younger activist, RB’s political response to 
governmental and institutional horrors was straightforward though 
admittedly ineffective. She collectivized, marched, threw stones 
(sometimes), resisted arrest (always), spent a day or two in lock-up then 
got bailed. At candlelit rallies she cried together with friends over a slew 
of injustices: the gross indecency of the distribution of wealth, dominant 
nation war mongering atrocities, genocide, vivisection and the stubborn 
persistence of racial hegemony. Micro-political activists cut from the 
same cloth as Red Betty threw their bodies into the polemic. Resistance 
was a tactilely felt force. Two days before her fall she’d tweeted: “I 
feel failure in my fingertips every time I click the submit button on Avaaz 
petitions” #popupworld.
Shaz Dada Blog Bits
Arts and Politics journalist Shaz Dada’s remarks on the drop of Red Betty. 
First published in Dada’s blog, Situations.
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20 April
On Falling, Failing and Flying
It must be said today that as a community we are again confronted with 
expressing an unambiguous feeling of loss in the face of ambiguous 
success and fulfillment. Deeply saddened by the passing of Red 
Betty of the notorious art propagandists The Bettys, we nonetheless, 
according to her own wishes, joyfully observe her adventurous life. Red 
Betty consistently walked the talk, inspiring generations of ethically 
vibrant artists, activists, theorists and precarity workers of all stripes, 
patterns and colours. We have the Bettys to thank for the anti-neocon-
consumerist approach to daily shopping and of course the twisted Shop 
Til You Drop slogan among other memorable idioms. ‘Cleavage Rules’ is 
my personal favourite. When Red Betty dropped to her demise at TAP 
on 15 April she was, like so many courageous and vigilant predecessors, 
cleaving her artmaking to her life and death.
Until her untimely passing, Red Betty had been an aggressive advocate 
of the non-monetary exchange of services and goods. Her strong teeth 
and broad back had carried more than her body weight in perishables 
and necessary toiletries over the years. While the others have opted to 
play and pay with J-coins, she chose for barter only and the ingenious 
scrutiny of what she referred to as the ‘really free’ market. Living 
healthfully off conspicuous urban food waste, she’d convened a band 
of rat-masked activists, daily foraging for ample spoils in a gluttonous 
city. Well fed and well read, her tireless advocacy of a better way had 
given her iconic status in an urban field fast approaching 22,000,000 
inhabitants. Her drop will surely have an effect on the art of dissidence.
I interviewed Red six years ago when Blue Betty first went missing. 
She was articulate, funny, concerned and unassuming, exuding, like 
her color, a very powerful aura. Perhaps more than any other Betty, 
she helped to construct the TAP project as a singular actualization of 
aesthetic resistance. She made a difference. Arguably, the transactional 
agency of placemaking that occurs in that arcade is of the profoundest 
sort. So it is with sadness and muted celebration that I extend my “RIP 




The air in their shared warehouse studio was thick with imploding 
drama. They all felt it but were reluctant to name it. RED. Gone. BLUE 
missing. GREEN empty. Left without the foundational RGB they were 
conceptually, scientifically, politically and philosophically bereft. 
Voided. Limp.
Thoroughly shaken by Red Betty’s sudden departure, the gaping 
sinkholes in the Bettys ROYGBV spectrum signalled the imminent 
collapse of their project. A sense of urgency prevailed in desperate 
defiance of any tendency to retreat into a sullen depression, a 
despairing purgatory. Collectively they needed to get back in the saddle. 
Mottled crew that they now were, unable to address the issue of their 
insolvency directly, they opted instead for a refreshing dip into the 
chaosmos. Anon proclaimed ‘it was there a horse soon dancing’ so they 
abided. They partied. Hard.
Waking Finnegan
“Fuck, I’m messed up. Can’t handle red wine anymore not to mention 
scotch and soda.” “Partying ain’t what it used to be but I still gotta say 
that being touched by the dark waters of a single malt feels real good 
right now.” “Crank up that tune sweetie, I adore Sonic Youth. Perfect 
music for an imperfect moment.” “Don’t ya miss her…Red, I mean? Fuck, 
I do. She had the best style of us all. Knew how to wear stilettos like a 
catwalker.” “Uuhh, well, hmmm, maybe not…you know… anyway, there’s 
no justice in this goddamn world.” “You got a smoke on you?” “Nope.” “… 
crudités?” “… and then this skinny dude with a plastic pen protector in 
his pocket, no joke, started writing equations on the kitchen tile and….” 
“Did you see the exoplanet photo that went viral yesterday?” “Kinda.” 
“Speaking of rats, have there been any more updates on that woman 
with the neon rat scratch? Her name is Betty right, or Bette or Beet, 
anyway friggin weird.” “But hey, everybody, y’all listen up. Personally, 
and maybe this is just me but (clears throat) I don’t think we oughta go 
to TAP for awhile. We should lay low, you know what I mean? Reconsider 
our asser(burp)tions.” “Fuck no, that’s the worst thing we could do for 
Red, abandon her project like scared little girls.” “We gotta go back 
tomorrow in style. Walk through the archway with quiet dignity. Climb 
that Netting like ants up a vine.” “Immediate!” “Hey, let’s barter her ratty 
mask for twenty vegan dinners for the homeless at Slushy’s. She’d like 
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that.” “Sounds patronizing to me.” “Yeah, me too.” “Fuck this shit.” “Let’s 
not enter a polemical pit tonight folks. OK? It’s time to get wasted on 
fond memories. Celebrate Red’s leaving, cry over Red lost. It’s not, I 
repeat NOT, the moment for politically correct fisticuffs. We got plenty 
of time for that tomorrow.” “Okedoki, White is right as always bam ba 
lam.” “Say that again without irony Betty Bob, pleeeze, for Red’s sake…” 
“Okedoki, White is right as always bam ba lam.”
Baconing
Impulsively, amidst the after party chaos of their eulogistic bash, the 
surviving Bs began redesigning their studio space after Francis Bacon’s 
catastrophe-style atelier. Creating a material shit storm felt like the right 
thing to do. There was no discussion. This was a moment when years of 
embattled collective negotiation paid dividends in collective intuition. 
Spontaneously fastidious, they began fashioning their workspace from 
hoarder photos of garbage heap rooms. “Shock inertia before it grabs a 
stranglehold” YB kept muttering.
Following the dead painter’s lead they played with a cacophony of 
perceptual triggers and dissociation mechanisms. This technique would 
surely horse jump them towards an indeterminate creative intensity, 
help to alleviate their alarming sense of loss and despair, the affective 
noise of hyper-stimulated precarity. Orange Betty pointed out that 
wading through mountains of accumulated debris could backfire on 
their delicate emotional states but her listless argument was overruled.
They went wild. Playing in a vibrational field of non-attachment, flush 
with the simultaneity of destruction and creation, they wrestled tumult 
to a fever pitch. “Immediate!” White Betty yelled. “Diagram goddamn it!” 
“Bacon it!” “Or Vega-bacon it!” A tactical pro by now at whipping vitality 
into motion, WB enthusiastically shouted motivational aphorisms 
through a hand rolled cardboard megaphone. “Infinite entanglement!” 
she shouted as she slipped on a slime heap of newsprint, vinyl shards 
and coffee grounds majestically laid out in a logarithmic spiral by VB. 
Her hipbone flinched in surprise as she hit the concrete floor. Blacks, 
blues and yellows colonized her haunches.
Soon they were knee deep in debris and images: images of images, 
junk, tools, objets trouvés, boxes and assorted detritus. The central 
convivial table in the 200sq meter warehouse loft was strewn with 
books, magazines, poster scraps, tools (markers, pens, brushes, 
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tablets, tweezers, screwdrivers, spray paint cans, tape, glue, arduino 
boards, raspberry pi’s, wires, transistors, alligator clips) potato chips, 
donut holes, kale crackers, and displaced dust. Every bare centimeter 
in the high-ceilinged drafty workspace was soon covered with things 
and representations of things. Articulated gibberish. One had to 
wade through an assault on the senses to carve out a still point in the 
mess. “Do you feel satisfied yet?” YB tentatively whispered to VB as 
they watched Infrared Betty swipe snow angels in a pile of shredded 
Cosmology magazine pages mingled with hundreds of poetry shards 
(among them clippings from Anne Carson’s Autobiography of Red and 
Maggie Nelson’s Bluets). Forging a butterfly pattern in a riot of spectral 
effervescence technically unavailable to human perception, this 
mélange of language and Hubble photos, of chaosmos and chiasmus, 
rendered an invisible universe carnivalesque, a Fellini cosmos in a Wes 
Anderson palette. IB sang “Come fly with me through The Verse, through 
The Verse” to no one in particular.
Attuned to a sighing collective exhaustion, the Betty’s caught their 
breath as they surveyed the scene. The words “Impressive” and 
“OMG” filled thought bubbles floating over the silence. Even by their 
own rigorous standards, they’d outdone themselves. For a kaironian 
moment they felt relieved, marginally content. And then, as if on cue, 
an unmistakable twinge, an undeniable tendency towards conceptual 
catharsis infected the semblance of closure. Slowly, they reassembled 
around the kitchen table. Philosophical conversation usually worked on 
their metabolisms like a psychedelic drug. “Let’s talk Color girls,” White 
Betty slurred as she massaged the ache in her hip. “ How bout we sleep 
on it first,” whined OB.
4. Dic cur hiccup
Long a Betty tradition, close reading sessions on topics of shared 
interest were as comforting as food prepared together. They called 
these conversations Dic cur hiccups after Leibnitz’s advice (dic cur 
hic) to say what’s up, what’s happening now. Fragments of feminist, 
queer and decolonial theory convolved with continental philosophies 
and approaches to artistic practice. Heady and happy, Whitehead 
tended to rule. Often, without formally beginning, disparate banter 
slowly dribbled into a kind of coherence. Provocations and questions 
littered with anecdotes and nonsensical tangents settled into focused 
concentration.
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The morning-after Red’s bash, copious amounts of coffee and green tea 
were consumed from stained jelly jars as they tried to rectify their hang-
overs with caffeine. At the crack of dawn teetotaler Ochre Betty pulled 
Wittgenstein’s Remarks on Colour from the library rubble. She printed 
out Part I pages 2-14 for the groups perusal. Amidst the cacophonous 
distraction of their ‘baconing,’ the B’s struggled with the text at hand. 
One hour into the discussion Ludwig’s proposition 52 was generating 
animated argument:
52. White as a colour of substances (in the sense in which we say snow 
is white) is lighter than any other substance-colour; black darker. Here 
colour is a darkening, and if all such is removed from the substance, 
white remains, and for this reason we can call it “colourless”.
Orange Betty: What bullshit is this? Why are we even talking about 
substances? And a substance colour? Passé dogdoo…
Brown Betty: Do you think he means materiality?
White Betty: Personally, I don’t get it either. Is he saying that white is 
colourless in uhh, essence? Or that essence is colourless? You know I 
don’t think this way and I have the most at stake here since, well, you 
know, I am White Betty… or I thought I was but then, aah, aah, maybe 
this can work for me in terms of eradicating identity politics altogether. 
I’m kinda confused… Or is he saying all substance is white with variable 
degrees of darkening? That I could live with. Or…no… it’s still confusing, 
objectionable.
Violet Betty: Well, it’s easier to grasp if we think about uhm, 
appearances, right? I don’t know, I never studied philosophy, but 
anyway, a rose is a rose is a rose is sometimes red. Snow, when a dog 
hasn’t pissed on it looks white. Isn’t that what he means? Substance is 
colour or colour is substance or something like that?
Orange Betty: Uh uh, I don’t think so. There’s more going on here. I 
smell a rat.
Infrared Betty: Hey OB, you’ve always been paranoid.
White Betty: Hang on darlings. Let’s get back to the text. That’s our task 
here after all.
Orange Betty: What do we do with this?
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Brown Betty: (head dangling) I’m sorry, can we deal with this at another 
session. I can’t think straight today.
Vermillion Betty: (chuckles) I can’t think queer today.
White Betty: OK, let’s skip that bit for now. One last try (reading aloud):
68. When we’re asked “What do the words ‘red’, ‘blue’, ‘black’, ‘white’ 
mean?” we can, of course, immediately point to things which have these 
colours, -- but our ability to explain the meanings of these words goes 
no further! For the rest, we have either no idea at all of their use, or a 
very rough and to some extent false one.
White Betty: We can all agree with that right?
Orange Betty: (murmuring) In principle I want to disagree with 
anything he says.
Vermillion Betty: In principle I want to agree to disagree.
White Betty: But this goes straight to the heart of our problematics. Our 
tags, our post-identity politics, the work we make. No?
Violet Betty: The limits of language. That’s the point right? And actually, 
I think that’s a cool concept. You know, what we can’t say. What 
we can’t know.
Orange Betty: But…
Black Betty: (excited) But ... sorry … I’m just riffing … backing up … if 
color is a darkening like he says in 52 then he’s playing his language 
games in the subtractive field. White is originating. He’s taking a side, 
flipped to a specific system of reference, of belief.
Orange Betty: Huh?
Ochre Betty: So what?
Mauve Betty: (sifting through loose images on the table) Hey, check this 
out, a snap of one half of Ronald Reagan. It’s hilarious. “Where’s the 
rest of me?”
Violet Betty: (undistracted) Yeah, continue, whatch you on 
about Betty Bob?
Black Betty: You know, this theory I’m working on about the relational 
difference between dual systems of color, additive and subtractive. The 
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additive system, RGB, you know, all prismatic color in white light and the 
‘other’ one, the subtractive, CYM, all color absorbed in black.
White Betty: As usual, you’re obfuscating … I want to understand the 
significance of this but you’re always soooo opaque.
Black Betty: Yes, yes that’s it you see…
Brown Betty: I’ll look for a blackboard and chalk. Must be something 
around here… you could draw it for us…
Violet Betty: (glaring at Black Betty) Can we not talk about your pet 
project now and focus on the text please.
Black Betty: (demurring) Yeah OK, sorry… it’s just…
White Betty: (sighing) maybe later Betty Bob. I’m interested.
Orange Betty: But hey, are we really talking language games here or 
are we enmeshed in something other? I always thought this analytic 
perspective carved out a suffocating system. I just, uhh, I just don’t like 
it. I instinctively prefer the process thinkers, not the logicians.
Infrared Betty: And for the record, sorry I got to interject, can we also 
talk about Pink or Beige or Gray for fuck’s sake? Don’t y’all get sick of the 
primaries after awhile?
Brown Betty: You got that right.
Mauve Betty: Oh my god, you gotta see this!
And so it went...
As a coda to the loud, heated, inconclusive discussion punctuated 
by tangential remarks, Violet Betty recited a passage from Derek 
Jarman’s Chroma to sober the escalating din – “Red is a moment in 
time. Blue constant. Red is quickly spent. An explosion of intensity. It hums 
itself. Disappears like fiery sparks into the gathering shadow.” “Voila” 
she concluded.
5. Whoa Black Bessie
A black man and a Betty, Bob was often off-balance. He took his 
politics and his philosophy seriously as did the other B’s but he was an 




He’d bonded with Red and missed her. She’d been his link to 
collaboration, to mixing it up with others. He felt the scissor cut of the 
sever, the cleave, now that she was dust in the wind. He was on his own, 
no matter how crazy comfortable the Betty gatherings felt. Red’s fall 
jolted his temperament.
“I have this funny feeling” Bob whispered to IB. He’d fallen hard for her 
since she’d joined the group. It wasn’t her toned bod (he told himself) or 
her enthusiasm for all things cosmopolitical that grabbed him. “I’ve got 
a sinking feeling my concerns… my art … is wanking bullshit like Yellow 
always says.” IB nodded. Bob couldn’t tell if it was a nod of agreement 
with his doubts or an empathetic gesture. He suspected his infatuation 
with IB might have something to do with her uncanny likeness to his 
boyhood heroine, Bessie Coleman. But he might be projecting. The 
remembered warmth of his grandmother’s stories flooded his dreaming 
with the thrill of adventure, the twinkle of starlight in a pitchblack sky, 
the waning blue of the vanishing point on an ocean’s horizon. This was 
the stuff of his future perfects, his will have beens.
Next to the cellophaned Panther poster on his bedroom wall he’d 
pinned up several photos of the aviator that he’d cut from a tattered 
second hand book he’d found in a Strand dustpile. His grandmother 
had told him bedtime stories of Bessie’s barnstorming exploits, her 
bravery, her remarkable resistance to racial profiling. “She was the first 
woman of African-American descent to earn an aviation pilot’s license 
Bobby. She had to go all the way to Paris France to do it coz there was 
no way she was getting into a pilot’s school in the US of A with two 
strikes against her, that being black and female as she was.” “Did she 
fly around the world Grandma?” he remembered asking. “No Bobby, 
she died before that was possible. You’re maybe thinking of Amelia, but 
she didn’t make it either. Anyway, Bessie died in a senseless way, falling 
from an old plane she’d bought herself, a tuna fish can with wings. A 
real aerial acrobat she was. A daredevil flying loop dee loops. Anyway, 
she didn’t have her seatbelt on when her dodgy plane went belly up 
mid-air, a wrench in the gearbox they said. Sounds like a bad joke but 
that’s the truth of it. She dropped 2000 feet they say.”
As a kid, Bob would often dream of Bessie falling through the Floridian 
air. She always wafted like a skydiver or an angel, seeing things through 
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her goggles no on else had seen, feeling things, remembering things, 
as if she had all the time in the world to float on a future. This dream 
always included a bright yellow single propeller plane trailing a metallic 
banner out its ass, fluttering in the sky like a giant water moccasin 
waving through prairie grass.
Justy Phillips
The Fictiōnella: Immediating Relations 
Through Fictiōneering
When you and I catch sight of a Great Tufted Owl in a forest 200 kilometres 
northwest of Montreal the world splits open once again. Our air-locked hire 
car splinters in two in five in eight in more. Separates with such devastating 
force, the nearly from the living.
In the stillness of more-than one. We consume each other. Move-with each 
others’ consuming. You. I.
She. The plumed beast. Aloft.
High in the canopy where cuts are made of ochre light. Organs of sugar 
soap and air.
In his seminal discussion paper on contemporaneity, philosopher and 
media theorist, Boris Groys asks: “How does the present manifest 
itself in our everyday experience—before it begins to be a matter of 
metaphysical speculation or philosophical critique?” (Groys 2009: 1). 
As an artist and writer, my life is shaped by the precarious ecology 
of fictioneering—a practice of “speculative eventing” that generates 
immediations through chance encounter and constructed situations.
Fictiōneering: To make-with the living experience of events.
The term “fictioneer” (C19th) is commonly defined as a “writer or 
inventor of fiction.” By activating the Latin root of fiction, fictiō, meaning 
“to make or produce” rather than the more common understanding 
of fiction meaning “the act of feigning or inventing imaginary events” 
(The New Shorter Oxford English Dictionary 1993: 941), a practice of 
fictiōneering becomes both a relation-producing movement and an 
active and ongoing, processual engagement with eventing of everyday 
life (Phillips 2014). The in-act of fictiōneering is not a matter of truth. 
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Only experience in-the-making. As a fictiōneer, the present manifests 
itself in my everyday experience through imperceptible acts of telling.
Fictiōneering is a practice of speculative eventing that embraces chance 
encounters through techniques of attuning, wandering, distilling and 
scoring. It can be understood as a bringing into language the living 
experience of the event. Conceived as a “process of thinking by doing, 
always with the understanding that concepts are made in and through 
the event”1 research-creation is a mode of enquiry that, as artist and 
philosopher Erin Manning argues, refuses to posit “the terms of its 
account before the exploration of what the account can do” (2016: 
29). Fictiōneering extends this mode of enquiry by drawing into its 
sphere of relations, what I might propose as the “interval” (Manning 
2009a) of telling.
In the dark green fields of the north of England. In the throbbing pink flesh 
of my failing heart. Stretched to the limit. I thought I was looking for my 
father. But now all I feel is yours.
A conjunctive meeting of “fictiō” and “novella,” the fictiō-nella extends 
the making force of fictiō with the novella’s unique form of telling. 
Originating in Italy during the Middle Ages, the term “novella,” from the 
Italian word “novella” (meaning new or news) is widely understood to be 
the telling of a single, suspenseful event, situation or conflict leading 
to an unexpected turning point. Often depicting events concerned 
with real-life people in a real-life setting (hence, the recounting of 
“news” events), the term “novella” is also used to relay fictive events. 
The novella, writes literary theorist, S. Trenkner, is “an imaginary story 
of limited length, intended to entertain, and describing an event in 
which the interest arises from the change in fortunes of the leading 
characters or from behaviour characteristic of them” (1957: xiii). In its 
earliest forms, the novella was an oral tradition, activated and animated 
through voice alone. To this day, through its commonly published short 
story form, the essence of the novella continues to be made felt in 
the telling.
I did not bother to check the ocean floor for upturned rocks. I did not think 
at the time that your grief was my grief. That your life was my living. That I 
could be of any assistance whatsoever in filling the absence of your loss.
I did not think you might still feel the salt in his hair. Late at night where you 
lie warm and pulsing in my arms. I did not see how all of this was growing 
inside me. Because I was looking for my father. And yours was already gone.
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Critically, the fictiōnella is a gesture of experiential and imperceptible 
telling. But more than this, it is a telling event.
Drawing together as a shared, transversal opening, philosophers, Gilles 
Deleuze and Félix Guattari’s concept of the “novella” and artist and 
philosopher, Erin Manning’s concept of the “interval,” I use fictiōneering 
to think-feel a new gesture of imperceptible telling.
Deleuze and Guattari conceive the novella as that which has already 
happened. It is presented in contrast to the literary genre of the tale, 
which they define as that which is yet to unfold. Rather than focusing 
on the dimension of time, however, Deleuze and Guattari define the 
essence of the novella as its fundamental relation to secrecy. In the 
novella, write Deleuze and Guattari, “you will never know what just 
happened” (1987: 193). I know this through experience. When I feel the 
hole in my heart, what I feel is never the event. Only its aftermath. I 
feel weakness in my legs, palpitations in my chest. Aching in my jaw. I 
feel anxiety. Materiality. An intense and overwhelming sensation of a 
bodying that could be my own. But for its edges.
The novella, write Deleuze and Guattari;
has little to do with a memory of the past or an act of 
reflection; quite to the contrary, it plays upon a fundamental 
forgetting. It evolves in the element of “what happened” 
because it places us in relation with something unknowable 
and imperceptible … It may even be that nothing happened, 
but is precisely that nothing that makes us say, ‘Whatever 
could have happened to make me forget where I put my 
keys, or whether I mailed that letter, etc.? What little blood 
vessel in my brain could have ruptured? What is this nothing 
that makes something happen?’ (1987: 193).
As blooms of rising damp scale the walls of his small bathroom. My father 
and I. And seep into the lounge where his television plays in the dark.
Deleuze and Guattari’s conception of secrecy, writes philosopher 
Claire Colebrook, is “not a content to be discovered—the secret, the 
sense, the genesis of relations—so much as relations where no term 
is exhausted by or through its perception of any other” (2010: 292). 
Secrecy, Colebrook writes, is “the invisible form that orients perceivers 
and bodies but that is not itself perceived” (2010: 292). Secrecy as 
imperceptible, orienting force.
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The air is full of blue and white. Flecks of iridescent dancing light in the sweet 
haze of his home-made cigarette. A symphony of under-stated self-fulfilling 
neglect. He gets up from his chair momentarily, to make another coffee. 
Leaves the shape of his body. And then back to the safe upholstery of his 
refrain. Secreting all the little things we cannot say because we don’t know 
what to say. Because we are afraid.
And all the things you could not say
because of that day. When the ocean swallowed your father. Whole. Knitting 
his gentle organs into coral reef.
In bringing together the two concepts of fictiō and novella, a new 
relation is born. The “fictiōnella,” is what I will come to define as a 
formless telling. Rather than finding presence in the layering or joining 
of their conceptual forms, the fictiōnella creates an opportunity for 
invention in the conjugating “interval” of the event. Invoking Erin 
Manning’s concept of the “interval,” a relational quality of space-
time, the fictiōnella is less concerned with coming to “know what 
just happened” but rather, the proposition of coming to feel what just 
happened. For Manning, “the interval never marks a passage: it creates 
the potential for a passage that will have come to be” (2009a: 24). 
Thinking the interval though the event of dancing, Manning writes:
The interval is duration expressed in movement. It is not something 
I create along, or something I can re-create by myself. It exists in the 
between of movement. It accompanies my movement yet it is never 
passive. It activates the next incipient movement. The interval is the 
metastable quality through which the relation is felt. Many potential 
intensities populate it. It expresses itself as the shifting axis that 
connects us. (Manning 2009a: 17)
As the polyphonic interval of fictiō and novella, the fictiōnella 







The fictiōnella, through this interval that I have come to define as 
“experience in the making-already made felt,” tells-with the affective, 
political and material force of speculative eventing.
In the realm of the visible—the discernable—this interval of experience 
in the making-already made felt is most easily identifiable in already 
existing artworks. The silhouette of a lame horse on a Tiranan 
highway (in Anri Sala’s, Time After Time, 2003). A dead mouse, a 
mound of basalt, sporadically planted marijuana; plants that affect 
the psyche, the digestive system, sexual impulse and the brain; 
upturned tree roots, heaps of cobble stones, a shallow pool of water, 
mud, a marble sculpture, a bee hive and the intermittent arrival of a 
dog named Human (in Pierre Huyghe’s, Untilled, 2012). An unfinished 
house in the Mexican town of El Rosario (in Justy Phillips’, Event #87: 
and towards the unknowable, 2012). The fictiōnella, however, should 
not be misunderstood as form—a mediated object, a printed book, 
an assemblage of feathers and rocks, a voice, a moving body, a 
back-lit video streaming live cross-hemispheric feeds. These are 
merely the visibles—perishings of that “which gives itself to be 
perceived while always being more that what is perceived, bearing 
the potential for further secrecy” (Deleuze and Guattari 1987: 290). 
This formless potential—this is the fictiōnella. This is the fictiōnella’s 
imperceptible glory.
Back home, the giant kelp writhes in the depths of the Tasman sea. He could 
have chosen that place. But I guess this is where he knew you would be.
Such glory demands to be felt. But it is a balancing act of precarious 
holding. Move too quickly and you’ll only ever catch what’s in view. 
Too slowly and the weight of your holding will crush you along with 
everyone else you know. Don’t move at all and you’ll perish, relations 
proliferating beyond and before you. To tell-with the fictiōnella 
you must allow the fictiōnella to tell-with you. To compose you. 
Imperceptibly at first. Perhaps without your knowing. Just a feeling 
that something has happened. Is happening. Over and over, the 
same question in my head: “What happened? Whatever could have 
happened?” (Deleuze and Guattari 1987: 192).
We’re moving forward on a corrugated road when you recognise his eyes in 
the trees. In the place where a copse of silver birch sheds skin upon skin.
Your
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Dad.
It has to be.
The mottled forest kisses him in slippery gills. And the car we are travelling 
in does not stop in time for you to ask him where he’s been. For seventeen 
years adrift. At sea.
In a concrescent collision of fictiō and novella, the fictiōnella makes-
with the affective, political and material force of telling. However, unlike 
the novella, whose primary expression is narrative, the fictiōnella is an 
experiential gesture always in-the-making. No tracing. No recounting. In 
this world everything is new. The fictiōnella is always the first time. The 
first space. The first wriggling, thresholding fizz.
And first it is you who cannot breathe. And then it is I who cannot breathe. 
The distance between the car and the verge and the ground and the sun and 
the broken tree which holds him motionless in this blue. Amphibious weight. 
A tidal rip cleaves you back into his glory plume. And me, to the sorrow of 
your Great Barrier Reef. I meet the crabs and the barnacles and the water 
fleas. Unleash from that day the most spectacular metamorphoses from 





Whilst the fictiōnella may exact details of everyday events, people and 
places, unlike the novella, these singularities are merely markers of a 
more complexifying assemblage—an entering into relation with the 
imaginings, trustings, desires and ineffable lines that score our own 
lives with the lives of others. Perhaps this is the secrecy Claire Colebrook 
marks as “the positive affirmation of an imperceptibility that is created 
through the proliferation of perceivers” (2010: 292). In other words, 
the joy of the imperceptible is only created through the proliferation of 
its perceivers—its voices, its readers, its performers, its partners, its 
memories, its vibrations. I tentatively ask: The fictiōnella as perceiver of 
its own telling?
As a direct experiencing of living events, the fictiōnella illuminates the 
perceiver at every turn. The “I.” The “You.” The apersonal othering. These 
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tendencies reveal not only the ability to cut from all directions but 
perhaps more importantly, the ability to affect the cut, deeply. To propel 
it forward. To dart it with precision. And force.
All our insides are on the outsides. Trailing. Trawling. Hundreds of metres 
cast from the window on your side of the car. Knotted and tangled they 
fall away in messy clumps of something once remembered so clean. I put 
my hand on your knee desperate to anchor this spectacular moment in 
more than the rivulets of petrified dirt that carve our wheels into all the 
things relentless summer rains have washed away. But the speed of this 
extrapolated body catches us both on the run. How badly I want to catch a 
glimpse. Of your dad looking out from his silvery ocean hide. To trace the 
gentle tufts of his eyes with mine.
Beyond any given form, the fictiōnella extends its living lines towards 
formless expression by moving-with the speculative opening, experience 
in the making-already made felt. This hyphenating interval of “space-
time,” this is where the fictiōnella composes itself. But more than this. 
This is how the fictiōnella composes us. How it gestures and cuts. This is 
how it immediates—by moving us to experience immediation as always 
beyond perception. But never beyond feeling.
To squeeze into him these years of missing touch.
My father not yours.
To let him feel.
This mass of invertebrate life between us.
Notes





Something as simple as walking to the shop on a rainy morning. Will 
you: take an umbrella? Tuck jeans into boots? Walk the quickest way, 
avoiding a downpour? Check RainAlarm on your iPhone? Plans begin to 
form; shaping movement, ordering time. The walk to the shop can be 
executed, has a trajectory, acquires a profile.
No! The door blows open and your umbrella sucks the rain inwards 
drenching the bottom of your pants and, as you lean down, you drop 
the phone onto the slate step cracking the glass letting in moisture 
and shutting it down. Swiftly, you plough in to the horizontal storm, 
throwing the forces of body across those of weather, pavement, traffic. 
The route is forgotten yet taken up anyway by habit, as you bend to a 
new mode of tackling the walk, re-orienting and abandoning previous 
plans. You and the day find a different yet faintly familiar carriage to a 
morning coffee.
The form of this walk was neither in the prior preparation nor in the 
chaos ensuing from a sudden change of plan. That walk formed in the 
middle, in-formed by events unfolding. Form is incessantly emergent 
and the emergence is shapely. Such in-forming, in the middle, is 
always at hand yet our capacity to follow and feel its contours fall 
away to habit. Michael Hornblow lands on a process for elongating 
such middling. To suspend middling, and so immediating a temporal 
sequence, is to foreground and value the nonlinear back and forth of 
thinking and making:
Thinking back and forth, feeling what just happened, what 
things have been and are still becoming, as all these emerge 
together—there are many modes in which an event seems 
to shift, as if outside of itself, just as this outside is felt 
within thought. Events are always in the middle of things, 
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even as this middling seems far-flung for the Now moment. 
(Hornblow, Immediation II, 456)
A thickening of experience’s middle that William James called the 
specious present—a “vaguely vanishing backward and forward fringe” 
( James 1950a: 613).
There was no prior form. In that very moment of planning the route 
to the shop—or the art performance—movement had not ceased but 
changed form from walking to strategizing. The prior form was already 
moving in to something else, that “else” moving at a different pace. This 
paradox of form—that form changes as it tries to inform something not 
yet formed and so experiences … a loss of form. But how to get hold 
of that shift? Not in order to pin it down but to let forces escape and 
possess themselves of something more.…
Go back to the questions forming. The questions were never “about” 
something else; were never a moment in which form could be 
hylomophically imposed on what was/is about to happen. As Gerko 
Egert states: “There are no pre-given bodies, no entities that can be 
arranged by a person in space and time, only movements interfering 
with movements” (Egert, Immediation II, 445). Questioning is instead 
a force that both provokes and abstracts from movement’s infinities, 
cutting across all possible routes, decisions, backtracks, bifurcations, 
sequences. Egert takes up the question of questioning as a mode of 
choreographing movement in Pina Bausch’s dance, arguing that: “The 
process of questioning transversally runs as a choreographic force 
through the dancers’ bodies acting upon and with other movements” 
(Egert, Immediation II, 445).
It turns out that piling up questions was never going to result in a 
blueprint for getting to the shops. Questioning is already thought 
moving—into another thought and/or into action—shaking up the 
sedimentation of the before and after of form and movement, design 
and making, theory and practice. Questioning is movement enough to 
transform practices of dance, performance, even interaction design. In 
challenging “design” as set-up for planning the “interactivity” of people 
and digital technologies, Jonas Fritsch develops a different “eco-logic” 
for interaction practices: “A question also arises around the notion of 
the events staged by urban interactive environments. One might ask 
of all the projects; when is the event actually taking place—or what is 
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the event taking place? And how is the event taken up into other events, 
from an eco-logical point of view?” (Fritsch, Immediation II, 484).
The question that pulls event to event—changing the unfolding of 
events and itself changing in each occasion—is (an) immediation. 
Unfolding events never occur according to plan. Their movement 
can be found in their immediate differencing: does the page open 
this way or that? How will the fabric fall as it meets a body halfway? 
How does a meal get cooked and then how is it eaten? Both every 
day and extraordinary events form in differencing. Differencing that 
processually generates as each tension and continuity transversally 
meets, creating novel ways to unfold form. And these processes are 
also an abstract arc of action that cuts across, pulled through and 
into all these unfoldings. Or, simultaneously and in difference: “ … the 
experience of paradox can draw an immediating practice out of lived 
abstraction,” Jondi Keane (Keane, Immediation II, 490).
Gerko Egert
Everyday Abstractions. Immediation and 
the Powers of Choreography
The Transversal Powers of Questions
Movement is brimming with questions. Movement asks questions, 
it reacts to questions, it can repeat and retain questions. The only 
thing it persistently avoids is answering questions. Choreography 
navigates by questions and with questions. It modulates movement’s 
immanent force, its questionness: its where-ness, its who-ness, its how-
ness. By articulating questions, choreography produces—and relates 
to—multiple movements: the technique of questioning is relational 
and transversal, spanning across different movements. How do the 
techniques of questioning feed problems from one event to another? 
How does the immediating power of choreography work?
Choreographer Pina Bausch knew about the question’s power and 
used it as a choreographic technique. In the rehearsal process of 
Walzer (1982) she asked: “How to hold on to someone when you are 
scared? How does an animal move into a trap? Which body part is 
your favourite to move? How do you open a boiled egg? How to hold a 
cigarette?” (Hoghe 1986: 84, 87, my translation). Bausch simply threw 
these questions into the studio. They were asked in order to start a 
movement, a scene, a situation. They cut into an ongoing process, 
altering and modulating an already existing movement. Sometimes 
they were even just text fragments, or verbal propositions intended 
to create new events: “building a pyramid. Trick table. Under an apple 
tree. Look what I’ve got here” (84, 87, my translation). These questions 
were not answered with “yes” or “no,” they were not to be answered at 
all. They opened up new possibilities, new movements, new texts. They 
called for certain material, a specific prop, a song, another question. 
Three men stand in the studio next to each other. Two others climb 
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on their thighs, a woman balances atop. Where is it best to hold the 
other person so she does not fall? How much tension do your legs 
need to carry the other bodies? Where do you need to shift the weight 
to balance the whole pyramid? In which direction can you fall? How 
is it safe? How can I get back on the ground?1 The movements of the 
dancers articulated questions, which do not long for verification or 
falsification. These questions present in movement are what Deleuze 
describes as “essentially problematic events” (Deleuze 1994a: 195). They 
articulate a difference that can only be resolved by the production of 
new problems and new questions, and therefore they can never be 
resolved. The question posed is radically open (i.e. unanswerable), it 
“animates works of art as much as philosophical thought” (195) and it 
“alone has an opening coextensive with that which must respond to 
it and can respond only by retaining, repeating, and continually going 
over it” (195).
Bausch uses the power of the question to create a choreography in 
which the various movements take up and repeat the question and 
thereby retain the question in its openness. Every movement, every 
action, every word or thing poses the question anew—yet differently. 
How does an animal move into a trap?—How does a trap move? Who 
moves into a trap? How to avoid a trap? Where is a trap? Caution!
The powers of the questions posed are strong and manifold: too strong 
to create a fixed technique simply applied by the choreographer. Too 
manifold to maintain any hierarchical organized dichotomy of the 
questioner (choreographer) and the responder (dancer). In addition 
to the questions’ power to create new questions, Deleuze describes 
two further powers. The first power is the “power of the absurd”—“the 
question silences all empirical responses which purport to suppress 
it, in order to force the one response which always continues and 
maintains it” (Deleuze 1994a: 195). The second power is “of the enigma.” 
It folds back and undermines the position of the questioner: It puts 
“in play the questioner as much as that which is questioned, and to 
put itself in question” (195). The third power is “of the philosophical 
Odyssey.” This is: “[T]he revelation of Being as corresponding to the 
question, reducible neither to the questioned nor to the questioner but 
that which unites both in the articulation of its own Difference” (196).
The process of collective experimentation in the rehearsal process of 
Walzer choreographs not only the dancer’s movements with questions, 
but the studio itself. The space and the bodies turn into a differential 
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field of asking. They put the dancer as well as the chorographer, the 
décor as well as the stage designer, the props as well as the technicians 
“into question” (that is, second power). “How does a pyramid dance?” 
is not a question posed from the stable position of the choreographer. 
The act of balancing, of attuning with other movements, other forces, 
other bodies is also not performed by the subject of a dancer—the act 
of questioning becomes itself a process of individuation, articulating its 
own difference. Chorography here becomes the immanent modulation 
and production of differentiation: a choreography of differential 
movements and tensions rather than individual bodies.
Choreography as a method of posing questions is an “impersonal” or 
“autonomous” power, not so much in the content of the questions but 
in the “how” of the asking. Even though these choreographic techniques 
are not without a subject they are not yet qualified. They are subjects in 
the making, or “larval subjects”: “rather patients than agents” (Deleuze 
2004: 97). Only they are “able to endure the pressure of an internal 
resonance or the amplitude of an inevitable movement” (97). The larval 
or moving body can unfold in the dramatizing choreographies and 
take up the dynamics of the “how,” “who,” “how much,” and “in what 
way” (98). The absolute intimate and at the same time totally arbitrary 
common question—How do you open a boiled egg?—addresses 
neither the dancer’s technical abilities nor her individual expression. 
The process of questioning transversally runs as a choreographic force 
through the dancers’ bodies acting upon and with other movements. 
The opening of the egg creates the “how” of the movement moving 
between the dancers. Neither egg nor dancer was first. The movement’s 
how-ness, its question-force “unites [questioner and questioned] in 
the articulation of its own Difference” (third power) (196). The power 
activates new questions and new differences reverberating in the 
studio, the rehearsal process, the choreographer and the dancers, they 
echo across the stage and the audience, across the video and this text. 
This choreography is not performed or created by a choreographer but 
rather the process of the events unfolding (Manning 2013: 76). Many 
relational movements intermingle with each other and create a space 
of intense connections. There are no pre-given bodies, no entities 
that can be arranged by a person in space and time, only movements 
interfering with movements. In the process of posing questions a tense 




The questions emerge out of the movements and various actions of 
the dancer’s everyday experiences. They feed the lived experience 
of the everyday in and though the choreographic process. Questions 
of power and gender relations as well as the experience of the social 
and economic tension of a conservative 1980s West Germany created 
the choreography of Walzer. The modulating power intensifies the 
tensions of the everyday in conjunction with the dancers, Bausch 
and the audience. Coming out of the midst of everyday experiences 
each question opens a speculative realm, it becomes the trigger 
for experimentation in the process of rehearsing. In the rehearsal 
studio the questions get inflected, they change and transverse. With 
every proposed movement, scene or gesture they fold back into the 
concreteness of the dance’s experience.3 Without simply reproducing 
the given or creating a utopian society, the questions modulate and 
differentiate the various experiences, bodies and movements. By taking 
up the differences and tensions of the everyday and differentiating 
them in the rehearsal, the technique of questioning doesn’t provide 
any answers. The questions keep the strength of differentiation in the 
act of asking.
Like dance, the everyday is full of movements, full of choreographic 
powers, and thereby full of new differences and tensions. Think of the 
everyday movements of cooking: cutting the vegetables, heating the 
water, mixing the herbs. In the middle of the preparation the phone 
rings and you need to answer it, so your friend takes over the cooking. 
Pulled into this differential (and difficult) situation a lot of questions 
will arise: how long does the rice need to cook? How do the herbs taste 
with the rest of the meal? How do I continue with the vegetables? The 
only question she dismisses immediately is: what was this supposed 
to become? What was my friend’s plan? None of these questions can 
resolve the situation or reproduce the initial plan (if there was one). 
These questions take up the process of cooking and modulate it 
differently—or as Deleuze would say: they dramatize the cooking.4 By 
proposing his “method of dramatization” Deleuze calls for a technique 
that uses “a certain type of question”: Instead of asking, “what is this?” 
Deleuze proposes that we ask “who? how much? how? where? when?” 
(Deleuze 2004: 94). These questions do not repeat or even resolve 
the given. They take up the tension of an existing process (like the 
differential field of a meal in preparation), but instead of eliminating 
these tensions (by turning off the stove, pausing the cooking, waiting 
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until the friend is back and the cooking can proceed in its “original” way) 
they inflect the process—they differenciate this already differential 
situation in a new way.5 As cooking runs transversally through the 
ingredients, the stove, the spoon and the multiple cooks, it does not 
follow a pre-given structure. No cookbook dramaturgy is executed, 
but a differenciating process happens instead. Cooking does not 
answer “how to eat this?”. Cooking dramatizes food. By bringing in new 
questions, new ways of preparing emerge, and the food unfolds as a 
space-time event.
The cooking, as well as the choreographic practices in the rehearsals, 
take up questions that emerge in the everyday and differenciate them 
anew. In Bausch’s “theatre of multiplicities,” (Deleuze 1994: 192)6 the 
movements in the studio actualize the tensions, the struggles and 
the power-relations of the everyday. In both contexts, the human 
subject is in no way central. The music, the lights, the props, and the 
space, on the one side, and the boiling of the water, the chopping, the 
mixing, the frying, on the other side, dramatize the choreographic 
processes. As an ecological process the method of dramatization 
“surpasses man on every side.… The inhuman and the superhuman—a 
thing, an animal or a god—are no less capable of dramatization than 
a man or his determinations” (Deleuze 2006: 79). By emphasizing 
the processuality that is “more than human” (Manning 2013: 81) with 
regards to choreography (of cooking, of dancing), the tensions are in 
no way reducible to the human body, to its movements or its actions. 
Cooking and choreography are always dramatizations of the ecology 
and of the milieu.
Choreographic Materialities
As the method of dramatization is not linked to the human per se, 
questions cannot be reduced to the realm of language. When, in New 
York in the 1960s, the everyday moved into the studio and onto the 
dance stage, the questions immediately posed were: “How do you do 
it?” and “Where does it move to?” The focus on movement was taken 
over by the question of action. Like Bausch, choreographers such as 
Yvonne Rainer or Trisha Brown were interested in the movements 
of the everyday. With their choreographic techniques, they asked: 
How can one create pragmatic movements on stage? By creating 
chorographic tasks, the question shifted from the “what” to the 
“where” of movement. The chart of Rainer’s Parts of Some Sextets, a 
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choreography for 10 people and 12 mattresses states among other 
tasks: “One vertical mattress moving back and forth on single layer” 
(Rainer 1965: 174) or “Move pile to other side” (175). These tasks are full 
of questions, not only verbal ones: “Where does it move to?” asks the 
chart. “How and who does it move?” asks the mattress, its floppiness, 
gravity and the floor. These choreographic techniques consist of more 
than just verbal questions. The mattresses, the elastic rubber foam, the 
absence of handles, they all articulate the power of material questions. 
Like verbal ones, these questions are taken up by the dancers. They 
are repeated, modulated and reformulated by the movements of the 
dance. The softness of the material transduces into the wavering and 
balancing movements of the dancer. The size of the pile of mattresses 
feeds the where-ness of the arm’s stretching. Even though neither 
Rainer’s task nor the mattress articulates one particular question, 
the assemblages of weight, sloppiness, anatomy, gravity etc. create a 
bunch of interfering questions. In their differential multiplicity, they 
differenciate and dramatize the act of carrying and moving. Objects do 
not simply stay objects—in the act of posing questions they themselves 
become choreographic. “Choreographic Objects”—as choreographer 
William Forsythe writes—are “an alternative site for the understanding 
of potential instigation and organization of action to reside” (Forsythe).7 
Coming out of the midst of the everyday, the objects feed the “potential 
for instigation” into the choreographic process. And by immanently 
carrying over everyday movements, the object becomes a process 
of immediation: this is not a question, an action, or a movement 
nicely packed and sent into the studio; this is the dramatizing force of 
materiality differentially immediating the field of everyday tensions 
into dance. Here the object is rather an operational status than an 
ontological or pregiven entity—it is the result of an event, its “datum” 
(Whitehead 1967a: 176). Every “occasion arises from relevant objects, 
and perishes into the status of an object for other occasions” (177). As 
“datum” the objects feed one occasion into another. By taking up the 
datum, the new occasion does not ask: what is the datum? The object-
datum is itself a question. This question can only be responded to “by 
retaining, repeating, and continually going over it” (Deleuze 1994a: 
195). By relating one occasion into another one, the question-object 
does not simply carry-over or repeat a given thing or movement, but 
proposes and differenciates them anew. In this sense, immediation 
becomes a relating-into (by its question-object-datum), rather than a 
transferring-over. The everyday relating-into dance, the mattress relating-
into choreography.
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The performed movements—carrying, lifting, balancing—are immanent 
to the objects and the related tasks. And at the same time the object’s 
choreographic force modulates these movements from within: The 
mattresses’ weight, its soft material and its size produce the wobbliness 
of the movement across. The task “move pile to other site” intersects 
with the dancers’ proprioception and navigates the movement’s spatial 
orientations. All these choreographic powers are operating immanently 
to the movements performed. They are folded into movement. None of 
them determines the movement’s course. They all act as questions that 
insist on going beyond any proclaimed fulfillment. How does movement 
take up these powers? Where do these questions open up again? Where 
do differences emerge anew?
Abstraction
Powers acting upon powers create a field of tensions. As a 
choreographic diagram they alter the ongoing movements, inflecting 
them, speeding them up, slowing them down, changing directions and 
dynamics. They create and change the various relations between them. 
None of these powers can be attributed simply to one movement. 
Abstractly they run between and through various movements creating a 
metastable choreography.
To think of dance simply as a field of ongoing movement or a 
continuous bubbling would neglect the choreographic tensions that 
make up the field. But thinking of choreography only as a structure of 
tensions and relations would neglect the force of movement and its 
penchant for change. This would be a choreography totally saturated 
in the actual. But tension—as understood here—is more that an actual 
equilibrium of powers: in its virtuality it is pushing towards change. 
This choreography of tensions is more than stable—it is metastable 
(Simondon 1992: 301–302).
Running through the ecology of movement, the powers of 
choreography create the abstract arc of an action: the carrying of a 
mattress, the opening of an egg, the move into a trap. This is not the 
linear arc of suspense in a classical drama but the nonlinear tension 
of dramatization. Operating right in the middle of the concreteness of 
movement, action is abstract. “Real and abstract” as Massumi states, 
“The actual form and the abstract dynamic are two sides of the same 
experimental coin. They are inseparable” (Massumi 2011: 41). Action 
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cannot be seen without the form of movement, yet action is more 
(and less) than movement taking form. Abstraction is in the middle 
of movement: it is “embodied thought” (Massumi 2014: 7). Only in 
retrospect or speculation can you abstractly “know” the causality 
leading to the actions’ purpose. Only then you can abstract and single 
out the useful, contributing movements from the rest. At the same 
time, any abstractions produce effects that open up possible futures. 
Abstraction is adding new connections, new movements, new lines to 
the field of movement. In this sense, every question, every task, every 
object creates new arcs of abstraction: action.8
Acting in the everyday you never just move in or with the actual. 
Bending down to the floor already anticipates the lifting of the mattress 
and the remembrance of a mattress’ weight. The lifting already 
anticipates the carrying, the experience of your friend’s last relocation 
already anticipates the mattress’ wobbliness and the tiredness of your 
body while carrying anticipates the good night sleep. Arcs leading to 
arcs leading to arcs. They just don’t follow any linear causal order. 
Lying in the bed you think of the course of action. Retrospectively. 
Abstractly. While moving, you speculate the course of action. Virtually. 
Also abstractly. But how sure are you about your good night’s sleep? 
The carrying is causing pain in the back and you lay awake at the new 
home on the familiar mattress, its dents and softness. Other actions 
(most likely the repetitive lifting you have done earlier) feed into the arc 
(causing back pain) and now foregrounding more the “how” than the 
“where-to” of the lifting.
This is not just movement moving: the object (mattress), the task 
(moving the mattress to the other house) the question (How to move a 
mattress?) create a choreography that composes multiple movements, 
producing the abstract arc of an action. This action contains more than 
just one or two movements—it runs abstractly through the multiplicity 
of an ecology of movements. Which movements and relations you 
experience as important and which you simply ignore (or even deny) 
and thereby exclude from the course of action are conditioned 
by the habit of organizing the world in meaningful and causal-
functioning ways.
Not everybody changes houses every day. Yet, you move every day—
you move in and through an ecology of movements, choreographed by 
the abstract lines of actions. You move your favourite body parts, you 
move your least favourite body parts, you show, you look, you smoke, 
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you hold on to somebody. Sometimes you fall into a trap. Sometimes 
you open a boiled egg. Often you carry things even though they might 
never arrive at the other side. These actions are neither a subset nor 
the essence of your everyday movements. As abstract forces they 
accelerate movement, they change its direction, its rhythm, its intensity. 
They produce new movements, new differences and new tensions.
By taking these questions, tasks and objects and placing them into 
the realm of dance, they bend the abstract arc of action into the 
choreographic process. Without simply staging the action of changing 
houses or moving into a trap, the powers immanent to these questions 
produce and choreograph new movements. At the same time that 
action starts to perform, movement outruns its path and its ends. 
Other movements take over. New questions emerge. New speculative 
action. The mattress finds a way. Another way.
Immediation
Nervously the cigarette is wandering between the fingers, from one 
hand to the other, to the lips and back to the hand. Anxious tremor. 
Sitting on the chair, waiting, the women does not know what to do or 
what to say, it feels like everybody is staring at her. Maybe she just does 
not know how to hold a cigarette. Maybe she is not used to it. Maybe 
she does not even smoke. Movingly she answers the question: how to 
hold a cigarette? Movingly she cannot answer. And yet, every movement 
seems to be a preliminary answer—and the repetition of the question at 
the same time. She cannot stop moving, she cannot stop answering, she 
cannot stop re-posing the question. Without the cigarette there would 
be just hands wandering in front of her chest and her face. With the 
cigarette she finally can stop. The arc of the cigarette’s burning offers 
an (temporary) end. Another cigarette will follow. The cigarette turned 
movement into action.
At the same time the choreographic force of the cigarette made 
movement expressive: you see nervousness, anxiety, and shyness. 
Abstraction created expression, movement became choreographed. 
This is not the abstraction of an inner feeling, a subjective emotion 
articulated through hand gesture. This is movement expressing 
its choreographic force by posing another question. How is she 
moving her fingers, where is she moving her hands? It is movement’s 
question-ness—in this case its how-ness and where-ness. The 
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process of abstraction does not simply add meaning on another 
level. Choreography is no mediation of movement in the realm of 
signification. Yet, the expression of movement goes beyond the event 
of movement moving; feeding into another event, another movement, 
another choreography. This is the immediating power of abstraction. 
Taking up the choreography of smoking, and forcing it beyond the 
immediateness of the event, the power of abstraction turns into 
immediation. By feeding into another nervousness and into another 
cigarette it creates the arc of reassurance. The always-prolonged arc of 
a bad habit.
This is not immediation as the opposite of mediation. The “im-” is more 
the “im-” of immersion, than the “im-” of negation or of “opposition.” 
Immersion and immedation share the power of “pulling into,” yet 
immediation forecloses any total dissolution and envelopment. 
Immediation is not about an individual entering another sphere but the 
pulling of an action or experience into another event. Cigarette pulling 
towards cigarette, pulling towards cigarette. This is the immediation of 
choreography as choreographic force.
By taking up the movement’s question—How to hold a cigarette?—
Bausch rendered the choreography of smoking expressive in a way it 
wasn’t expressive before. Using the question as a choreographic tool 
she fed the movements of smoking into the practices of the rehearsal 
space. Immediation never acts in linear fashion and the everyday does 
not simply serve the choreographic rehearsal. Smoking takes place in 
the breaks, it forces the rehearsal to stop, it changes the questions—
who has a cigarette? Who has a light? The talking continues, new ideas 
pop up. The rehearsal restarts, the cigarette is still burning. People 
are tired and hanging around. A new smoke, another cigarette. Are 
we still rehearsing? Everyday rehearsal.9 Dance practice and everyday 
life fold constantly into each other. And in these foldings the forces 
of choreography create a nonlinear assemblage: Questions of the 
everyday, feeding into the studio, into new rehearsal sessions, into 
performances, into writing, and back into the everyday.
After the opening night, you light a cigarette. But your movements 
have changed. Choreography now foregrounds the how-ness of your 
movements. Habit starts to struggle with uncertainty. The “aftereffect” 
of perception makes itself “oddly” felt “like a very faint déjà vu” 
(Massumi 2011: 166). The experience of the choreography of smoking 
shifts the way you feel your hand moving, your fingers tremble. “You 
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are consciously experiencing the semblancing of experience—its 
double order; your double existence—that normally remains in the 
nonconscious background of everyday life” (166).10 The power of 
choreography feeds (back) in the everyday movements, it differenciates 
them, it shifts the question: immediation.
Everyday Politics
The smoking of a cigarette, the moving of a mattress, the opening of 
a boiled egg—these immediating choreographies operate between 
dance and the everyday. By transversally pulling and feeding abstract 
questions into and out of one event and into another, new questions 
are raised and new tensions produced. These questions speculatively 
navigate our movement, our attention and action. These questions 
also open up new connections, and new movements that relate to 
one another. Choreographies of smoking are not only made of fingers 
moving, they interlink with the psychic as much as with the economic, 
the environmental as much as with the demographic, they are also 
physical and biological choreography. By acting across all of these 
different ecologies, the choreographic work articulates the political 
of the everyday. None of the questions raised in the everyday can be 
taken as merely personal, private or artistic in nature. Every question 
addresses the politics of ecology in a Guattarian sense (Guattari 2008), 
as an ecological question. By taking these questions up in the context 
of the everyday, choreography foregrounds how every movement 
effects other movements. Every arc of an action extends into another 
event and thereby foregrounds its relation with other choreographies 
(ecological, social, psychic, economic, etc.) By extending the relations, 
new differences emerge: none of this choreography, nor the interplay of 
differences, operates in the seamless flux of the logistical imagination. 
These relations are tensions, forces pulling in multiple directions. It 
is the power of (everyday) choreography that navigates, disciplines, 
modulates and creates movement’s differential and conflictual 
interplay. The choreographic process of dramatization relates these 
manifold forces of movements without simply synchronizing them 
or bringing them into one coherent form, but creates productive 
differences and tensions. In the interplay of these various movements, 
choreography is rather the immediation of tensions: it operates in the 
difference of the everyday at the same time that it expresses its powers 
through new questions, new movements and new tensions.
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Notes
1. Very little documentation exists on Pina Bausch’s rehearsal processes. The 
descriptions in this article are based on the TV documentary Walzer – 41 
Minuten aus den Proben. Pina Bausch und das Wuppertaler Tanztheater 
April – Mai ‘82 (1986, Bayrischer Rundfunk Deutschland).
2. The concept of a “choreography of tensions” is in line with Susanne Langer’s 
concept of “dance tensions.” According to her, dance is the “interplay of 
virtual forces of ‘space tension’ and ‘body tensions’ and even less specific 
‘dance tensions’ created by music, lights, décor, poetic suggestion, and what 
not” (Langer 1953: 186).
3. The rehearsal process and the movement experimentation can be de-
scribed as a speculative (Whitehead) or speculative-pragmatic (Manning 
and Massumi) activity. In reference to his speculative thinking, Whitehead 
writes: “The true method of discovery is like the flight of an aeroplane. It 
starts from the ground of particular observation; it makes a flight in the thin 
air of imaginative generalization; and it again lands for renewed observa-
tion rendered acute by rational interpretation” (Whitehead 1978: 5). Like 
philosophy, the rehearsal constantly moves between the thin air and the 
landings of movement’s flights. On technique as “speculative pragmatic” see 
Massumi (2001: 85) and Manning and Massumi (2014: 89–90).
4. In 2013 a group of people from the SenseLab experimented with these 
questions during the event “Enter Bioscleave.” The setting was a camp in the 
woods, several huts, each equipped with its own kitchen. The propositions 
were: 1) Go to one kitchen and bring an ingredient for cooking. 2) Cook for 
7 minutes. 3) After 7 minutes leave everything as it is and move to another 
kitchen. 4) Take up the process of the kitchen 5) Start again with 2) This cho-
reographic technique is called “Anarchist Touski.”
5. Note that Deleuze differs between the differentiation (with a ‘t’) and dif-
ferenciation (with a ‘c’). He defines the difference as follows: “We call the 
determination of the virtual content of an Idea differentiation; we call the 
actualization of that virtuality into species and distinguished parts differen-
ciation” (Deleuze 1994a: 207). In regard to the method of dramatization he 
concludes: “In short, dramatization is the differenciation of differenciation, 
at once both qualitative and quantitative” (217).
6. In reference to the theatre of Antonin Artaud and Carmelo Bene, Deleuze 
develops the concept of a “theatre of multiplicities”: It is “a theatre of 
problems and always open questions which draws spectator, setting and 
characters into the real movement of an apprenticeship of the entire un-
conscious, the final elements of which remain the problems themselves” 
(Deleuze 1994: 192).
7. In her discussion of Forsythe’s “Choreographic Objects” Manning links his 
work to Deleuze’s concept of the “objectile”: “They extend beyond their 
object ness to become ecologies for complex environments that propose 
dynamic constellations of space, time, and movement. These ‘objects’ are in 
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fact propositions co-constituted by the environments they make possible. 
They urge participation. Through the objects, spacetime takes on a reso-
nance, a singularity: it becomes bouncy, it floats, it shadows. The object be-
comes a missile for experience that inflects a given spacetime with a spirit 
of experimentation. We could call these objects ‘choreographic objectiles’ to 
bring to them the sense of incipient movement their dynamic participation 
within the relational environment calls forth” (2013: 92). See also Deleuze on 
the “objectile” (1993: 19).
8. Action, as it is used here must not be confused with the concept of activity 
Massumi develops in his account of an “activist philosophy” (Massumi 2011: 
1). Yet, both terms—action and activity—are closely related and depend 
on each other. Whereas movement, as I use it here, is more on the side of 
activity, action is concerned with the question of the abstract arc, its tension 
and the becoming of its continuity. What is at stake in this essay is nonethe-
less a non-subjective, non-voluntaristic concept of action, in which action 
is precisely based on abstraction in the field of “bare activity” (Massumi 
2011: 2) and movement. Discussing the concept of abstraction in play in 
What Animals Teach Us about Politics, Massumi describes the “style” of an 
action between its “execution” and its “dramatization.” Yet, “execution” and 
“dramatization” are no either-or decision but “mutually included” in the act 
(Massumi 2014: 9, 11). Style is here referred to as the “type of question” 
(Deleuze 2004: 94), the questioness of movement.
9. Tiredness, sickness and smoking are dominating the atmosphere of the 
rehearsal process of Waltzer as shown in the documentary Walzer – 41 
Minuten aus den Proben. Nonetheless, this atmosphere functions as an af-
fective motor for creating new movements, new scenes and new questions. 
The scene of a women smoking coming out of the pragmatic question, “Who 
wants another cigarette?” is articulated in the rehearsal break.
10. In its passage on the immediation of perception Massumi refers to the 
sensation of a John Irvine art installation and its force as felt during a walk 
down the street afterwards. “You are aware of thinking-feeling the depths of 
the city as you walk and look” (Massumi 2011: 166).
Michael Hornblow
So Soon Too Late: Affective Shifts in a Ketl 1
Thinking back and forth, feeling what just happened, what things have 
been and are still becoming, as all these emerge together – there are 
many modes in which an event seems to shift, as if outside of itself, just 
as this outside is felt within thought. Events are always in the middle of 
things, even as this middling seems far-flung for the “now” moment.
Drawing on systems-based and philosophical approaches to affect and 
situated cognition, I discuss a media performance project called Ketl 
to consider how media may be seen to open (and withhold) relational 
processes of collective creation. I want to define media quite broadly, 
for both this work and its writing—to include physical objects, digital 
interfaces, site-specific elements, and their modes of description; 
where it’s not just specific kinds of media, but the speeds and slowness 
they allow in modulating affective tonalities for bodies and persons.2 
If the immediacy of the event is already a “specious present” that’s 
blurred and smudged across untimely modes of attention (Varela 
2000), then perhaps media do not so much mediate our experience 
of the world, as enact an ecology of thought that includes human and 
nonhuman agents.
This allows us to think about media in the manner of immediation, a 
term that lends itself to strange middlings. Immediation marks its own 
disjunctive coherence when we pull the term apart to find those that 
comprise or decompose it – immediacy and mediation. Our tendency 
may be to immediately suspect mediation because it suggests a 
position of representation, a mode of presentation or of resolution. 
We may feel more in favour of immediacy because it seems to deliver 
the pure event to us as a singular moment in time. I aim to trouble 
these oppositions, to open instead a productive disjunction in terms, 
where immediation may offer a more immanent and shifting relation 
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across immediacy and mediation. I seek to show how immediacy and 
mediation shift through various practices of thinking and making in the 
development of a project. This has an affective dimension that becomes 
useful for understanding collective dynamics within collaboration and 
participation, especially at different scales of relation.
In doing so, the art making process may also reveal underlying 
conditions within a given milieu, to offer a critical perspective on 
social mechanisms of control and agency, even as these conditions 
become generative constraints drawn through the aesthetic logic of a 
work. For Ketl, I aim to demonstrate how online geospatial interfaces 
are embodied through affective states of withdrawal and openness 
across a broad set of registers. Here I identify formative points and 
critical shifts, where particular techniques emerge in the process as 
ways of approaching affective immediation in media performance 
practice. These move through collaboration and creative development, 
to audience spectatorship and participation, where affective and 
emotional tonalities are complicit with analogue and digital elements.
Ketl—in the time of writing
These shifting relations are also immanent to the practice of writing 
itself. In the back and forth of writing both for and about performance, 
this essay becomes another site for immediation, where problems 
of description trouble the boundary of thought and materiality. 
Immediation offers a concept at the intersection of writing and art 
practice, where description is inflected by the fabulatory impetus of 
media entities, such that writing may feel the aesthetic quality in which 
these entities are coordinated.
Ketl is part of a continuing project that has involved workshops, 
research-creation events and exhibitions – with performance, video, 
and participatory actions, using mobile, locative and interactive media. 
This essay focuses on one iteration – Ketl at FOFA Gallery in Montreal 
(Hornblow and Sans 2015).3 The problem with describing the work is 
that it’s already a long and variable series and I’m still in the middle of 
everything. At the time of writing ( July 2015), we’ve just completed the 
performance at FOFA Gallery, and I’m now preparing two presentations 
for the International Symposium on Electronic Art, to be followed by a 
work at the Affect Theory Conference in Lancaster Pennsylvania.4 Being 
caught in the middle of things can be a source of much anxiety, but just 
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as deadlines loom large they also allow new forms of life to appear. To 
say “at the time of writing” may then become a matter of foregrounding 
the time of writing itself. Where immediacies shift across multiple 
durations and scales of action, we may feel many speeds and durations 
in which things already describe themselves somehow, and where 
media come to enact processes of thinking and making in the back-
and-forth of our own descriptions. If writing may describe a work, it is 
through singular, untimely and distributed processes of immediation 
where multiple media shift in tonality, opening and withdrawing, with 
and from one another.
“So I’ve been thinking about 
withdrawal and opacity 
transparency and openness
how they seem to go in a loop 
or get folded through in a way” 
Ketl (Hornblow and Sans 2015)
Flashback to the FOFA performance/event – the opening lines for Ketl 
are repeated over and over as I bounce up and down on the spot. 
People enter the space and spread tentatively around the perimeter, 
finding a place to land while I shift position with each repetition, framing 
their movement in-between short, improvised dance sketches. The 
bouncing is a warm-up exercise borrowed from dancer/choreographer 
Yumiko Yoshioka – a good way to ground yourself and get into a 
Figure 48: Ketl 2015, Hornblow and Sans, 2015. Image: Kinga Michalska
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dancing body, which is useful for me now as I’m feeling nervous about 
how things might work out. A warm-up exercise is not always the best 
choreographic gesture to begin with, but it suits the text. With each 
repetition the words get mixed up a little, finding strange loops, as if 
I’m not quite sure which way round things should be. The bouncing 
and framing gradually opens into more extended movement and vocal 
phrases, as the grounding effect amplifies my expression on different 
levels across the floor, displaced, all the while, with broken gestures to 
lend the text an open uncertainty.
First Formative Point—Impossible Indifference
I’ve been feeling and thinking about withdrawal and openness for 
some time, but it was only in the intimate immediacy and mediation 
of working closely with another person that this became something 
to work with. We had met just recently through a mutual friend, 
had nothing much to go on – Sans and I – except a feeling of shared 
sensibility, and a curiosity around affective states in the creative 
process. Sans sent me a YouTube link to a lecture by Catherine Malabou 
on the possibilities of new forms of withdrawal, after reading my 
paper for ISEA (Hornblow 2015b). In “From Sorrow to Indifference” 
Malabou challenges Deleuze’s reading of Spinoza, suggesting that 
each of them disavows a total lack of affection for wonder in human 
experience (Malabou 2013). Drawing on contemporary developments 
in neurobiology, Malabou argues instead for the possibility of total 
withdrawal, and that “inspiring indifference” – rather than “inspiring sad 
passions” (as in Spinoza) – has become “necessary for the exercise of 
power” in contemporary political spheres.5
This isn’t something I want to deal with right now, or at least not yet. 
It’s still too soon for indifference – except to say that withdrawing from 
the question allows for the possibility of drawing with-and-from what 
becomes delayed so it may enter untimely relays with other things. 
For now, I’m more concerned with how the serial immediacies of this 
process and its enactive mediation may find a disjunctive quality of 
immediation. In the middling of withdrawal and openness, transparency 
and opacity, immediation moves as an affective shift; as I came to 
wonder during the Ketl performance – “how they seem to go in a loop or 
get folded through in a way” (Hornblow and Sans 2015).
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Second formative point—screen / display
Collaborations are never without difficulty. It’s hard to know in advance 
what the outcomes may be and how they might land. Especially with 
new work, iterations or partnerships, there’s a delicate search for 
formal coherence, while allowing all entities in the process to have 
their autonomy and potential – as much as these are already relational 
and with context. After several discussions we are finally in the 
gallery, which doubles as an open studio for a group show seeking to 
foreground process and collaboration through a series of “visitations.” 
We’re trying to define how my video-art and performance elements 
may work together with Sans’ contribution using 3D animation and face 
recognition through the real-time software environment Processing. 
There are a lot of things on either side, with many constraints 
beyond the technical – conceptual, spatio-temporal, compositional, 
performative. We sit around a laptop considering different scenarios for 
the interactive media, but keep hitting a wall. The speculative nature of 
the project makes it difficult to anticipate how technical objects might 
sit alongside everything else, without actually testing them. But we 
don’t have a lot of time, and each task requires a series of steps, the 
linearity of which limits adaptation to changes in process. So we bounce 
around a frustrating mise-en-abyme of projected ideas that don’t seem 
to land in any future, only collapsing in a proliferation of possibilities 
that seem to withdraw on themselves.
Realizing that half the problem is being locked in a screen world, we 
move into the concourse beside the gallery to consider the space where 
Figure 49. Ketl, Processing screenshot, Hornblow and Sans, 2015
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the work is to be installed – a long narrow display area known as the 
vitrines. Suddenly everything shifts. Now that we have a real wall to 
bounce off and a real window to look through (rather than a digital one), 
the dead ends open up as the conversation moves through our bodies 
with each scenario placed in situ. We reach a brief impasse for deciding 
which options should be pursued and how, but the shift has opened 
enough of a middle ground for charting a way forward. Now media has 
moved from its usual place in technological interfaces to include the 
wall and the space it enacts, a move that arrives with an accompanying 
shift in affective tonality.
Slippage and Appearance—Affective Tonality
The screen/display experience indicates how states of openness and 
withdrawal move as a speculative horizon that extends or recedes, 
even collapses, drawing with-and-from the media (materials, spaces, 
devices) in which we situate our attention. External elements do not so 
much mediate our experience, just as mediation is never only a site of 
communication and negotiation. Instead, such elements enact speeds 
and slowness for which their immediacy is variable and distributed. 
The movement from screen to vitrines seems to offer a technique that 
has something to do with shifting scale and/or mode of attention – 
but there’s something more slippery going on that eludes individual 
agency. To account for a strange middling, the shift may be found in that 
slippage where the now moment seems to both elude our attention and 
enact the situated nature of our experience.
What is this – to elude and enact, to feel things slip away in the same 
manner of making an appearance? And what occurs for affective 
tonalities that shift in the passage opened up by this gap? The 
experience I’ve called screen/display – moving from a laptop to the 
vitrines, offers a way of thinking about how attentive slippages shift 
affectivity. These shifts and slips may be seen to move across three 
main scales of action and related timeframes.6 In what follows, these 
are: for the surrounding environment, its apperception as absolute 
duration; for the body, readiness response and the half-second 
lapse; and for the conscious mind, a fringe horizon of around 1/10th 
of a second.
1. Already Always: apperception—The wall in the vitrines is every 
wall I’ve ever considered until I engage with it directly, even 
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as this falls into worlds that have since moved on, retaining a 
pastness of future potential.
A kind of absolute duration is already there before us while 
we foreground what is necessary and intentional, a slippage for 
smoothing our way in the world. We subconsciously assimilate 
familiar elements from our surroundings based on prior 
knowledge (apperception). This is not reserved for matters 
at hand, for it already suggests a distribution of thought at a 
liminal level. The situated and embodied nature of cognition is 
enacted through a dynamic ecology of experiential couplings 
with other entities in the environment. Embodied cognition is 
enactive and extensive in thinking and feeling through material 
traces and mnemonic devices that operate as physical supports 
for recollection and speculative prehension (see Thompson 
2007; Chalmers and Clark 2002).
2. Half a Second: readiness response—A wall is proximity, 
enclosure, and display, finding its threshold in the readiness of 
all walls within me.
At the level of the organism, our apperception of the 
wall is already primed in the physiological activity of the 
autonomic neural systems, so much so that it often gets the 
jump on us before we know it. Around a half-second lapse 
may occur between the initiation of movement in response 
to external triggers, and the time it takes for the movement 
to be registered in conscious thought (see Libet, Gleason, 
Wright, Pearl 1983). This is not just a case of being a little 
slow off the mark, but where functional stimulus potential 
and psychophysical tendencies are virtually prefigured with 
incipient forms.
3. 1/10th: fringe horizon—A wall is the blurry surface of my own 
agency towards it. As I reach to touch it I’ve already touched it, 
and in touching am reaching still.
At the level of consciousness, we find an even more discrete 
interval for this composite sense of the “now.” As Francesco 
Varela explains, what we experience as “the specious present” 
in any instance is not clear and distinct, but more a blur of 
impressions within an almost imperceptible timeframe – a 
fringe horizon at around 1/10th of a second (Varela 2000). On 
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one side, this slippage tends towards an immediate future 
(protention), while on the other tends toward a just-past that 
is not yet memory (retention). Protention finds our grasp upon 
the wall in the speculative micro-intervals of how things might 
work out, just as retention performs a kind of cognitive cache 
for carrying this coherence.
Being in the world entails a dynamical flow of cognitive couplings with 
other things based on sensorimotor activities that operate in a liminal 
area as much as anything we can clearly grasp. Affect doesn’t begin with 
being affected by someone or some thing as such; rather it turns upon 
a kind of disjunction in the very texture of subjective agency, where 
we are always and already affected (auto-affection). Affect becomes a 
“constituitive temporality” in which “I am affected before knowing that 
I am affected” (Depraz 1994: 73, 75). Consciously identifying states of 
feeling in relation to outside influences may be where a particular mood 
or emotional tone becomes clear and distinct, but these are predicated 
on an auto-affective substrate in which we are in a state of “permanent 
coping” (Varela 2000: 230).
Third Formative Point—Collapse / Reframe @ 4am
Flashback and forth to the Ketl ... it’s the day before the performance 
and we’re busy arranging the final installation, each of us attending to 
our own areas and tending to the overlaps. Then, suddenly, catastrophe 
strikes. I tested the WiFi signal weeks ago, but on final checks the signal 
strength has collapsed to two bars. An essential feature of the show 
involves me wearing a Google Cardboard VR headset, to dance an 
online navigation through the Google Street View world on St. Catherine 
street outside the Gallery. The image I see on my Nexus smartphone 
goggles is shared with everyone on a large video projection, sent live by 
a screen-share application over WiFi. But it’s a lot of data and needs a 
strong signal. Now the video stream is crashing after 10 minutes, then 8 
... 4 ... nothing. I collapse with the WiFi into a screen of anxiety, emotion 
heightened and scattered across device and set up … wondering all the 
while what might happen tomorrow.
Recalling the first formative point (screen/display), I try different 
locations, discuss the situation with Sans and others, but everyone is 
focused on their own tasks, and the possibility of resolving it through 
technical support feels remote. The protentional collapse is palpable, 
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centripetal and vertiginous. I can feel the walls closing in as I navigate 
many corridors of impossibility. A sense of quiet terror slowly shifts 
through despair, resignation, looking for hope, a change of plan. I 
get home late and exhausted but can’t sleep, my mind all ruminant 
machinery with strange transitions of worry, fatigue, REM states barely 
dropping into dream. Then gradually, images appear, ideas take form, 
coordinating and accelerating, feeling the joy of them. I’ll be deliriously 
tired today but at 4am I have a “plan-b” that feels better than just live-
streaming an online navigation to the audience.
Falling Out of Phase—Emotional Expression
Attuning to shifting rhythms is central to the strange middlings of 
immediation, especially where affective tonalities loop and fold 
with emotional expression. As Brian Massumi puts it, emotion is 
“qualified intensity owned and recognized at the conscious level of 
a personal subject, while affect operates more at a pre-individual 
level (Massumi 2002: 28). Varela describes affective tonality as a 
“dynamical landscaping” (Varela 2000), to which the horizon of our 
situated attention becomes transparent (open) or has a certain opacity 
(closure) that takes on the color of specific emotional content. From a 
cognitive dynamic systems perspective, the appearance of emotion 
is accompanied by a “phase shift,” when a break occurs in the tonal 
continuity of self-affecting-self (auto-affection); an interruption in 
the transparent or unreflective absorption in a flow of action (Varela 
2000: 291-292). Emotional expression shifts affective tonality when 
thinking and feeling identify something that seems to be at stake for 
the subjective territory of a person. This is not to attribute a negative 
value to emotion solely in favour of pre-personal affect. Phase shifts 
on a fringe horizon are simultaneous and incipient in their movement 
across dynamical landscapes of affective tonality. Both have their 
places, where systemic conditions and different ecologies of experience 
allow collective tonalities of “affect” and “emotion” to be mobilized in 
different ways.
Several questions and potentials arise for the art-making process, 
for it’s not just where interpersonal mediation may be transduced 
through collaboration, but how the spatial, temporal and material 
elements specific to this transduction offer further insights. How 
might these affective media ecologies allow an audience to think 
and feel in different ways through various modes of participation 
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and spectatorship? How can this thinking-feeling remain affective 
and conceptual in the relational back-and-forth of media, performer, 
spectator? And what is at stake for the phase shifts of affects and 
concepts, where a performance does not simply communicate ideas 
or convey emotional states? If critical practice can do more than make 
comment on the mechanisms of control that mould these tonalities 
(as if it were outside their very operations), this calls for a critical 
edge of a different kind. A precarious and speculative one, in which 
transformations of thought and action might occur.
As Massumi has shown, affective politics operate at a liminal level 
where forms of power exercise a kind of shorthand trigger mechanism, 
especially in the way media effects elicit emotional responses that 
are already prefigured within a broad spectrum of control (Massumi 
2005). The art process often confronts a redoubled limit, and a certain 
reticence, lest it become too literal around political critique. On one 
side, when forms of power and emotion are invoked or expressed they 
can collapse the potential for new affects and sensations to emerge, 
as creation and reception fall into the dead ends of interpretation. On 
the flip-side, the internal fields of force at play within works of art (and 
their emergent processes), harbour their own qualities and powers 
for transformation. We might say that art finds its own politic of sorts, 
seeking diverse modes of agency, entities of thought and feeling that 
have not yet come into being but have a nascent power nonetheless. 
In the abstract concreteness of conceptual and affective vitalities, 
aesthetic processes seek a critical edge within themselves where a 
work may eventually take on a singular life of its own. Across them both 
(external collapse and internal potential), there’s a strange middling 
particular to immediation. The invocation of emotional responses (as 
subjective territories, forms of power, and their critique) becomes a 
relational boundary condition for weighing up how audience reception 
may participate in, and indeed enact the distributed nature of affective 
and emotional ecologies. For Ketl, this becomes a fugitive exercise on 
the precarious cusp of critique.
Orbital Flatness—Faciality
My first thought at 4am was to go outside the gallery and smash my 
phone on the footpath as a way of ending the performance. But by 
mid-morning, I realised the catastrophe called for a subtler sense of 
urgency. Even as a joke for insomniac frustration my initial reaction 
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seemed appropriate at the time, especially where questions of 
withdrawal and critique found relevance beyond my discussion with 
Sans. The FOFA performance was curated as a two-hander with Joel 
Mason’s Duck Feet soiree, and the two works were situated more 
broadly within the timeframe of the Undercommons Residency, hosted by 
Senselab in Montreal with guests Stefano Harney and Fred Moten.7 In 
The Undercommons: Fugitive Planning and Black Study, Harney and Moten 
put forward a compelling response to contemporary mechanisms 
of control (2013). Their project recognizes that the Commons as we 
once knew it is long gone, already overrun with neoliberal subjectivity 
and micro-fascist complicity at a systemic level. Entering the 
“Undercommons” instead becomes a matter of recognizing our shared 
brokenness, to discover a constantly shifting fugitive capacity – “the 
refusal of what has been refused” (Harney and Moten, 2013: 96).
For Harney and Moten, objective critique becomes patently impossible 
when institutional frameworks professionalize it as the voice of 
privilege. (For them it is primarily the problem of the critical academic, 
but this can be applied more broadly). A critical perspective becomes 
yet another performance indicator, a condition of impossibility 
carrying an affective tonality that may be felt as a fugitive state: acting 
both for and against the institution. This tonality is ecological, and 
systemic – in institutional context and in the dynamical manner in 
which Varela describes affective phase shifts. A fugitive criticality calls 
for working through a shifting condition in which there is no outside 
in objective terms, only a strange jouissance of being overcome by 
its transformations. It is, then, that other “outside” of which Deleuze 
speaks (Deleuze 1988: 23-47, 118). Or in a different manner, where fields 
of force shift phase through the deepest interiority, immanent shifts 
that bifurcate and jump in scale, confronting the very conditions in 
which a system operates.
For Ketl, the WiFi catastrophe brought home with some gravity how 
broader tonalities may be felt within a specific institutional context. 
It also created a break in thinking through what was at stake in using 
Google Street View as a performance platform. How could it function 
as a critical lens for looking at online geospatial interfaces at a 
simultaneously planetary and embodied scale? How then to work with 
the limits of that critique, given the conditions and constraints that 
had appeared? Affective phase shifts acquire very particular media 
materialities, finding an interstitial quality that turns upon disjunctions 
of immediacy and mediation. The catastrophe had already cast its own 
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refusal, so the question of what options were given or taken now lay 
in a fugitive region of distributed tonalities, across performers, media, 
various spaces and occasions.
Instead of the live screen-share projection, I show an edited Street View 
navigation from a previous iteration in New York (Glasshouse Gallery 
2014).8 At FOFA, the screen is a large perspex sheet covered in white 
lard, which gives the projected video a glistening painterly quality. This 
accentuates the strange organicism of digital artefacts already apparent 
in the image. As I discuss in my paper for ISEA, the Google Street View 
image has a textural flatness that belies its 3D orbital orientation, full 
of bleeding contours and shallow blocks of colour. Zooming up on 
people at the limit of the image’s resolution, this flatness shifts across 
the visual platform when we notice how faces are blurred to satisfy 
legal concerns, enacting a simultaneous privacy and privatization of the 
public (see Hornblow 2015b).
An initial point of departure for discussion with Sans was to draw 
parallels between Deleuze and Guattari’s concept of faciality, and the 
image recognition algorithms Google uses to identify faces and signs. 
Faciality is a codified assemblage of control operating in and through 
the human face—a white wall of signifiance with its sensory orifices 
as black holes of subjectification (Deleuze and Guattari 1987: 167-191). 
Similarly, many facial recognition systems look for identifying features 
by extracting landmark elements (eyes, nose, mouth, etc.)9 To trouble 
an easy parallelism calls for both specific and speculative slippages. 
Faciality is not a machine that simply works via faces but through 
any encoding regime of white surface and black holes, with their 
coordination enabling figure/ground relations for a territorial system 
of identification. On Google Street View, faciality becomes dense and 
abstract when the algorithm saturates a scene to find accidental traits; 
for instance in the leaves of a tree or a pile of trash. A paradox occurs in 
which the very processes that encode a given scene come to generate 
aberrant signifieds through the universality of binarisation. Accidental 
identities, as in a tree or some trash, suggest faciality machines yet to 
come, as if permeating nonhuman entities at the machinic level of their 
very materiality.10 If there’s something inherently inhuman about the 
human face, it is where systems of control appear as a distant close-up 
for subjects and signs. To resist faciality is then not to erase the face but 
to multiply its traits, to invent new faciality machines, or ‘probe heads’ 
as Deleuze and Guattari call them (190) – a monstrous becoming-animal 
468 Michael Hornblow
of proliferating orifices where it’s hard to say for sure what mouths and 
eyes are anymore, or of what they may be capable.
Plan B - broken media
‘I don’t have an answer for these questions 
of withdrawal and openness, 
except something broken to share’ 
Ketl (Hornblow and Sans, 2015)
The WiFi catastrophe helped to draw out affinities between The 
Undercommons and notions of faciality, towards a kind of generative 
brokenness for immediating the performance process. Plan B began 
with me crawling around the gallery, showing my phone to people 
one by one, holding the screen flat to the floor so the accelerometer 
sensor in the phone would convey the geospatial orientation of a 
ground in parallel with the online 3D image. The intimacy of the small 
screen drew people in one by one, the performance becoming more 
conversational in tone, with a break in presentation leading to a number 
of open questions.
The image on the screen carried its own brokenness, of a geospatial 
kind. I’d come across several glitches in my navigation outside the 
gallery on Google Street View. With multiple cameras on the roof of 
the Google Street View car, the composite image these create is always 
prone to dislocation and planar distortion. Gaps appear in the way 
Google stitches together a spherical 3D world. Like falling through the 
cracks in the pavement, urban fabrics and geospatial interfaces extend 
and shift through a ubiquitous planetary assemblage, a scopic regime 
full of its own slippages.11
I collect a few things together – the Cardboard VR unit, some small 
tomatoes, a kitchen knife, a container of lard. Kneeling, I cut some slices 
of tomato using my phone as a board, lathering lard thickly across the 
screen and embedding the slices into it like a snack. I place the phone 
inside the Cardboard VR unit and secure it by circling cling wrap around 
my head, inserting tomatoes as I go – a wipe of lard here and there – 
cutting a hole to breath and speak. A few participants assist me with the 
wrap, then I offer the knife, inviting people to cut into the tomatoes so 
the juice can escape and dribble down my body like a bleeding image.
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The actions contrast with spoken speculations on the planetary nature 
of geospatial interfaces, looking to a time of writing when, as I say 
in Ketl: “everything will become media, as media becomes orbital in 
orientation, and all matter carries data” (Hornblow and Sans 2015). Plan 
B is not just a withdrawal from the failures of technology (in technical 
process, or their negligence in providing critiques of power); rather 
something has shifted in scale and mode, where concepts take on 
materiality by reconfiguring the coordination of analogue and digital 
elements. Much of the early work by artists using Google Street View 
(Doug Rickard, Jon Rafman, Michael Wolf, Mishka Henner)12 finds a 
post-photographic condition where artistic agency meets machinic 
vision. With the development of Ketl, and what might follow from it, 
I’m thinking more broadly about a post-media condition where there 
is no longer any outside in terms of agency. Or indeed, this has always 
been media’s “outside” in the Deleuzian sense – that any milieu is both 
troubled and renewed by the very conditions that define its boundaries. 
Which is to say, where media is the plurality of a medium – as the means 
of doing or communicating something, its hybridity can only go so far 
before it finds an internal limit. The agency media assumes to mediate 
for other things enters an absolute middling, where all entities already 
describe themselves somehow, just as our own mediations are already 
full of enactive couplings.13
This may be immediation’s most radical middling for media 
materialities, where the development of a project is no longer just to 
be caught in the middle of things, but where descriptions might pass 
Figure 50. Ketl, Hornblow and Sans, 2015. Image: Kinga Michalska
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through things themselves, troubling the boundaries of human and 
non-human agency. For Ketl, an attempt to dance this condition was 
accompanied by other thoughts coming over the PA, with a text-to-
speech program used to sound like an android:
It’s not a personal thing 
it’s almost impersonal 
or some kind of impersonation 
where I becomes like a thing
I becomes a thing 
made up of many things 
to feel that other things 
all think in their own way 
Ketl (Hornblow and Sans 2015)
With-drawing In-difference
I want to return to Malabou’s proposition around withdrawal from 
wonder, which I couldn’t deal with earlier but can no longer avoid. 
Arriving with some delay at the question of indifference, and feeling 
indifferent one way or another (whether withdrawal inspires sad 
passions or a lack of affection), my inclination is towards a different 
in-difference—to refuse the options given and in this refusal to accept 
them both. For if auto-affection enacts the dynamic landscaping of 
affective tonalities as a state of permanent coping, there is already a 
nascent politics in withdrawal as a field of forces that may confront 
its own outside. To withdraw is not simply to refuse or recoil from the 
circumstances of a given context, as if institutional forms of power 
were merely external forces for subjectivity. To be always and already 
affected (auto-affection) often appears to lie “outside” our attention, 
and yet this outside comes to the fore as a defining condition in 
the micro-perceptions of untimely phase shifts. Whether passive in 
retreat or active in refusal, states of withdrawal sit astride emotional 
and affective tonalities in the unravelling of multiple speeds and 
durations. The minor catastrophes of Ketl revealed how technical 
agents underlying the process may suddenly withdraw their affordance, 
arriving so soon or too late as points of protentional collapse, through 
which auto-affections are embedded and extended to other things.
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My own withdrawal was already there as a state of affection (or lack 
thereof), in mutual sensitivity for the initial discussion with Sans, 
and thereafter acting as a kind of strange attractor throughout the 
process. Now, post-catastrophe, a kind of slowness arrives for the 
performance itself, a withdrawal from affordance in which the multiple 
speeds and durations of other things may enter a speculative area. 
This with-drawal is not just a refusal of the technical (broken media) 
but a state of affective restraint, a caution and care for the future of 
our becoming media. To be in-different around the political uses of “sad 
passions” versus “lack of affection,” may then find a different politics; 
an immediation in potential – for and against, with and from, to be 
in-difference with the phase shifts that pass back and forth, within and 
between us, through other things.
A lack of affection is not nothing, for even states of withdrawal enact 
distributed couplings. I wonder then, whether wonder was never 
simply a personal joy but rather that “enjoyment” that all occasions of 
experience partake as absolute process (Whitehead 1968: 150-152). And 
we might add, where human and nonhuman entities both add to and 
draw from one another’s existence ( James 1912: 180). Even after the 
collapse of intention, beyond the catastrophe, we may find the delirium 
of a strange jouissance, allowing ourselves to be overcome. Or, as in 
that peculiar mood called melancholy, which is nothing if not a different 
curiosity toward other things – to really wonder what they can do, a 
sensate feeling all the new after the self has passed a state of despair, 
and continues to carry that potential.
To draw with and from (rather than simply open or withdraw), is a 
process that has passed through several stages and scales of relation: 
from the transduction of interpersonal collaboration via the digital 
and analogue shifts of screen / display, to the WiFi catastrophe and 
subsequent delirium of 4am, to Plan B and its broken media. Two 
concerns conclude my thoughts on affective shifts in “a Ketl” around 
the politics of withdrawal for contemporary media. How are systemic 
ecologies and their affective / emotional tonalities taken up on the 
other side of the performance by people in the audience? And how does 
a speculative post-media condition begin to find its own outside, in 
feeling bodies and thinking subjects? It’s hard to say what an audience 
response may be, let alone speak for it, when feedback is so often 
based on the communication of personal feelings and opinions. I’m 
more interested in what may be called “post-performance” strategies 
or tactics for troubling expectations around spectacle, reception and 
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participation.14 When virtuosic techniques seem to collapse, diverge or 
delay their effects, the affective gaps that issue from this may become 
more apparent between performer, audience, and the middlings of 
their media.
The so-called group subject of ‘the audience’ collapses as a single 
entity when spectators come to acknowledge their own side of the 
wager, opening a relational field of forces in which responses may 
both diverge and polarise. Emotional and affective tonalities teeter 
either side of the shift, as people withdraw into critical interpretation, 
or find a speculative area where they come to reference and reframe 
the grounds of their own reception as part of the event. When 
virtuosity fails or falters in the gap, shifts in phase generate multiple 
responses. For Ketl, post-performance strategies shift between 
an over-determination of description (performance lecture, and 
this essay), tentative improvisation and quotidian gesture (dance/
physical action), and the dirty analogue collapse of digital media 
interfaces. On the pre-personal side of the post-performance gap, the 
distributed nature of affective intensities may retain their potential 
for multiplicity and transformation. In the back-and-forth of shifts in 
phase, tonalities of various kinds are taken up by the audience through 
restraint or disjunction. New collectivities may be invented; not just 
those of a human group subject, but where people might enter a 
relational mode of thought in which the notion of thinking things feels 
tangible somehow.
Figure 51. Ketl, Hornblow and Sans, 2015. Image: Kinga Michalska
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De-scribing delimitation, towards a different writing
These speculative conditions of a multiple post-ness offer trajectories 
beyond the scope of this essay. Indeed, they point to its own outside 
in the delimitation of de-scribing a tentative time of writing.15 As a final 
response to Malabou (where “inspiring indifference becomes necessary 
for the exercise of power”), I would add that critical art practice 
exercises its own politic of sorts in demarcating a semi-autonomous 
potential for the transformation of affects and sensations. Post-
conceptual and post-performance conditions call for a different kind of 
“in-difference”: for with-drawing-from systemic ecologies; for thinking 
through where things may shift in tonality. Here the strange middlings 
of immediation find broad frames of reference and scales of action, 
towards a speculative post-media condition. Here aesthetic processes 
have much to offer critical conundrums to come, when thought and 
matter collapse and proliferate in their singular multiplicities.
Anything may contribute to the emergence of a work of art – the way 
it coheres across diverse modes of agency, material and conceptual 
affordances, collaboration, participation. The work takes on a life of its 
own when its delirium starts to move within and between subjects and 
objects. Phase shifts in process offer untimely immediacies that seem 
to come so soon or too late, appearing as signs of affective tonalities 
not yet felt, or of concepts invented on the fly. Even at a point of 
protentional collapse there’s an opportunity to withdraw for a moment, 
to draw from that which has withdrawn its usual affordance, to draw 
in-difference with a new alterity. When this happens, immediating 
qualities that are untimely and translocal may be seen to move 
transversally across human and nonhuman agencies, where critical 
practice may weigh up what is at stake for collectivities of various 
kinds. For Ketl, critical shifts approach a fugitive limit around systemic 
tonalities, becoming speculative as a process of de-scribing the 
delimitation of its own self-reference.16 Thinking back and forth, feeling 
what just happened, what things have been and are still becoming, 
as all these emerge together – I wonder how the radical middlings of 
immediation might shift differently, if this text may be felt in the world 
when its end starts again with other things? Reading this sentence … 
we have a general feel for how the flow of words might work out in the 
near future that’s already now, carried along by a just-past potential for 
holding it all together, as this iterative recursion enfolds the movement 
of thought through an intentional center, bounded by a fringe horizon. 
If the time of writing is a matter of affective tonality, then being caught 
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in the middle of things is not just a concern for this project, but for 
disjunctive rhythms of immediation to be felt in the time of reading, and 
in times of living.
Notes
1. This essay for Immediations is a companion piece to two recent publications 
written during my postdoctoral research at Senselab – the first, a journal 
article for Inflexions 8, special issue on Radical Pedagogy, “A Sahara in the 
Head: The Problem of Landing” (Hornblow 2015a); the second, a confer-
ence paper at the International Symposium on Electronic Art (ISEA 2015) – 
O’megaville: Excursions in Planetary Urbanism (Hornblow 2015b).
2. I aim to contribute to the sense in which media takes on a broader definition 
within an expanded field of research. See for example, Andrew Murphie’s 
“Electronicas: Differential Media and Proliferating, Transient Worlds” 
(Murphie 2003). Also, Matthew Fuller’s Media Ecologies: Materialist Energies in 
Art and Technoculture, where he explores how new media works have mul-
tiple compositional elements that generate “abnormal” relationships in their 
interaction with other objects (Fuller 2005).
3. Ketl was performed at FOFA Gallery, Rue St Catherine, Montreal, on June 23 
2015. For previous and ongoing iterations for this project, see: michaelhorn-
blow.com/Ketl/
4. This iteration for Ketl at the Affect Theory Conference involved a site-
specific installation on the street outside the Ware Center in Lancaster 
Pennsylvania, on October 17 2015; in collaboration with Melora Koepke and 
Anwar Floyd-Pruitt.
5. It may be said that Malabou offers a very narrow reading of Deleuze, with 
her focus on a contemporary neurobiological understanding of affect, via 
Damazio (Malabou 2013), which limits the broader philosophical engage-
ment with Spinoza. My own concern is not so much to weigh in on this 
debate, or at least to “with-draw” from it at this point. I’m more interested 
in how the question of withdrawal may be deployed as an experiential 
concept, not just for this project in its performance and preparation, but 
for a time of writing that might find a mode of description immanent to it. 
In saying this, and as I go on to discuss towards the end of this essay, I also 
question the neurobiological basis of Malabou’s argument from the point of 
view of Varela’s thesis on auto-affection (Varela 2000).
6. See my Doctoral thesis for a discussion of how ‘intensive timeframes’ may 
become a way of thinking about untimely speeds and durations across af-
fect and performance (Hornblow 2013).
7. The Undercommons Residency involved a series of discussions, read-
ing groups, workshops, performances and “pop-up propositions,” 
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at the SenseLab (Concordia University, Montreal), as well as in local 
parks and other venues ( July 13-25, 2015). See: http://senselab.ca/wp2/
events/a-week-of-study-with-the-undercommons/
8. Omegaville was a previous development to Ketl, involving a four-channel 
video installation, presented at Glasshouse Gallery, New York; as part of an 
exhibition The Smell of Red with Erin Manning, Nathaniel Stern, and others 
( June 2014).
9. Traditional face recognition software uses this geometric approach, for 
example the MFlow system in airports (see: www.hrsid.com/product-
mflow). Other developments involve photometric algorithms, with 3D data 
points, skin texture maps, or thermal imaging.
10. Deleuze and Guattari refer to information theory as being permeated by the 
machine of faciality, with relation to processes of binarization: “Information 
theory takes as its point of departure a homogeneous set of ready-made 
signifying messages that are already functioning as elements in biunivocal 
relationships” (Deleuze and Guattari, 1987: 179).
11. See my paper for ISEA2015, where I discuss in more detail how notions of fa-
ciality may be explored through specific features of the Google Street View 
platform; with related concepts around cinematic machine vision, planetary 
urbanism, and mondialisation (Hornblow 2015b).
12. See the following: Doug Rickard’s A New American Picture, exhibited at 
the Museum of Modern Art, New York (2011); Jon Rafman’s The Nine 
Eyes of Google Street View (ongoing); Michael Wolf’s Street View: A Series of 
Unfortunate Events (2010); and Mishka Henner’s No Man’s Land (2011).
13. Domenico Quaranta gives an overview of how the term post-media has 
been used in different ways; from its political call to action with Felix 
Guattari, to the historical impact of the media in New Media Arts, and 
related crises for aesthetics and medium specificity (see Quaranta 2011). As 
suggested in Ketl, with current technological advances for the materiality 
of media, I see new implications moving across these debates. As indicated 
in my later comments in this essay, areas for future research may include a 
combination of post-conceptual, relational and object ontologies.
14. I see this as a tendency in relational approaches to contemporary perfor-
mance art practice. For a similar approach to theorising such a tendency in 
theatre, see Lone Bertelsen and Andrew Murphie’s Affect, Subtraction and 
Non-Performance (Bertelsen and Murphie 2012).
15. A speculative post-media condition may be explored further through 
relational and object ontologies. For the former, thought is a process of 
making invented in and with the world, and is not limited to human men-
tality but enacted through material affordances and collective processes 
of various kinds (see Manning and Massumi 2014). For the latter, I would 
say that things do not just withdraw in their being in a sea of alterity (see 
Harman 2002), but also draw with-and-from others through semi-autono-
mous relations.
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16. The project title for Ketl is taken from the military “kettling” practices adop-
ted by riot police, as used in Montreal during the 2012 and 2015 student 
protests. What interests me is how kettling, as a process of biopolitical 
delimitation, has co-evolved alongside new techniques in urban protest 
with similar yet contrasting dynamics, beginning with the Arab Spring and 
Occupy movements of 2011. See further, my synopsis for the Affect Theory 
Conference 2015: https://www.michaelhornblow.com/#/Ketl/
Jonas Fritsch
An Eco-logic of Urban  
Interactive Environments
Introduction
In this chapter, I will sketch out an eco-logical thinking of urban 
interactive environments building on Félix Guattari’s ecosophy to 
cultivate a critical reflection on the theorizing and design of such 
complex environments in interaction design. Digital technologies 
continue to make their way into our everyday urban practices, changing 
the urban landscape and our affective experience of being (together) 
in the city and elsewhere. Corporate visions for living in the so-called 
Smart City have emerged alongside a growing body of research within 
urban computing and urban interaction design, presenting quite 
different visions for living with digital technologies. The streamlined 
visions of a comfortable and convenient lifestyle facilitated by 
technologies that form part of the scenarios for everyday life in the 
Songdo International Business District (IDB) in South Korea (http://
www.songdoidb.com) are in contrast with the actual accounts of empty 
apartments and a general lack of livability in this developing Smart City.1 
The critique of the predominant Smart City visions coming out of the 
joint fields of urban computing and urban interaction design—may be 
voiced most prominently by Adam Greenfield in his book Against the 
Smart City—points to the lack of understanding of the ecosystems of 
practices that make up cities (Greenfield 2013). Following from these 
ideas, this chapter builds on a growing need to develop new ways 
of theorizing and analyzing urban interactive environments in their 
ecological complexity. Through this theoretical mobilization, the goal 
is to cultivate design concerns that are actually contributing to crafting 
urban interactive environments that provide the opportunity for richer 
experiential fields beyond the comfortable and convenient.
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The motivation for writing this chapter comes from an ongoing 
engagement with the work of Guattari not least as part of activities 
within the SenseLab2, in particular in the events Generating the 
Impossible (2011) and Immediations (2013-19, in particular the Sydney 
Workshop 2014), and from an ongoing exploration of developing a 
theoretical foundation for experience-driven approaches to urban 
interaction design as a kind of research-through-design (Frayling 1993, 
Fritsch 2011). In this chapter, I will sketch out how Guattari presents 
a theoretical opening for unfolding an eco-logic that I believe can 
contribute to forming a new agenda for the design of urban interactive 
environments. Guattari’s ecosophy situates the changes catalyzed 
by technology on an environmental, social and mental scale. In 
Guattari’s work, ecological change is not only for the environment; 
it also works on a social/societal and experiential level—and, maybe 
most importantly, any changes to one ecology will affect the others, 
leading to new productions of subjectivity. Building on Guattari, the 
chapter’s overall aim is to develop an analytic understanding of the 
complex ethico-aesthetic processes that form our experiential fields 
in urban interactive environments, engaging directly with the concept 
of “immediation” from an eco-logical point of view. Indeed, the notion 
of immediation implies an understanding of technologies directly 
related to forms of experience, rather than tools or objects, and must 
be understood eco-logically as well. To urban interaction design, the 
Guattarian ecosophy is introduced as a theoretical foundation for 
analyzing and designing urban interactive environments, taking into 
account the experiential complexity of the intersecting social, mental 
and environmental ecologies.
First, I contextualize the introduction of Guattari’s eco-logic in relation 
to the “ecological turn” within Human-Computer Interaction (HCI) and 
interaction design, where I argue that Guattari presents a different 
genealogical starting point and theoretical implications. I then present 
the main concepts from Guattari’s work for theorizing and analyzing the 
eco-logic of urban interactive environments. Based on this conceptual 
exploration, I draw lessons from a range of urban design projects, 
leading to the formulation of new design concerns and experiments 
from an eco-logic point of view.
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The Ecological Turn in HCI and Urban Interaction Design
The notion of ecology holds a central place in diverse disciplinary fields. 
Grappling with issues of situated design and understanding contexts 
of use have long been core interests in HCI and interaction design, in 
particular in areas like Participatory Design. As Kaptelinin & Bannon 
(2012) describe it, it can be argued that there has been an “ecological 
turn” in HCI and interaction design to better account for the complexity 
of the habitats we are designing for and with. The notion of ecology has 
been worked on with contributions through “information ecologies” 
(Nardi and O’Day 1999), “ecology of artifacts” (Krippendorf 2006), 
“ecological inquiry” (Smith et al. 2013), “ecology of digital artifacts” 
( Jung et al. 2008) and “digital ecology” (Kjeldskov 2013). Since digital 
technologies have become an organic part of natural environments, 
Bannon and Kaptelinin argue that:
The effect of a new technology on human life conditions 
critically depends on a complex system of interactions 
between the new technology and other technologies, as 
well as people, social context, preceding events and so on. 
In addition, the effect may take considerable time, and the 
outcome is often difficult to predict. (2012: 290)
According to this, interaction design requires local knowledge and local 
action to manage disparate technologies (291). In earlier work, I have 
developed the idea of understanding participation in interaction design 
processes as ways of cultivating a “design ecology” (Fritsch & Iversen 
2014). Here, my collaborator and I drew on the work of Nardi and O’Day 
(1999) together with the work of Isabelle Stengers on “ecologies of 
practices.” According to Stengers, an ecology is processual, relating to 
the “production of values, to the proposal of new modes of evaluation, 
new meanings” (2010: 32) In an ecology “new relations are added to a 
situation already produced by a multiplicity of relations” (2010: 33). This 
way, any design ecology intersects with other ecologies of practices, 
which will affect it in any number of ways.
However, it is possible to add to the work on ecology within HCI and 
interaction design a different “ecological turn” associated with the 
arts and humanities—what John Tinnell (2011) identifies as a general 
evolution of the “eco-humanities.” This turn stems from different 
genealogical starting point(s), namely Arne Naess’ notion of “deep 
ecology” and Gregory Bateson’s Steps to an Ecology of Mind, a genealogy 
Tinnell sketches out as a way to enter the ecosophical work of Félix 
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Guattari, which will be unfolded in the next section. However, first 
a cautionary remark; according to John Tinnell (2011), it is important 
not to only develop Guattari’s notion of ecosophy from a reading of 
The Three Ecologies, since this book is only part of a range of larger 
conceptual developments running across the joint body of Guattari’s 
work. In his article, Tinnell sketches out four general conceptual 
trajectories informing the ecosophical investigations carried out by 
Guattari: nascent subjectivity, machines, post-media and autopoiesis 
(2011: 40). For present purposes, however, this chapter will mainly focus 
on the introduction of Guattari to urban interaction design, and how 
this introduction and ensuing analysis of existing projects and future 
design concerns talks back into the development of immediation as a 
concept dealing with the experiential and ecological complexity when 
designing urban interactive environments.
Towards an Eco-logic of Urban Interactive Environments
Felix Guattari develops his notion of “eco-logic” as part of his proposed 
ecosophy in his book from 1989 The Three Ecologies. In the book, 
Guattari unfolds the problem of the “subject’s fabrication posed in the 
context of ecological struggles” in the age of “advanced informatics,” 
calling for a “necessity of a mastery that can keep pace with the 
environment’s reinvention in a time of widespread techno-scientific 
progress and crisis.” (Genosko 2009: 69). Guattari argues for a general 
rethinking of the notion of ecology:
Ecology must stop being associated with the image of a 
small nature-loving minority or with qualified specialists. 
Ecology in my sense questions the whole of subjectivity and 
capitalistic power formations, whose sweeping progress 
cannot be guaranteed to continue as it has for the past 
decade. (Guattari 2008: 52)
In The Three Ecologies, Guattari presents three intersecting ecologies—
the mental (human subjectivity), the social (social relations) and the 
environmental (biospherical)—all related to a “common principle” 
concerned with the production of subjectivity (Genosko 2009: 76). 
According to Genosko, the Guattarian subject is “an entangled 
assemblage of many components … before and beyond the individual 
(76). Guattari states that the three ecologies are governed by a logic 
of intensities, an “eco-logic” “concerned only with the movement and 
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intensity of evolutive processes, rather than the capture of delimited 
entities (2008: 44). Subjectivity produces and is produced by existential 
territories, fields, through a productive self-positioning which is 
relational “subsuming both autonomous affects of the pre-personal and 
pre-verbal world, and multitudinous social constructions. Emergent and 
processual, producing and produced …” (Genosko 2009: 77).
For Guattari, eco-logic is by definition activist (Genosko 2009: 79). 
In his own work, Guattari exemplifies this through a variety of 
artistic practices, concerned with forging new value systems and 
new productions of subjectivity. According to Genosko, this can be 
understood as a call for an ethico-aesthetics of eco-praxis, initiating real 
change, but without being able to predict outcomes (87). Interestingly, 
Guattari links this to digital technologies that are part of the 
technological and machinic phylum forming subjectivity. He argues that 
the advent of microprocessors can be seen as a molecular mutation 
that catalyzes changes in macro-social and experiential conditions, 
changing the “actual substratum of human existence” and thus opening 
up “fabulous possibilities of liberation” (Guattari in Genosko 2009: 87). 
This also leads to Genosko arguing that “[a]t the heart of Guattari’s 
project is an ethics arising from the interface between humans and 
non-human machines” (Genosko 2009: 88). Importantly, Genosko 
argues that the notion of ecology allows Guattari to pose questions of 
transdisciplinarity on a large and stratified scale. If we wish to actually 
tackle the complex ecological crisis of today, no one discipline can 
stand alone; an eco-logic approach to understanding urban interactive 
environments also calls for a transdisciplinary approach to working with 
these kind of wicked problems (Buchanan 1992).
In his generalized ecology—ecosophy—Guattari again and again 
emphasizes the interrelatedness of the different ecologies. As Genosko 
states, “solutions at one level entails changes at the others.” (Genosko 
2009: 73). Andrew Murphie has argued that the question of ecology 
“becomes not only a matter of the environment but of media ecologies, 
cognitive ecologies, ecologies of perception and affect. Moreover, 
these ecologies need to be considered singly, in their interaction with 
other ecologies, and both at the same time” (Murphie 2006: 118). 
Consequently, it is less about the different ecologies in themselves 
as it is about understanding and analyzing the dynamics of change 
governing their processual and emergent transitions. This also entails 
looking into the affective resonances and relaying across ecologies, how 
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they form more or less stabilized assemblages, which becomes central 
to the analysis and design of urban interactive environments.
In the next section I will put the conceptual foundation to use in 
an analysis of five urban interaction design projects I have been 
involved in. The projects have been carried out over a period of 
more than 8 years, as part of the research center Digital Urban 
Living (www.digitalurbanliving.dk) that ran from 2008-2012, and 
later the Participatory IT-center (www.pit.au.dk). Both centers are 
rooted in the research environment around the Center for Advanced 
Visualization and Interaction (www.cavi.au.dk) at Aarhus University. 
The projects range from the design of interactive installations aimed 
at getting people actively engaged in issues related to climate change 
(CO2nfession/CO2mmitment), 3D projections for a museum to bring the 
statue of Holger the Dane to life (the Journey of Holger the Dane), the 
design of an interactive listening machine used to bring stories/echoes 
from the past to life and to foster community storytelling (Ekkomaten 
and Echoes from Møllevangen) and the design of an interactive poetry 
generation machine to be used in public libraries and festival (INK). 
These projects can all be said to explore the design of urban interactive 
environments, using digital and interactive technologies to form new 
experiential fields in the city, creating new relational events—and failing 
at this sometimes as well.
I draw on these projects, related to the work and the vocabulary of 
Guattari to sketch out a range of design concerns to be pursued in 
urban interaction design. It must be noted that these projects are 
not to be seen as exemplars of Guattarian concepts; there are other 
projects that more acutely activate the ecological concerns. In addition, 
the projects are not as directly radical and activist in their scope 
and reach as some of the artistic projects Guattari mentions in his 
own work. However, I will argue that there is a point in fostering and 
developing these design concerns from an ongoing design research 
practice put into resonance with the Guattarian concepts and that this 
is an important way of unfolding a range of ecological design concerns 
to be further pursued and experimented within the design of urban 
interactive environments.
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Unfolding the Ecological Complexity of  
Urban Interaction Designs
A range of the projects presented in this chapter have been concerned 
with bringing stories or objects to life, using digital technologies to 
tap into the affective spaces surrounding such diverse settings as 
Kronborg Castle and the story behind the statue of Holger the Dane, 
as well as Store Torv in Aarhus and the eighteenth century life in the 
city in the design of Ekkomaten. Here, a driving motivation has been 
that the city holds an experiential and narrative potential that can be 
unleashed through different kinds of interaction designs, uncovering 
and (re)activating the hidden affective layers forming part of the 
existing experience of these urban and public spaces. In, for example, 
Ekkomaten, the interactive setup activated both the environment in 
Figure 52. Immediations Collage, NY. Top: The Ekkomaten machine in the 
neighbourhood Møllevangen in Echoes from Møllevangen, where the inhabitants 
could experience different sound recordings related to different locations in 
the area. Photo by Jonas Fritsch. Bottom, left: The Journey of Holger the Dane, 
using 3D projections to activate the statue of Holger the Dane in the Casemates, 
Kronborg Castle. Photo by Jonas Fritsch. Bottom, right: The INK poetry machine 
on display at Roskilde Library. By engaging with the sensorembedded books, 
people could write poems that were then printed out in the format of library 
receipts. Photo by Roskilde Libraries (image in public domain).
484 Jonas Fritsch
which the installation was placed as a cultural, historical and physical 
setting, the social relations forming around the use of the installation 
in a specific public space and the more personal engagement with the 
presented stories (as seen in Fritsch et. al. 2013). Pastness and futurity 
traverse the immediate relational activation of the history of the place, 
the site, the technologies deployed, the social situation. Ekkomaten does 
not mediate between these factors; it immediately situates the ecology 
of experiences emerging through the interaction with the installation in 
a relational field comprised of these (and other) process lines that may 
or may not actualize, but which nonetheless color the affective tonality 
of the event.
A question also arises around the notion of the events staged by urban 
interactive environments. One might ask of all the projects; when is the 
event actually taking place—or what is the event taking place? And how 
is the event taken up into other events, from an eco-logical point of 
view? A traditional analysis of people’s experience of Ekkomaten might 
focus on the moment of interaction—but what about the changes in 
technological conception catalyzed by the interaction, re-orientations 
of historical knowledge, a new sensation of being in the city and 
other relational activations? Echoes from Møllevangen is an example 
of a way to build on the event of Ekkomaten into another project with 
a more societal and communitarian reach; the same infrastructural 
setup to catalyze or condition the emergence of different events in a 
new relational field. Because of the relational complexity it becomes 
increasingly difficult to say when the event is taking place. Clearly, 
in Echoes from Møllevangen, a number of events were facilitated 
throughout the project; researchers performing soundwalks in the 
Møllevangen neighborhood, the collection of sounds by the inhabitants 
of the neighborhood through sonic probes, interviews carried out 
with selected inhabitants by the local social worker, the additional 
collection of everyday sounds by the research team, the orchestration 
of the collected sounds into a curated soundscape, the display of 
the installation with the soundscape in the neighborhood—lots of 
subevents make up the overall project—and can potentially take on a 
life of their own. It must be stated, though, that Echoes from Møllevangen 
was to some extent a less successful project since we, as researchers, 
did not manage to care enough for the composition of the subevents 
into the actual display of the installation—or in their potential relational 
ramifications after the display.
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With INK, however, the story can be said to be quite different. Again, we 
might ask: what is the INK event? When picking up the interactive book? 
When choosing a sentence? When playing around with the sentences 
and “writing” the poem? When the poem is printed out? When the poem 
is read out loud—or shown to people at home? When you videotape 
your friend reading out loud the poem, and when you show this video 
to your friends? When the blog with all the aggregated poems is visited? 
When the machine accidentally inserts the same sentence three times 
in a row due to an algorithmic glitch? When a person instructs another 
person in how to compose a poem? All these are real life observations 
of the relational complexity of the ecologies of experience emerging 
through the interaction. Apart from this, the design of the installation 
and the ensuing exhibition of it in a great number of places (numerous 
libraries, the Roskilde Festival, conferences) has been instrumental in 
changing the participating librarians’ understanding of the function 
of the library today; currently, 4 interactive installations are being 
crafted, that will continue to travel around the country in the years 
to come, experimenting with text and interactivity as part of the 
library experience. Another interesting observation from this project 
concerns whether the digital installation can be seen as a literary 
work in its own right. Recently, the author of the text in the database 
of the installation, Peter-Clement Woetmann, collected a range of 
poems in a physical book, authored by him. Only then did INK become 
an event in the literary community; the book was reviewed (mostly 
positively) in newspapers and magazines. Again, this is an example of 
the process lines emanating from the crafting of the installation, taken 
up and (re)activated over a much longer period of time, in a variety 
of intersecting contexts. A central element is that of co-composition, 
where you “cannot know in advance where the collective value of the 
project resides” (Manning in Massumi 2015b: 165). This seems to be the 
case when we talk about urban interaction design, and it is important 
to continuously track and tend to the process lines activated in the 
process, and possibly facilitate the co-compositional when designing 
the conditions of emergence of urban interactive environments.
In most of the presented projects, there has been a focus on developing 
technologies that directly engage bodily movement through the 
development of physical interfaces. INK uses physical books embedded 
with sensors so people can choose sentences on a screen and “write” 
poems. The physical interface moves the interaction into a social space, 
the library or a festival setting, fostering new ways of being together in 
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the settings where the installation has been put up. Using closed books 
as a way to write also questions the relation between text, writing and 
technology. Ekkomaten also clearly experiments with physical interfaces, 
in fact the interaction with the machine was intentionally designed to 
be demanding in a physical sense, as a commentary to the seamless 
swiping on mobile devices. This orients the interaction from individual/
personal to social/collective; often people would have to collaborate 
and negotiate when it came to the interaction with the machine. In The 
Journey of Holger the Dane, 3D projections merge with a physical statue; 
in a sense, the interface disappears. Instead, there is a fusion of the 
physical and the digital, which is immediately and affectively felt. In 
particular there is a sequence, where the statue looks as thought it is 
breathing; the 3D projection subtly shifts the contours of the statue 
so it looks like Holger the Dane’s chest is moving. At the same time, 
the soundscape plays breathing sounds. Here, I would argue that the 
interactive setup works in “the formative stir of the field of emergence 
of experience” (Massumi 2011: 76). In the context of immediation, 
interfaces are more than screens, and the feeling of interactivity tied 
to the richness of the ecology of experience catalyzed through the 
digital activation.
In CO2nfession/CO2mmitment, we see concerns developing towards 
more large-scale ecological experimentation, facilitated by the 
interactive technologies, fostering new urban practices, creating richer 
experiential fields in urban space. The whole idea behind this project 
was to take an environmental, large-scale issue and show its relation 
to the immediacy of everyday actions of people in Aarhus, putting a 
personal face on the collective struggle for a better climate. In this 
project, the city in itself becomes an interface for engaging with issues 
related to climate change. By hijacking commercial infrastructures and 
making them accessible to public issues, a new idea of communitarian 
engagement and open, performative dialogue is suggested; people 
are encouraged, through the technological setup, to actively engage 
with societal and environmental issues. Relational events emerge 
from this infrastructure, and the same can be said with respect to 
the two Ekkomaten-projects linking sounds, history and the cityscape, 
using auditory explorations to make people engage in new community 
storytelling as a collective listening process. Rather than a technology 
per se, Ekkomaten is an assemblage that works eco-logically in the 
way it activates relational events through people’s engagement with 
the installation. INK adds to this a questioning of the infrastructural 
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ecosystems concerned with (digital) text production and their relation 
to reading/writing; the poems appear in real-time on a screen, they are 
printed out on small receipts, and simultaneously published on a blog 
seconds after they have been written. The circulation across platforms 
adds to the exploration of ecologies of information, entering the 
machinic phylum through the aesthetic production.
Emerging Eco-Logic Concerns for Urban Interaction Design
In all the projects presented in the above section, we are talking about 
interaction design that goes beyond any idea of a designed object. The 
design projects must be understood ecologically as urban interactive 
environments activating experiential fields through the deployment 
of digital technologies. This activation across ecologies cannot be 
fully determined in the design process, or by the design. Focusing 
on the immediacy of the experiential fields and relational events 
activated, forces us to rethink the way we conceive of urban interaction 
design projects; rather than controlling interaction, we are staging or 
facilitating processual activations and oscillations between process 
lines that will always play out differently through the interaction—and 
beyond. Importantly, this is not a way to diminish the importance of 
the material crafting of e.g. the physical machine in Ekkomaten. It is a 
way of valuing this material crafting in its activation of the relational 
events emerging through people’s interaction. If anything, the theory 
of immediation and an ecological approach to understanding urban 
interactive environments calls for an increased attention to detail in 
every part of the ecological activation.
An eco-logical approach to the design of urban interactive 
environments needs to take into account that any changes in one 
ecological register will affect the others. Any design simultaneously 
works on an environmental, social and mental level, affecting ecologies 
of experience in the immediacy of everyday life, catalyzing changes in 
the production of subjectivity. Here, an experience-oriented design 
approach would focus on the ethico-aesthetic processes that form 
our experiential fields through different intersecting and resonating 
ecologies, activated by different technologies understood as Guattarian 
“molecular mutations,” in an attempt to unfold the complexity of the 
emergence of new forms of subjectivity. This concern is directly tied to 
unfolding the transversal politics of the different ecological processes 
cultivated both in the design process—a form of design ecology—and 
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after the introduction of the design into already existing ecologies 
of practices, relating to the question of event and co-composition as 
unfolded in the previous section. In addition to this form of transversal 
politics, a transdisciplinary approach to the design processes should 
always be a guiding principle.
The presented projects and concerns described in this chapter 
clearly transcend the vision of a Smart City which would seek to 
instrumentalize, operationalize or smooth out ecologies of experience. 
Rather, what urban interaction design must pursue is a vision of a city 
providing conditions of emergence of differentiated experiential fields 
and relational events catalyzed by affectively engaging interfaces. 
Such interfaces would actively experiment with the experiential 
parameters of our immediate urban experience through an exploration 
of technologies of emergence. It was stated in the beginning, that 
the theory of immediation must be understood eco-logically. By 
developing an eco-logic approach to the analysis and design of urban 
interactive environments, this chapter calls for a continued digitally 
led experimentation with the relational richness of ecologies of 
lived experience.
Notes
1. See e.g. http://politiken.dk/oekonomi/gloekonomi/ECE2480009/verdens-
stoerste-udviklingsprojekt-ligner-en-spoegelsesby/ or http://www.financi-
alexpress.com/article/markets/smart-city-or-ghost-city/4345/
2. The SenseLab is an international network of artists and academics, writers 
and makers, from a wide diversity of fields, working together at the cross-
roads of philosophy, art, and activism (taken from and see more on: http://
senselab.ca/)
Jondi Keane
The Practice of Immediating: Toward the 
Ground of Our Own Activity
There is not the mere problem of fluency and permanence. 
There is the double problem: actuality with permanence, 
requiring fluency as its completion; and actuality with 
fluency, requiring permanence as its completion.
A. N. Whitehead (1978: 347)
Immediation and Immediating
The concept of immediaton raises questions about the filigree, about 
the eventful connections from which nextness arises. It concerns the 
techniques1 through which one practices. What might enrich collective 
action? What can an event become? How can research-creation, or 
practice-led research enter into these questions?
This essay engages a research-creation event by drawing out a 
proposition regarding the nature of a practice of immediating through 
the concept of lived abstraction. Specifically, the performative and 
interactive installation, ZOOM, provides a situation through which to 
explore how events can be perceptually felt as a lived abstraction: an 
“effective virtual vision of the shape of the event, including in its arc 
the unseen dimensions of the immediate past and immediate future” 
(Massumi 2011: 17). The generative proposition of nonsensuous or 
amodal perception excites the imagination of practitioners who use 
art and media practices to play with the conditions of perceptual and 
conceptual processes from which felt perception comes to experience.
If art and media practices play with the conditions of how concepts 
might be experienced, my proposition is that the experience of paradox 
can draw an immediating practice out of lived abstraction.
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Engaging the Uses of Paradox
Poet and theorist, Charles Stein, has written extensively about creative 
practices and the philosophical concerns that bear upon immediation, 
particularly the paradox of contemplative exercises in relation to 
the work of art. Stein thinks about paradox through what are called 
diagonal constructions in mathematics 2, for example instances in which 
a system refers to itself. Familiar paradoxes include: the liar’s paradox 
(the truth or falsity of the statement “I never lie”), Russell’s Paradox (a 
catalogue of books in a library that includes itself), whenever literary 
authors refer to their own text (Calvino’s If on a Winter’s Night a Traveller) 
and, in contemplative exercises, the instruction that must be applied to 
itself (the meditation instruction: refrain from intentional activities). In 
the last example, the diagonal substitution that occurs for a Buddhist 
meditator confronting a Zen Koan is useful for thinking through 
ways of approaching paradoxes confronted in everyday experience. 
The practice of engaging with paradox throws us into the heart of 
immediation. Of particular interest is how the Koan offers a useful way 
to immediate through a particular experiential paradox that I will go on 
to discuss through the ways form is active formation.
To summarize Stein’s discussion, the meditator is confronted by the 
problem that “refraining from activity” is also an activity and, when 
emptying the mind, the thought that sets meditation in motion is 
itself a concept that confronts the mind with the difference between 
experiencing and understanding a concept. Stein suggests that for 
this particular task of engaging with the Koan, students often make 
two types of error. The first error is refusing to take the contradiction 
seriously by ignoring it (Stein associates this error with the formalist 
mathematics that save the system by rejecting the diagonal case as 
undefined within it). The second error is to allow the contradiction 
to inflate the state of mind that produces a mystification of thought 
(which Stein associates with the classical mathematicians, carried away 
by Platonistic possibilities) (1988: 28-33). To be clear, these are not 
problems in themselves, they only become problematic when the task is 
to deal with the paradox of self-reference. That is to say, the errors Stein 
identifies interfere with accessing the immediate ground of one’s own 
activity. Recognizing these errors opens the possibility to discover what 
immediating entails.
To meet the task of the Zen Koan does not necessarily mean to 
accomplish the explicit instruction. Here is where the artwork and the 
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Koan can share a common operation: the indirect connection afforded 
by a paradox. The Zen student must attain a vantage not confined by 
the language in which the meditational instruction is delivered in order 
to grasp the condition and structure of the exercise. By doing so the 
student “covers the entire space of their cognitive language and steps 
beyond it … onto the immediate ground of their own activity … brought 
into contact with its experiential basis, capable of saturating, at a single 
stroke, the space of its own activity” (Stein 1988: 32-33).
Over many years my art practice has explored the problem of self-
reference. Artworks are not simply a way of producing novel experience 
or confounding or critiquing existing modalities but operate instead 
as ways to open up an understanding of how to live, attaining a 
broad generative value. This generative value is related to enquiries 
into “immediation.” Immediating is the deployment of techniques 
of engagement that usher us onto the ground of our own activity, 
prompted by conundrums or challenges such as that of the paradox 
of self-reference. In the context of an art practice, this might involve 
eliciting a co-dependent movement between form and forming.
ZOOMing In and ZOOMing Out:  
Installing Immediating Practices
How one immediates, then, pertains to those often implicitly mobilised 
techniques (a disposition perhaps), that artworks can help to recognise 
and develop. I recently set out to navigate these issues through an 
interactive installation, ZOOM, which was part of a tandem installation, 
PAN & ZOOM ( Jondi Keane and Kaya Barry) shown at the “Performing 
Mobilities” Exhibition (Melbourne 2015). The installation consisted of 
two distinct works (PAN & ZOOM) that were devised to be co-joined. The 
works shared a common wall and offered very different, but related 
spatial experiences: the sweeping panoramic movement on a horizontal 
plane in PAN contrasted with the knots of spatial compression and 
expansion in ZOOM. The experience of these two works might be 
described as perpendicular as opposed to parallel. For this paper, I 
will focus only on the interactions offered by ZOOM focusing on how 
‘immediating’ played a role in devising and enacting the work.
ZOOM explores the movements contained in the cinematic apparatus 
of the moving camera. The installation co-opts the “dolly-zoom” effect 
in cinema, wherein the camera zooms in while moving backwards, 
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or zooms out while moving forwards, resulting in the screen image 
expanding or contracting to amplify intense moments of realization 
for the protagonist in film narrative. Offering two sets of spatial 
experiences—a performative event and a cinematic screen-based 
event—the work was an assemblage constituted by a video camera, 
a live feed to a screen, and a moving wall 2.7m high by 3.6m wide, 
which was on wheels and on which a perspectival photographic image 
was attached. This image was chosen to provide strong architectural 
structure as well as multiple levels and vistas (see figure 3). The image 
on the wall is also one of the images in the array of panoramic images 
stitched together in PAN. The selected architectural image was shot 
from street level but shows a ramp descending to a lower level, a half 
wall that one might be able to sit upon, an entryway courtyard slightly 
elevated and view of the surrounding buildings that tower overhead. By 
manually moving the wall (pushing or pulling an attached rope which 
replaced the movement of the camera in the dolly zoom effect) ZOOM 
dilated the movements-within-movements that unfold when a dynamic 
physical structure interacts with the complexity of lived-experience.
The installation pulled apart the double movement of the camera 
effect by performing the pulling-back-and-forth of a moving wall as 
environmental backdrop. During the exhibition, a person, or group of 
people were invited to make a video recording using the installation to 
enact a dolly zoom effect, inside of which they were asked to improvise 
actions. These improviser-participants stood between moving wall 
(operated by myself) and zooming camera operated by my collaborator.
If desired, the potential improvisation was discussed with participants 
in terms of how the performative space of the installation was set up 
and where the participant’s image would or would not be not captured 
in the video. Further discussion was offered to those willing to discuss 
Figure 53. Installation view of PAN & ZOOM set up. Photos by Kaya Barry.
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their experience of space and a compilation of historical dolly zoom 
effects was on hand to augment these discussions. A screen on the 
wall next to the camera displayed a live feed of the recording, such that 
the improviser-participants could see the footage both while being 
recorded and just afterwards. We offered to make as many recordings 
as the participants wanted. At least half of the participants made more 
than one video, experimenting with ways of inhabiting and responding 
to the spatial event. The time of the recording and therefore of each 
improvisation, was the time it took for me to slowly push the wall 
eight meters to the back wall, turn around and pull the wall towards 
the improviser-participant and camera. Generally, this took about 
30-40 seconds.
Figure 54. PAN & ZOOM spatial layout of installation. Drawings by Jondi Keane 
and Kaya Barry.
Figure 55. Working with improviser-participant (Shaun McLeod) in ZOOM. Photos 
by Vicki Jones.
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It is important to note that improviser-participants could view a live 
feed of the film being recorded by the zooming camera, such that the 
movements of both the wall and the camera were immediately fed 
back to the improviser-participants. ZOOM sets up several instances for 
self-reference and re-entry into the installation’s system of relations. 
The moving wall had two starting positions: close to camera (half 
metre away) and at the back wall of the gallery (8 metres). Each time 
the wall moved, to make a video recording or not, it was treated as an 
iteration. Through these iterations, the wall began to reference itself 
and the gallery context. It continually distinguished itself from and 
moved in accord with the space—creaking across the uneven wooden 
floor, rubbing against the gallery wall, wearing a groove in the gallery 
space. The wall offered itself as a measure of space, time, relation 
and variation. I began to become part of the wall, in service of the wall 
and yet distinct from the wall, for example on the occasions when 
I was addressed as the artist or wall operator. On most occasions, I 
disappeared into the wall itself and would emerge, sticking my head 
out from the undifferentiated visual noise of the background as if from 
behind the invisible curtain. Gallery goers were not sure how to interact 
with the person who had separated from the wall. I purposefully did 
not adopt the silent role of the performer, but, as mentioned above, 
tried to move gently between the performer of tasks, the moderator of 
activity, facilitator offering information and artist guiding engagement. 
The encounters varied depending on the distinctions and decisions 
made by the gallery goers. Some were amused, others overwhelmed by 
the sensory environment and feedback, others pulled back and some 
projected a unified autonomous front.
Standing or moving in the space between the (moving) wall and the 
(zooming) camera, a person is amidst something highly structured 
but, at the same time, very much in formation. The “form” of the work 
is a kind of “machine,” and the improviser-participant/s are asked to 
“perform” or move within these pre-scripted or “formal” components. 
As much as the actions of the installation assemblage are, to some 
degree at least, pre-given, the actions of the improviser-participants 
are not. What any one person might have felt in their engagement with 
the work was inaccessible to me, however, what I witnessed from within 
the performative event and from watching the recorded videos, I can 
offer as observations about a pattern that emerged when people spent 
extended periods of time in the installation.
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Participants had to improvise a way of being in the installation and 
respond to the expansion and contraction of the space in the video 
recording on screen, in the live performative event or indirectly 
through onlookers’ reactions. The improvisations began to intensify 
the improvisers’ response to changes of the installation space and 
their choice to move with or against the other installation components. 
It appeared that participants who developed the improvisation over 
several iterations entered into a mutually responsive relationship with 
the space and began to feel the expansion and contraction as a function 
linked to their experience. Other improvisers remained separate and/
or reacted against the movement of the space rather than in concert 
with it. Others moved into the movement and aligned themselves with 
their own bodies. Improvisers began to think and feel their way into 
(or out of) the experience of space and their own ways of processing 
(organising and correlating) the experience.
What seemed most telling, however, was the degree to which the entire 
assemblage of the work “came together” most convincingly through 
an event that seemed to move toward something like meeting the 
task of the Zen Koan. In other words, when the assemblage became 
aware of itself as a set of separated and connected components, the 
beginnings of a practice of immediating emerged. The work set up a 
self-referential loop in which one is both inside and outside the spatial 
assemblage of the dolly zoom effect—both being affected by the spatial 
event and simultaneously seeing oneself externally in the recording 
zoom-image. As part of this entire set-up, pre-scripted movements 
gave way to modes of active formation as people composed multiples 
experiences from multiple modes of perception and conceptual 
construction at once.
Figure 56. Expansion and compression of the event-field in ZOOM. Drawing 
by Jondi Keane
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In the installation, the different feedback mechanisms each relate to 
different configurations of experience. The work also produced several 
feedback loops between all those attendant components – the wall 
operator, the camera operator, the improviser/s, the gallery space, 
the constructed installation, the moving wall, the live-feed screen, the 
recorded video document and any spectators viewing the process. This 
left plenty of room for connections to emerge between material, agents 
and artefacts and be used to augment, dilate or ignore the registration 
and proliferation of affects and the modes of engagement activated at 
each instance within the event.
In general, the way things are set in motion informs how we plan, 
perform and reflect upon ecologies of relation, whether these things 
are artworks, architectural environments, essays, choreographed 
movements or everyday actions. However, the specificity of the 
components, their material qualities, context and modes of activation 
are affected in turn by the way one immediates. Paradoxically, “one” 
(oneself) is precisely what comes into question as the process of 
realising the ground of one’s own activity accentuates or emphasises, 
uncouples or links “one” to the collective, the environment and the 
technologies in play. ZOOM attempts to construct conditions that 
emphasise the generative value of art, by using the paradox of forms in 
an artwork as one might construct a Koan. In this way the work of art, 
as a relational platform, becomes a provocation for engagement and 
reflexivity, highlighting what emerges when participants immediate by 
turning towards the ground of their own activity.
The practice of immediating impacts upon the extent to which 
timescales can be dilated or compressed or the ways in which form 
can be understood as expanded and/or contracted modes of forming. 
Exaption, in the context of evolutionary biology as described by Darwin, 
Figure 57. Improviser-participants recording video in ZOOM (stills from video). 
Video and stills selection: Kaya Barry and Jondi Keane.
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Gould 3 and others, has been used to refer to an adapted trait or 
feature that only becomes useful when activated in a future context. 
This has implications for selection – particularly how an organism and 
environment dynamically shape each other. In relation to an artwork or 
creative process, exaption suggests that a process of perception, mode 
of understanding, formal structure or mode of forming can be made 
available for an as-yet unknown future use. Exaption helps to articulate 
the strange temporal and spatial complexity of an artwork’s affect on 
the re-composition of experience, particularly when considering the 
affects of paradox.
The potential held by the concept of exaption, a concept of the futurity 
immanent in the present, allows the timescale of biological formation 
to operate through the immediate experience of lived abstraction. The 
implication of exaption, as a concept activated within art, provides a 
way to think about the way form plays out across time scales that are 
imperceptible to us. If exaption is about morphology in the context of 
evolution, it also indicates the potential of form in the context of art. As 
art becomes an evolutionary device, it can be used to trigger moments 
of self-reference within evolution.
In ZOOM, for example, the wall was not made for structural purposes or 
for decorous reasons, rather the wall was constructed as a prompt to 
activate exaptive potential—to be put to use in service of recomposing 
experience. If an improviser in ZOOM glimpses the way in which he or 
she composes experience, this affects the recalculation of the parts 
to the whole. By zooming-out the form and shape of the river can be 
perceived. By zooming-in, the eddies and contingent events reveal the 
unique niche events. Movement through scales of perception transpose 
the relational network. The components of the installation moved even 
without moving or more exactly—the movements within a seemingly 
still structure were made to resonate and vibrate with potential. These 
transformative movements happen in both directions—from object to 
environment and vice-versa. For example, an object such as a soccer 
Figure 58. The moving wall in ZOOM. Photos by Kaya Barry
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ball changes the lounge room into a stadium and the gallery changes 
the urinal into a work of art.4 Whereas the placement of an object into 
a new context does not constitute exaption, the immediating capacity 
to make new distinctions, constitutes the exaptive potential made 
available through the paradoxical status of art.
An experimental artwork allows for actions, objects and the 
environments to form new configurations. In this way a wall can operate 
like an iteration of the liar’s paradox (e.g. “This statement is false”). The 
moving wall in ZOOM is a wall and not a wall, it is walling and refusing 
to wall: it is true and false: it has gone AWOL (away without leave) and 
is stuck in place. The moving wall enables movement between the two 
states. The wall is an exapted feature whose potential is mobilised 
under the conditions of an artwork rather than an architecture where 
it is asked to behave as it always has behaved. The uselessness of an 
exapted feature and the absurdity of the non-yet apparent new context 
is transformed by the practices of immediating that art draws out.
Features and behaviours given a new context in art realise their 
exaptive potential by participating in an open platform of relations, 
which the artwork foregrounds. When exaption occurs, the crowd of 
past distinctions (like a crowd walking down a busy city street behind 
a person who bends to tie a shoelace), hits the newly constructed 
slow-moving walls of the platform. Something has to give. The wall in 
ZOOM is made to behave in an unaccustomed manner and exceeds its 
objecthood, no longer needing to conform to the template of walls. 
Exaption without the new context in which an adaptation flourishes 
also seems absurd. The wall does not request or receive permission, 
it leaves its post where the duty to uphold ideas of permanence and 
structure is housed, to go out roaming the boundaries in search of new 
distinctions.
ZOOM ’s acquired function re-configures events and recomposes 
experience in ways that make the ground of one’s own activity 
perceptible. This is where an exapted Sisyphian behavior finds its value, 
rolling the stone up and down the hill not as a repetitive punitive task 
but as the meditative realisation of everyday actions. The unceasing 
activity constitutes hell only if objects are inherently tied, through their 
form, to teleologcially defined goals. Otherwise, only the movement 
matters for the realisation of living. If the endless task is to touch and be 
in touch with the ground of activity, then movements within and across 
the boundary states (of any distinction) are not tied to particular forms 
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but to their occasions. An immediating practice would experiment with 
and strive to develop new techniques of engagement that usher us onto 
the ground of our own activity.
An immediating practitioner, in the flow of an expanding and 
contracting present, might purposefully mis-match certain possibilities 
for action in lieu of future possibilities. Immediating, as a practice, 
becomes a way to develop techniques for mis-matching existing 
traits and their environments and deploying the constituent forms 
speculatively. In this way, form would be made to speculate on its own 
viability, risking itself in the process.
Notes
1. Within the Immediations project the collaborators have been working 
through the concept of technique not tied to the content of practices but 
extended through their processual invention and sites of potential multi-
plication (Manning and Massumi 2014: 94). Terms such as “technique” are 
loosened from their mooring to take on more ambitious registers and reso-
nance. Techniques such as conceptual speed dating, making propositions, 
shared meals as research creations, reading groups as part of research 
creation events, free radical within the group, collective devising event—all 
of which require further elaboration and collaboration. Techniques cannot 
be separated from the technologies, which are embedded in the environ-
ments they co-construct.
2. Stein’s discussion comes from the introduction to a collected volume of 
texts in the journal IO (1988) produced by the Rhinebeck Institute (a group 
of poets, philosophers and mathematicians in upper NY state) of which 
Stein was part.
3. For more on exaption as an evolutionary principle, see Gould and Vrba 
“Exaption: A Missing Term in the Science of Form.” (1982)
4. In his discussion of the logic of relation in Parables for the Virtual Brian 
Massumi (2002: 68-88) comments that Michel Serres, Bruno Latour and 
Pierre Levy all use the soccer ball to discuss the relation of subject to object 
and individual to collective (71). Objects can open prefigured space to 
bottom-up perceptual processing, forging unanticipated relationships. The 





It could not be clearer: “the elucidation of immediate experience is 
the sole justification for any thought” (Whitehead 1978: 4). In a single 
phrase, Whitehead sweeps a venerable concept off the table: mediation. 
A shudder can be felt across the disciplines as a centerpiece concept 
shatters like an antique vase brusquely elbowed by an uncivilized 
guest. The concept, after all, was long fought for, and remains a prized 
acquisition in many a field, whose critical credentials are embossed on 
it. My own field of communications is prime among them.
But Whitehead also phrases the same admonition differently. We 
must “confine ourselves,” he writes, “to that which communicates with 
immediate matter of fact,” because “what does not so communicate 
is unknowable, and the unknowable is unknown” (1978: 3). The pieces 
may not be able to be glued back together, but this statement gives 
some hope of a knowing reconciliation. It announces that in the process 
philosophy advocated by Whitehead, immediation is not to be taken 
as the opposite of communication. The “elucidation of immediate 
experience” actually requires a concept of communication – which 
is to say, transmission. Where transmission goes, some notion of 
medium is bound to follow. But what manner of medium is this? Which 
concept of communication are we talking about? How can transmission 
inhabit immediacy? It is necessary to construct a robust concept of 
immediation, equal to the needs of a process-oriented take on the 
world, to begin to answer these questions.
But first: what is it about the concept of mediation that requires it to be 
swept aside for a process-oriented perspective to take hold?
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A Forensic Portrait
Mediation in its classical, communicational sense is a good place to 
begin. What follows is a schematic sketch of the concept. It is not meant 
to correspond to any particular author’s or school’s technical take on 
it. It is more like a composite identikit drawing. Its purpose is only to 
enumerate a set of tendencies and commonly interlinked conceptual 
gestures that are generically presupposed by the concept of mediation, 
and tend to return as of their own accord in varying constellations, 
or to insinuate themselves into the conversation like a half-heard 
whisper, wherever that concept is deployed, even in cases where 
they are officially declared to be unwelcome. There is such a thing as 
zombie concepts: concepts that carry a presuppositional force of such 
staying power that they tend to return no matter how many times 
you slay them. The presuppositions accompanying the concept of the 
self-contained, sovereign subject of modern thought is one of them. 
Mediation is another. The two are not unrelated. The aim here is to 
provide a generic forensic portrait of the mediation zombie, not in order 
to turn it against any particular version of mediation theory (many of 
which are admittedly far more sophisticated than this sketch will let on), 
but rather, positively, to highlight the contrasting counter-tendencies 
that a theory of immediation is called upon to develop following its 
rallying cry to seat thought and knowledge in immediate experience.
The sketch: what is transmitted is a message. The message is 
assumed to be preconstituted. Only once it is formed or formatted 
into a transmissible content does it become transmissible. In a word, 
mediation supposes pre-formation. The pre-formation extends 
to the parties in communication. The sender and receiver are also 
preconstituted, in the sense that their ontological status is assumed: 
they are subjects of thought sharing information. A raft of humanist 
presuppositions about what constitutes a subject and cognitivist 
presuppositions about the nature of experience floods the transmission 
wires. Cognition is understood to precede perception, and to have 
primary status in relation to it. Perception enters the picture on the 
receiving end, playing the basically passive role of reception. It is 
treated as a transparent window on the content. The important thing 
is the subject’s retrieval of the information. That is where the action 
is. Logics that are properly perceptual, or broadly experiential, would 
only cloud the view, so must be sidelined in favor of the cognitive 
acts of information packaging and retrieval. The medium, like the 
perception it delivers to, is committed to an ideal of transparency. 
Immediation Unlimited 503
This instates a dichotomy between form and content, twice over. 
First, the transmissibility of the message is its fittability into a general 
form (a formatting), and that general form is the vehicle for the 
particular content transmitted. Second, the medium as information 
channel is itelf the general form for all transmissions: their general 
condition of possibility. This second form/content division coincides 
with a structure/process dichotomy. The medium is the structure 
framing the process of communication. This brings with it yet another 
dichotomy, between fixity and flow. Finally the operation of mediation 
is understood in terms of an intervening third. It is around this point 
that the philosophical questions will congregate in what follows. This 
is because the notion of an intervening third lies at the heart of all 
theories of mediation, however sophisticated, and however cognizant 
they are of the shortcomings of the schema just enumerated. It is their 
sine qua non. It is the bite of the mediation zombie, drooling unwelcome 
presuppositions as its teeth clamp down.
The model of the intervening third is as simple as the idea of an 
apparatus of communication viewed as interposing itself between the 
sender and the receiver. Its coming-between as a third term tasked 
with ensuring the conditions of possibility for communication places 
the parties in communication in a relation of exteriority to one another. 
This fashions social relation as external relation: an interaction between 
two, mediated by an intervening third. Mediation’s being “in the middle” 
is understood in these terms, as pertaining to external relation. This is 
relation as an added factor constituted by an intervening third coming 
between two discrete points, joining them at a distance through its own 
devices. This has far-reaching philosophical consequences. The gravest, 
for a process oriented approach, is that it writes immanence out of the 
equation. As we will see, immanence and immediation are a package 
deal. One cannot be conceived without the other. Immanence is not a 
concern for mediation.
In mediation, immanence is replaced by interiority. Sender and 
receiver are subjects, each with its separate interiority, triangulated 
by an intervening technology. This refuses any fundamental status 
to the transindividual as opposed to the intersubjective, making it a 
secondary effect of the external relation between individuals, rather 
than a primary fact of “intra-action” (to use a currently popular term, 
which in my work I call generative “infra-activity,” used as a synonymn 
for “immanent relation”). It also firmly ensconces the process in the 
confines of the human, and confines the human to its own finitude, 
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limiting its resources for becoming-other. The unlimited falls entirely 
to the side of the media apparatus, in its ability to exponentially 
multiply content, and to distribute its operations ever more extensively 
throughout the social field. Technology arrogates the openness of 
infinitude to its own operations. As part of the same gesture, it claims 
“singularity” for itself, preceding it with “the” to make it a punctual 
event, rather than a logical category all its own, outside the opposition 
between the general and the particular, as process philosophy styles 
it. Singularity is deferred, arriving with the apocalyptic crossing of a 
speculative threshold. In the meantime, humans remain relegated 
to their accustomed status of particulars representing their general 
category of being, conforming recognizably to its model, their belonging 
to it defined by their displaying common characteristics, their becoming 
riding on their external relation to technology rather than on any 
internal relation of difference to themselves, infra- to their form of life, 
in trans-connection to its outside. The significance for immediation of 
the concept of immanence, and its kinship with a certain idea of the 
outside, will become clear as this essay progresses.
There are many currents in communications and media studies 
that have called the conceptual gestures just outlined and the 
presuppositions they carry into question, attempting to make a break 
from the generic schema of mediation. Recognizing that media and 
technology play a constitutive role not only in the formation of the 
social but in the very genesis of the human subject goes a long way 
toward shaking the schema at its preconstituted roots. Positing an 
“originary technicity” at work within the human, making the human’s 
technological extendability definitive of its being, overcomes the 
externality of the relation to technology. Moving toward an ecological 
paradigm upholding a symbiogenesis between human and nonhuman 
actors opens the gates of becoming, as the human reopens onto the 
outside and the infinite, in posthuman or more-than-human becoming. 
Giving the affective dimensions of experience their due challenges the 
schema on another front, by dethroning the cognitive from its position 
of primacy and reasserting perception, and more generally experience, 
as fundamental factors. The importance of these developments should 
not be underestimated.
And yet … as long as the cornerstone of the paradigm of mediation is 
left in place, the conceptual gestures outlined above, with their plethora 
of presuppositions, will continue to stir menacingly in the grave. The 
issue, once again, is the intervening third. Only an effective concept of 
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immediation radically writing that notion out can complete the break. 
The mission is to push the entire framework into a phase-shift, driving 
all of its attendant zombie concepts – sender/receiver, information, 
content/form, interaction, interiority/external relation, perception as 
passive reception, particular/general – into their final theoretical death 
throes, in favor of a new figure of transmission pertaining to that which 
“communicates with immediate matter of fact.”
The stakes are broader than communications and media studies. 
The paradigm of mediation has another major homeland: the theory 
of power. Theories of the ideological transmission of structures of 
power are a major province of mediation theory. In this case, the 
mediating apparatuses are the traditional family, education, disciplinary 
institutions such as the police and prison, and the state, in addition to 
the media. It is important to run through some salient points, at the risk 
of generating another identikit drawing.
Theories of ideology rest on the thesis that there is a power of 
conformity already in place prior to experience. Experience sprouts on 
the soil of inherited sets of implicit ideas that encapsulate the structure 
of social relations. These naturalized social relations are transmitted 
to the individual, in whom they are implanted as a priori beliefs. 
They come to the individual before the individual consciously comes 
to herself. Individuals’ self-expression is secondary and deriviative, 
expressing the power relations already structuring society, whose form 
of domination reproduces itself by means of this inculcation. Individuals 
come to their thinking in ideological conformity with what is already 
socially pre-thought. Their form of life comes to them preformed. The 
inculcation may come as a habitus, or a structure of feeling, but the 
transmission is always essentially cognitive in tenor. The word ideology 
says it all, with its etymological combination of “idea” and “logos.”
It is no wonder, given that etymological ballast, that when feeling is 
highlighted it remains subordinated to a structure of thought. In the 
words of one of the theorists of ideology who worked most concertedly 
to open the structure to process by giving a pivotal role to embodied 
feeling and perception, in the final analysis ideology still always 
boils down to a “pre-formation” of thought (Williams 1977:134). The 
ideological structure is “thought as felt and felt as thought” (132). This 
phrase’s bookending of feeling by thought recalls the etymological 
doubling of idea and logos written into the word “ideology.” The crux 
of the matter remains cognitive, in spite of the importance attributed 
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to feeling. This is attested to by the fact that the dialectic between the 
inherited ideological structure and the embodied process of reception 
and transmission that updates it, adapting it to each historical period, 
is understood to coincide with the dialectic between the individual’s 
particular practical consciousness and the general social consciousness. 
The particular/general and structure/process dichotomies are not only 
retained, they are collapsed into each other. The work of the critique of 
ideology is to counteract the effects of this blurring, which results in the 
formation of a false consciousness founded upon the acceptance of the 
transmitted ideology as natural and unquestionable. The prescription 
can only be more and better cognition: a raising of consciousness. This 
has significant political consequences. It stands to reason that the lifting 
of the veil of illusion can only be spearheaded by an astute subgroup, 
already uncommonly in the know, who have honed their critical 
prowess and are now in a position to enlighten others. The mediation 
paradigm, applied to the theory of power, tends toward a vanguard 
politics. This in turn fosters a new hierarchical structure in replacement 
of the old. Historically, that hierarchy has tended to incrust in a party 
apparatus. The theory of immediation carries strikingly different 
political valences.
In the foregoing account, a concern for the structure/process and 
general/particular dichotomies have repeated like a refrain, in harmony 
with the issue of the intervening third. The reason for the concern for 
structure/process is that, regardless of the intent, the structure side 
allies with pre-formation, making of transmission a conformation. 
Conformity then takes precedence over differencing. The static takes 
conceptual precedence over movement and change. Position comes 
first in relation to movement. Change comes a derivative second to 
fixity, as an operation upon it.
For process thinking, in contrast, change is the only constant, and 
movement only comes from movement. The logical category of the 
singular is considered primary in relation to the particular, and its 
partner in ideological crime, the general. Confusing particularity for 
singularity glosses over the way in which every particular is always, 
in some way, in excess of its category. In everything, there is always 
a little-something-extra over and above the common properties it 
displays that identify it as a particular case belonging to its generally-
recognized type: an errant detail, an embryonic appetite, a slippage or 
minimal deviation, a shimmying troubling its positioning and priming 
it into aberrant movement. The consequences of this for the theory of 
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power are that structures predicated on pre-known general categories 
– as is the case for all state, governmental, and institutional structures – 
are always playing catch-up. They are always running after the singular, 
in an attempt to corral it back into place, and feed off its energies. The 
mediation paradigm that is in complicity with these dichotomies glosses 
over this processual fact: structures are defined by what escapes 
them. Escape and the process of becoming it carries forward do not 
presuppose structure. Quite the opposite, structure presupposes the 
primacy of escape.
This is a reminder that the philosophical questions concerning 
immediation are immediately political. The political “implications” are 
not add-ons: they are of the metaphysical warp and woof. Speculation 
on immediation, however abstract, carries by its very nature a 
pragmatic force. It carries a concrete suggestion of alternative ways of 
negotiating power relations, not as an option, but as a metaphysical 
necessity, if change and becoming are to be given their processual due.
Immediation in the Middle
Charles Sanders Peirce makes Mediation one of the metaphysical pillars 
of his “triadic” philosophy. He uses Mediation, and sometimes Medium, 
as a synonym for his category of Thirdness (Peirce 1992a: 254, 295; 
Peirce 1997: 191, 193-194). Despite the name, Peirce makes it crystal 
clear that mediation does not imply an intervening third as a separable 
element. Calling it mediation is misleading, particularly after the long 
intellectual history from Peirce’s day to our own that has embedded the 
term with the schema of presuppositions just described.
For Peirce, what defines genuine thirdness, quite the opposite of an 
intervening third, is a condition of inseparability. Thirdness designates 
the indissolubility of a coming-together. Calling this Relation would be 
much more intuitive, and would have the added benefit of signalling the 
pivotal status of this concept as the linchpin of the logic of relation that 
Peirce considered one of his chief contributions to philosophy. Relation 
is indissoluble because if it is possible to decompose a phenomenon 
into separate elements and still have the same phenomenon, what 
you’re dealing with is a collection. A collection is when elements 
are discrete from one another, a mere disjunctive multiplicity. Their 
natures are not in play simply by the fact that they come together. The 
connection between them is extrinsic to their natures. It is a merely 
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accidental circumstance. The between of them has no particular 
consistency, no thickness proper to it, no nature of its own in which 
their natures are called upon to participate in a way that changes them. 
The relation, in a word, is external. External relation, according to Peirce 
is a “degenerate” thirdness (or “mixture”; Peirce 1992a: 254-255). It 
corresponds to what nowadays is called interaction, a term with which 
discourses on media are rife. Interaction is the thin between.
In genuine thirdness, the in-between has a thickness that requires a 
participation that goes to the heart of what the participating elements 
are and what they can do. Entering into the relation changes their 
natures. This entails, conversely, that removing them from their coming-
together will change their natures again. In a favorite phrase of Deleuze 
and Guattari’s, they cannot be divided without changing in nature 
(Deleuze and Guattari 1987: 33, 483). This nature-changing participation 
where the very definition of what a thing is, and the spectrum of what 
it can do, is at stake in what is meant by “internal relation.” This term 
does not at all mean that the relation is inside, confined to an interiority. 
Quite the opposite, it means that the “inside” comes out. The thing 
sends its very nature on an adventure in the world, taking a wager on 
what else it can be. Internal relation is involvement in an event, and 
the event constitutes a becoming. It is the elements, coming-together, 
that are in the relation; it is not the relation that is in something else. 
This is another way of saying that the concept of internal relation is a 
concept of immanence. Internal relation is the mutual immanence of 
the multiple, in the singularity of a changeful event. Immanence is when 
things come out of themselves to come together. It is shared outside of 
what they collectively come into, to become-through.1
This changes the meaning of “between.” Between is no longer the 
external distance separating two things. It is co-involvement, a 
participation that brings things together in change. “Between” is a being 
outsided together; being in the midst of a shared becoming. Becoming 
comes through the middle. The middle is not passively circumscribed by 
the external relation between things, as pre-constituted. It is an active 
middling that takes thing up together into itself, toward change. It is the 
direct implication of a multiplicity of natures in each other, across any 
actual distance separating them. All immediacy is in the middle, and 
all middling is in immediacy. The between is not the actual distance. It 
is the absolute proximity to each element, and by the same token to 
them all, of an implication in the event of change, integrally shared. This 
makes the relation a locus of sorts, but not one that can be pinpointed 
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in space. It the locus where what is localized in space participates 
nonlocally, in immediacy. This means that it is by nature abstract, or 
ideal: as much of the order of the virtual as the actual.
Take love as an example. The love relation is not decomposable into 
two separate people, both of whom are busy, each on their own side, 
executing the action of loving. This would make love a collection of two 
dual relations: that of each individual to love. The feeling of love is of 
a direct involvement in another’s life, in a way that adds a supplement 
to your life that you cannot put your finger on, because it is neither 
here nor there–or rather it is always here and there, wherever you go. 
Unlocalizable as it is, you feel it directly, without having to think about 
it. You also know, just as directly, that it will draw you into an adventure 
that will not leave you unchanged. Love is not an interaction between 
two living beings. It is an intermodulation between two lives. It takes 
off from what they are, each on their own side, in order to sweep them 
up toward what they will become together. Love is not 1+1=2. It is a 
strange, vital mathematics where 1+1=3. The third is the becoming. 
This is a third that exceeds addition. It is more a kind of fusion.2 The 
one and the other cease to be a collection of two. Instead, they move 
together, across their distance and difference, integrally as a block, their 
movements correlated even when they are apart. They are entangled, 
not unlike quantum particles. To paraphrase Whitehead, the world of 
two becomes one, and is increased by one (making three). This “fusion” 
is not an erasure of distance and difference. It is a supplementation of 
them: a real but abstract thirdness of co-involvement. Every couple’s 
coupleness has its own affective complexion, which can be felt and 
responded to, supplementary to any one-to-one interaction you 
may have with either party. There is a being of the relation. Anyone 
who is friends with a couple knows that implicitly. The relation is an 
incorporeal being that has its own “personality,” irreducible to the 
personalities of the individuals in love. It is not a mere convention of 
speech to say “in” love. The being of the relation is a kind of ideal locus, 
defined by what Raymond Ruyer calls a nonlocal liaison. You are still in 
love when you are apart.3
The same logic applies to situations involving three parties, for example 
in polyamory. Polyamorous relationships are not decomposable 
to two sets of dual relations, because each relation cannot fail to 
be modulated by the other, even if the choice is made to maintain 
a certain separation between them. The between of relation is a 
nondecomposable “among”: it goes between all of the terms in relation 
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at one and the same time. It’s not a straight line from one term to the 
other, plus a straight line from that other to another. It’s an abstract 
line that snakes in a zig-zag between all the terms at once, filling the 
intervals with its own ideal thickness, at no remove and at no delay. The 
thickness, or intensity, can be variable. To say that integration does not 
erase distance and difference is to say that it applies to a differential, 
and that the differential is never surpassed, but rather supplemented. 
Differentiation and integration are two sides of the same coin. People 
in love become together, but they do so without becoming the same 
– or becoming in the same way. Love relationships are notoriously 
asymmetrical.
Another example of a thirdness among three co-involved parties is the 
gift (Peirce 1992a: 251-252). From the interactive point of view, giving 
is decomposable into a dual relation between the giver to the gift (a 
proferring) plus another dual relation between the gift and the giftee 
(receiving). However, this is only an event of giving because the action 
of proferring coincides with the action of receiving. They overlap in the 
event, entering into continuity with one another. If the giftee refuses the 
gift, the gesture of proferring is abruptly sundered from the receiving, 
and both parties break from the gift relation. The two actions fall into 
separation. Their reciprocity is broken. In a true giving, proffering and 
receiving are reciprocals, integrally intertwined. They are fused aspects 
of a single action that fills the distance between the two participants 
with a quality of relation, in the thick of which their lives are moving 
forward. You can’t decompose the gestures into two dual relations 
without losing that quality of relation. There is of course a distance 
between the two participants, but there is no distance between the 
two gestures. They occupy the same abstract locus, which is the 
relation of giving.
There are many proferrings that are not of gifts, and likewise receivings. 
Exchange has many faces. If you approach giving as an interaction 
between two individuals mediated by the gift-object as intervening third 
passing from one dual relation pertaining to one individual to another 
dual relation pertaining to the other, you deprive yourself of any way 
of distinguishing intrinsically between different kinds of profferings 
and receivings. Divorced from the singular quality of the exchange, the 
actions look the same. They are basically identical: one arm extends, 
the other extends to meet it, something passes hand to hand. Looked 
at as isolated actions, there is nothing to differentiate receiving a gift 
from receiving a hand-me-down or, for that matter, from a cashier 
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receiving cash for a purchase. The profferings and receivings involved 
display the same general form. Given that common form, in order to 
differentiate between events you have to appeal to extrinsic factors. 
An obvious way of doing this is to situate the exchange, for example by 
appealing to how it is framed by external circumstance. The problem 
is that from the relational point of view, circumstance does not frame 
the relation. It enters into it, and its ingression exerts a force of fusion. 
The circumstances are an operator of the fusion, along with such things 
as intention, nuances of posture and facial expression, the presence 
of corroborating signs such as decorative wrapping, and the flair with 
which the act is performed. The integrality of the relation, the way 
these relational operators come together as one event, carries a felt 
quality all its own. It is this felt quality that distinguishes this event from 
other events of proffering and receiving. That felt quality expresses an 
intrinsic difference endowing the act with its own event-personality. 
It marks the immanence of the relation: the fact that the contributory 
factors, or relational operators, are in on it together, reciprocal 
co-conspirators, inseparably bound – as good as one, for all the event 
cares (but still very much themselves, from the point of view of the 
differential of their asymmetrical involvement in the integral event).
As these examples show, immediation, understood through a 
philosophy of relation, is vitally concerned with qualitative difference. 
The singular feeling tone of events is foregrounded. That qualitative 
difference is expressive of internal relation, directly felt. The notion of 
fusion points to the immediate reality of the relation, and underlines 
that the event is composed of differences coming to coincide – coming 
into continuity with each other, without their difference being erased. 
Immediation, to paraphrase Whitehead this time, concerns the 
becoming of continuity (Whitehead 1978: 53). But how do qualitative 
difference and continuity go together? What is their relation? Continuity 
is often understood in term of indifference. Here, we find ourselves 
called upon to link it integrally to difference. The relation takes up the 
difference in nature between its multiple contributory factors and 
supplements that differential with the expression of the emergent 
thirdness of a singular qualitative difference characterizing this event, in 
an immediacy of feeling.
In order to say with Peirce that Thirdness is mediation or medium, 
while saying in the very same words that relation is immediation, an 
explanation has to be found for how difference and continuity are 
as intimate with each other as a pair of lovers. What will be achieved 
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will be the holy processual grail of a concept of the medium that does 
not rely on the notion of an intervening third, while at the same time 
providing a basis for a theory of transmission.
Time to Become
Whitehead makes a similar conceptual move to Peirce’s. The 
relationality at the heart of process, he writes, features “a group of 
fused occasions, which enters into experience devoid of any medium 
intervening between it and the present immediate fact” (Whitehead 
1967a: 181). Whitehead seconds Peirce’s approach in his invocation of 
fusion and coming into continuity, as well as in attributing a thickness 
or effective consistency to the continuous in-between and in casting 
aside the intervening third. Whitehead goes one further, adding a 
new emphasis: on time. The fused occasions, he says, come from 
the immediate past, and their coming-together constitutes the cusp 
of the present. The question of (im)mediation now fuses with the 
question of time.
Media studies, like ideological theories of power, are typically more 
concerned with place and space than temporality. Networks are seen 
to produce cultural “spaces” whose study often takes the form of 
explanatory mappings of arrays of nodes. Time figures most often 
in terms of speed (of transmission or contagion between nodes) or 
acceleration (increasing pass-through speed across nodes). Speed 
and acceleration are spatialized figures of time: time measured in the 
framework of space, reduced conceptually to rate of displacement. 
Whitehead, on the other hand, is concerned with time as becoming, 
connected to the problem of the emergence of the new. This is time not 
as displacement, but as qualitative change, constitutive of being. Pre-
formation, fixity, and generality have no purchase here, in the singular 
event of relation.
What is immediate in Whitehead’s formulation is the action of the past 
as it figures in the dawning of the present. What he is referring to as 
the fusion of occasions is an activation of potentials inherited from 
the past. These “reenact” themselves. They reactivate, to serve as 
formative forces for what the present will bring (Whitehead 1967a: 192-
193). The present’s dawning is this very reactivation. The reactivation 
is selective. The infinite potential of the past is felt, but only certain 
potentials are felt clearly and insistently enough to figure positively, as 
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readily available resources for what the present aims to become. The 
aim at the future, according to Whitehead, is as necessary a factor as 
the impetus of the past. The attractor of a coming completion of the 
occasion just commencing moves backward from the future to meet 
the forward push of the past. This is the immediate future beckoning 
becoming. The reenaction occurs at the intersection of the immediate 
past and the immediate future. The occasion is energized by their 
differential, as they fuse into immediacy with each other. The present 
is the integration of these two asymmetrical forces, coinciding. It is 
the dynamic mutual inclusion of the impetus of the past and the allure 
of the future, co-energizing a becoming. The present is the past and 
future’s thirdness: the reality of their co-involvement. It is the being of 
their relation. It is the supplementation of their irreducible difference, 
as they come into continuity across their difference.4 The selection of 
which potentials will figure positively, as contributory factors ready and 
raring, is a function of the synergy between the two inverse movements 
as they integrate. More potentials reactivate than can eventuate. The 
selection integrally includes mutually incompatible potentials. This 
pregnance with more potential than can be, gives the present its 
intensity. Its intensity carries a singular feeling characterizing this now, 
such as it is, as no other now has ever been, nor will be: a vitality affect 
expressing the happeningness, the novelty, of this present passing. 
The task of the becoming is to narrow down the bundle of reactivated 
potentials to a selection that are compatible, or can be rendered 
compatible en route, so that the becoming can complete itself, in a final 
determination of the event it will have been.
This is a complicated way of describing something we all know 
intuitively. Whitehead uses the example of speaking a sentence 
(Whitehead 1967a: 181-182). The aim to express, intersecting with the 
available resources of language inherited from the past, energizes 
the formation of the utterance. The infinity of potentials carried by 
language is at the tip of the tongue. A first word issues, and the cusp 
of the present’s energization, at the cross-roads of the past and 
future, gear-shifts into a forward momentum carrying the potential 
with it. But the potential has now been narrowed down.”The…,” you 
say. That doesn’t narrow it down by much, but still. The future aim is 
now at a common noun, under pressure of habit and grammar, with 
the orientation toward those most readily available common nouns 
(those suggested by the context). “Donald…,” you say. The expectation 
is shattered by a proper name, a nickname no less. Trump is preying 
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on your mind. A new context sets in, reconfiguring the selection of 
potentials for what comes next. “Is …” A number of vivid potentials 
now vie for the honour of completing the sentence, in a selection 
not unaffected by the inflexion with which you pronounced the 
introductory words. The energizing aim has characterized itself as 
pointedly political. You are suddenly at a loss for words. The remaining 
selection of potentials is all so vivid, all equally suggestive, all so apt 
(and satisfying), that you simply let the sentence trail off, leaving them 
hanging in the air. The utterance has completed itself with a certain 
incompletion, leaving a remainder of alternative potentials between 
which it is no longer necessary for the occasion to choose, because 
they reinforce each other, across their difference. Their hanging 
together, compatibly various, gives the occasion its final character 
as an expression of an intensity of feeling too heart-felt to narrow 
down completely.
All utterances, even those more definitely completed, leave a remainder 
of potential for follow-up. Potential feeds forward, with a characterizing 
intensity, no matter what. The coming into continuity of the future and 
the past that is constitutive of the occasion energizes a continuous flow 
of potential through the occasion: a continued becoming of continuity; 
a flow of qualitatively changing relation (the relation of the past to the 
future, of you to your interlocutor, of you to your own affective state, 
of shifting contexts articulating to each other and rearticulating, of one 
event following upon another). No pre-formation. No fixity. Process. An 
event, not opposed to structure, but structuring.
It is easy, and in some ways more instructive, to use a perceptual 
rather than linguistic example. The same account could be repeated, 
for instance, with the example of sightseeing in an unfamiliar city, 
approaching a corner. The event potentials do not simply pertain to 
what is already in place lying in wait around the corner, deposited 
there from the distant past. They also exceed what your accumulated 
knowledge of walking through cities leads you habitually to expect 
to see. They notably include your state of attention, incoming from 
the immediate past to cusp the present melding into the immediate 
future. Distracted by the stress of not knowing where you’re going, 
you fail to see an uneven paving stone in the sidewalk as you turn the 
corner. The potential for a fall suddenly jumps out at the occasion, a 
co-production of your aim to get somewhere and the affective tonality 
of the immediate past (distraction) forming the inattentive step now 
leading you there. The bundle of potentials greeting you is quite limited. 
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Either you fall or you don’t. Although it’s not so cut-and-dried as that. 
There are many ways of falling and not falling when you trip. There is 
an infinity of them, in fact, but a smaller infinity than what the city as a 
whole generally offers around its corners. As it happens, you draw on 
your balancing skills to catch yourself, with an embarrassingly byzantine 
flail of a pirouette. Now, that’s a novel way not to fall. Not falling 
never felt quite like that, you sigh. You compose yourself and walk on, 
recontinuing the potential of your relational encounter with the city, 
across the interregnum of the trip. It happens that you are a dancer. 
As you continue, you feel a new dance move gestating in style of your 
almost-fall. Your catching yourself links to dance, at a distance, offering 
potential for that other practice.
Take a Moment
The main point to retain from this is that a distinction must be made 
between the immediate and the instantaneous.
The immediacy of the present is not an instant, understood as a 
point in time. That is yet another spatialized figure of time, modeled 
on space. It is taking the classical notion of space as composed of 
widthless, dimensionless points, and applying that model to time. This 
didn’t pan out so well for space, as Zeno showed at the very beginning 
of philosophy. Why should we expect it to turn out any better for 
time? Yes, it’s a powerful heuristic, highly useful for dividing space for 
purposes of measure. But it is a philosophical non-starter. Because if 
you push the division toward the limit, space – which it is the whole 
point to measure – is annihilated. As you divide down to smaller and 
smaller intervals, you converge toward the void of the ultimately 
widthless. What else would you expect but a void, when you construct 
three dimensions out of building blocks of no dimension? The principle 
of the whole operation of division is the spatial archetype of the 
mediation doctrine of the intervening third: that between every two 
points lies another. But what can it even mean to say that between 
every two points there is an intervening third point if the points are 
widthless to begin with? Doesn’t the widthlessness of points destroy the 
very idea of “between” that is supposed to be the fundamental spatial 
relation? The medium of space swallows itself whole, by its own self-
voiding definition.
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The present of immediation is not made of points. It is made by 
fusion: an integration of differentials of all sorts, the primary of which 
is between past and future. The figure is not that of interpolation, 
but rather of overlap. A selected group of potentials reenacting the 
formative force of past occasions integrally overlap and fuse together, 
entering the present en bloc. Their entry energizes a force of impulsion 
through the present, which is boosted by the attractive force of future 
aim. The fusion of selected potentials from the past is, in the same 
stroke, a dynamic fusion of the past with the future. It is misleading to 
say that the past potentials enter the present. It is more the case that 
this two-fold fusion constitutes the present. It is the “immediate present 
fact,” or what Whitehead often calls the “concrete fact of relatedness” 
(Whitehead 1978: 22 and passim). It is the density of this complex 
overlap that constitutes the thickness of the present, as in-between 
time. But then, all time is in-between time. What is there, actually, but 
the present? We are always actually in the between. We start in the 
middle, as Deleuze and Guattari liked to say – and stay there, moving 
with it as it slips ahead, qualitatively changing. Unmoving locus of 
becoming, moving us along.
There are no end-points on either side of this in-between. On either 
side lies the infinite expanse of the past and the infinite horizon of 
the future. The in-between of becoming is bracketed by openness. It 
has no definite boundary. It is only limited by potential, past (incoming) 
and future (ongoing). Immediation is the unbounding of experience’s 
taking determinate form. For this is not a model of seamless flow. 
There is always a hitch giving the occasion pause: an interregnum 
across which the action continues. Time trips. Something cuts in and 
trips it up, triggering the event into taking definite, irreversible form. 
The continuity of time becomes across the cut of the interregnum. The 
model is not of seamless flow, but of cut/flow.5 What intervenes to make 
the cut (flow) is not a third thing, but a relation that makes a difference: 
an unnevenness met en route that triggers a dynamic taking-form 
on the fly (a clinamen immanently modulating the momentum of the 
occasion). The unevenness is not a separable element. It is relational. In 
the corner example, what made the event was a relation between the 
sidewalk and a pace and manner of walking. The crack in the sidewalk 
figured as making relational ingress. Apart from that ingress, it is 
nothing for the event (for the event will not have happened).
Overlap gives us the figure of the “saddle-back,” as William James 
famously put it, as opposed to the point ( James 1950a: 609). Becoming 
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rides the saddle of the time it takes, which is the time the concreting 
fact of its cut/flow makes. The present is not a point in time. It is a 
“specious present” carrying a certain width or thickness of process 
(ibid.). “The immediate present of each actual occasion,” Whitehead 
writes, “lies in a duration” (Whitehead 1978: 124). My undancerly near-
falling will have a different experiential thickness, a different intensity, 
than yours. It will yield a qualitatively different duration, which will in 
turn yield a measurably different chronological time-interval (I flail 
more than you, and it takes me more to right my balance). The duration 
that is the specious present is not this chronological measure. The 
duration is the internal relation, directly expressed in experiential 
intensity, of the contributory elements of the event fusing into it, 
giving it its singular arc. The chronological measure is a secondary 
(“degenerate”) artifact of the event being juxtaposed (set in external 
relation) to another event (the moving of the hands of a stopwatch).
The point about time not being a point is that immediacy is relationally 
saddled with duration. It is not in an instant. Rather, it has its moment. 
It is momentaneous rather than instantaneous. The time it takes is the 
time it makes.
It is the rhythm of the hitches giving pause, triggering the catch of a 
definite taking-form of the movement-across, that parses the flow into 
specious presents. The resulting moments stand out from the flow 
as definitive emphases in becoming. Cut/flow, trip/catch–stand-out 
moment in life’s ongoing.
Some Consequences
Quoting Whitehead again, the duration of the moment coincides with 
“the rush of immediate transition” (Whitehead 1978: 69). It is to this 
immediate fact that philosophy should “confine itself.” In immediation, 
transition precedes transmission. Things are not in transition when 
they are being transmitted; there is transmission when things make a 
transition. The past, selectively reactivated, transitions into the present. 
Or to put it more precisely again, when the two-fold constitution of 
the present draws past potentials forward to meet future potential, 
transition occurs. A charge of pastness, fused with a force of futurity, 
carries across the in-between that is constituted by that very 
movement. To say that “transition precedes transmission” means 
that transition is, processually, primary in relation to transmission. 
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Transmission is a derivative of the thickness of a transition. This turns 
the whole model of mediation on its head, in more ways than one.
In mediation, the present is mediated by the determinations of the past. 
In immediation, the past is mediated by the present, in the sense that 
it is the constitution of the present that determines what of the past 
carries forward. The relation of the present to the past is active. There 
is no passive reception. The present involves the reenaction of the 
immediate past, selectively taking up this past inheritance into its own 
singular taking-form. “What becomes involves repetition transformed 
into novel immediacy” (Whitehead 1978: 136). The transformation in 
question is the active self-constitution of the moment’s becoming. 
The occasion takes form as a function of its “living aim at its own self-
constitution” (244), exploiting the resources of the past through the 
fusion of its own attractive force with the impetus of the past (and with 
the forces of circumstance). It could be said with equal justice that the 
present is mediated by the determinations of the past, and that it is 
mediated by the allure of the future, because it is precisely the middling 
of the two, an emergent third. This is a third that supervenes rather 
than intervenes (it is supplemental, adding the one of its becoming to 
the many earlier become and to come). However, retaining the word 
“mediation” at this point is no more than a matter of habit. What comes 
through the middle does not intervene between two existing endpoints. 
It directly supervenes between two potential open-endednesses, filling 
the in-between with its own immediacy. This is a strange kind of self-
constituting in-between whose coming-to-pass spins off its own either 
side from the middle.
Mediation in the usual sense places the emphasis on a particular 
notion of determination. Everything hinges on the linear causality of 
a transmission from point A to point B, and how that transmission 
determines what comes next. The move from A to B is a closed segment 
bookended by the sending of the message as initial cause and the 
reception of the message as consequent effect separated from its 
cause by the interval of transmission. In immedation, determination is 
recursive: it occurs in the fusional loop between the past and future. 
The emphasis is on potential. The emphasis is on the active selection 
of potential by a self-constituting duration, rather than the passive 
entraining of an effect already pre-figured in, and commensurate 
with, its cause. “Immediacy is the realization of the potentialities of 
the past, and is the storehouse of the potentialities of the future” 
(Whitehead 1978: 136). That realization is not a commensuration, but 
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a supplementation. The in-between is not closed by pre-figuration; 
it is open-ended by an excess of potential (more than can actually be 
absorbed in the event). Immediation is the interval. It is the thickness 
of that self-constituting in-between. There is no separate message 
that is communicated across the interval. There is only the expression 
of potential in a taking-determinate-form that parses the openness 
with its own becoming. The expression is of a momentaneous self-
constitution. The self-constituting is both the form and content of the 
event of becoming. In the expression, form and content integrally fuse 
into what can be called, albeit somewhat misleadingly, and for lack of a 
better word, the “dynamic form” of the event. (When the phrase “taking-
form” is used in this essay, it is with the proviso that it is an irreducibly 
dynamic form – a form of transition – and that the word “form” is being 
used with suspicion, for convenience of expression.)
Ultimately, what is transmitted, what is carried across by the transition’s 
self-constitution, is formative potential, not information.6 Potential 
is not transmitted as a content. Unlike the determinate taking-form 
that parses out of it, potential has no definitive form or content. It is 
transmitted as a degree of freedom of form, and from content. These 
gloss, respectively, as the remainder of futurity left over across every 
transition (free for subsequent form-taking) and the inheritance of the 
past (the initial energetic charge that the occasion’s self-constitution 
takes up into itself, and from which it departs to the extent that it 
becomes). The past has no given content, because it is taken as content 
by and for the occasion’s self-constitution. The future, for its part, has 
no taken form, because it gives (in the sense that a door that is open a 
crack gives when given a push).
In immediation, there is no form/content dialectic, any more than there 
is a structure/process dichotomy. Form and content only figure as 
presently fused into dynamic form, or separated out as freedom of and 
freedom from (futurity and the determinations of the past respectively). 
The freedom is not total, but gradated, of a certain degree. The degree 
of freedom varies for every passing present, depending on the way it 
spins its open-endedness. Not even freedom is a general concept for 
immedation. Immediation, in its self-constituting of its own event, only 
knows the singular.
The dichotomous distinctions out of which the paradigm of mediation 
is constructed are reconstrued, by immediation, as processual 
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distinctions bearing on aspects of the cut/flow of time as qualitative 
change, or the trippy becoming of continuity (the event).
A Fork in the Road
Peirce shares Whitehead’s sense of middling. An example he gives of 
mediation is a fork in the road (Peirce, cited in Zalamea 2012: 57). It’s 
an odd example, by the lights of conventional images of mediation. For 
one thing, it is just that: one thing. It is an integral figure. True, it has 
three components. It is internally differentiated. But none of its three 
components qualify as an intervening third. Take one out, and the 
remaining two change in nature. A fork in the road with one line is not 
a fork in the road. The figure of the fork in the road passes the test of 
genuine thirdness: it cannot be divided without changing in nature.
Although this figure has no intervening third, it does have a middle. 
The middle is the point at which the three paths intersect. Overlap 
would be a better word, because they are in fact tangent to one another 
rather than intersecting. One of each of their endpoints overlap to form 
the middle. If you look at the figure as a spatial diagram, the overlap 
appears as a single geometric point, and you would be forgiven for 
considering it widthless. But zoom yourself into it, on a journey, and its 
thickness and multiplicity jump out. Look down one fork, then another. 
They look and feel different. Because they are. Not only physically, 
but in terms of the potential they open. Now look back. The road you 
have traveled to come to this point is even more different than the two 
ahead. It also has a feel to it, but it is the familiar, comparatively boring, 
feel of the already-tread. Your standing where you are, with the exciting 
alternative of two divergent paths in life ahead of you, is the embodied 
inheritance of the past of your journey, whose potential has been spent, 
but in a way that opens more, divergent, potential. Experientially, you 
are not at a point. You are in the thick of a transition, and what lies 
ahead for you depends on which way you end up going. It gives you 
pause, because the road is unknown to you. You can trip up, and end 
up lost, in which case what lies ahead for you is frustration, things like 
late meals, missed appointments, and lost opportunities. You look 
down one fork again, and then the other, as if some previously missed 
detail will mercifully attract your attention and trigger a decision in you. 
Nothing comes. So you plunge ahead as if it had, perhaps on so thin a 
ground, so slight a trigger, as a shift in the light on the surface of the 
road that just now flittingly filters through the trees, half-consciously 
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beaconing you ahead. A road never quite forked for you just this 
way before. You have made the transition, and with that, the world’s 
potential – a modest dollop of it, surrounded by a practically unlimited 
swathe of it in the form of less availabe paths through the unbeaten 
woods toward myriad unsurmised destinations – is transmitted to your 
life’s ongoing. You are free, to a graded degree, to carry on.
In place of an intervening third, we have an overlap consisting in a 
reduplication of endpoints. A line of movement never ends at a point. 
Processually speaking, it comes to a saddle formed by the superposition 
of multiple endpoints. These are less endpoints than anchor points for 
divergent vectors onwards and backwards. The “point” is the thickness 
of their coming integrally together, across their difference, for the 
present moment. It is their fusion, into a block of multiplicity. It is the 
how of their fusion, the manner in which they come multiply together, 
that characterizes the present moment, endowing it with its singular 
vitality affect.
Any diagram or schema of what Peirce called mediation – or what is 
less confusing for us to call the immediation of genuine thirdness – is 
insufficient if it is approached simply as a geometrical figure, given the 
heuristic reality that geometrical figures are constructed from, and can 
be divided into, points that do not have qualitatively different natures 
and are as indifferent to the event of construction as division. We must 
zoom into experience, at least in thought experiment. For experience is 
always in movement, and movement is always in the thick of transition, 
taking its own duration, making its time, middling for qualitative 
change. “Immediate experience [is] the essence of an individual fact” 
(Whitehead 1968: 98).
To say that immediation is the present immediate fact is to say that 
it is irreducibly experiential. Experience cannot be bracketed out. 
Immediation is one with direct experience, on the road in thought or 
in the woods. The process philosophy adequate to immediation is a 
species of James’s radical empiricism, defined by the precepts that 
relation is real (it is the reality of thirdness, a doctrine drummed into 
his readers by Peirce) and that relation is directly experienced (it is of 
the order of the event) (Peirce 1997: 190-191; James 1996a, 42). It is 
experience that effects the fusion that forms the relation. Diagrams and 
schema are necessary aides of analysis, but they must never be left at a 
merely geometrical juncture. They need to be prodded into movement. 
They need to be forked into experience.
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Forking Zeno
This is precisely what Peirce does with the problems philosophy 
inherited from Zeno, heuristically glossed over by the later Euclidean 
consensus forming the classical foundation of geometry (the idea 
that lines are made of points rather than transitions, that points are 
widthless, and that between every two points lies an intervening third). 
It is worth the detour to go through Peirce’s strategy for prodding this 
schema into movement, in order then to zoom experience into it.
As noted earlier, Peirce’s concept of mediation is that of thirdness; 
the problem of thirdness is undecomposably a problem of continuity 
(Peirce 1992b: 190); continuity is of the nature of relation; and the reality 
of relation is directly experienced – making mediation immediate. 
For the concept of immediaton to set, all of this has to integrally hold 
together. Continuity is a weak link, first of all because the traditional 
way of envisioning it – by cutting into a line and interpolating points into 
the gap, repeating the procedure ad infinitum, in a passage to the limit 
of the widthless – is so heuristically ingrained in us as to form a habit of 
thought that is very difficult to shake, but which, unshaken, will swallow 
immediation in the void. Continuity is also a weak link in connection 
with directly experienced relation, because that involves continuity 
in issues of qualitative difference, and the way we think of differing 
qualities of experience – which experience never comes without – is 
anything but geometric. We are back at the relation between continuity 
and qualitative difference, signalled earlier, as a core problem of 
immediation.
The following account is freely based on Fernando Zalamea’s 
remarkable account of Peirce’s logic of continuity (Zalamea 2012). 
Peirce begins by denying that lines are made of points. It is obvious, he 
says, that lines would be discontinuous if they were made of points, 
because however far you took the division, there would always be a 
gap into which you could intercalate another point. At the limit, the gap 
would be infinitesimal. Over the limit, you would fall into a void and 
everything would be all gap, as the infinitesimal concertinas out into 
infinite nothingness, in an energyless geometric equivalent of the Big 
Bang. As you try to construct the continuum by division, all you achieve 
is to infinitely gap it, making it as deeply discontinuous as it can get, up 
to the point that it gives up the ghost of geometry and expires in the 
spaceless void. Poor line.
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To save it, you just have to give it a shake. Instead of thinking of the 
points as lying next to each other with a potential gap in-between for 
a third to intervene, think of them of them as moving back and forth 
over each other, in restless agitation (Zalamea 2012: 20, 22). Now every 
point is a smear: an overlap composing a “neighborhood” of multiple 
points. You can transition continuously over a smear. And you can also 
continuously transition from one overlap to a next overlap restlessly 
smearing with the first. Now, if you cut the line, you just cut through to 
more smearing: under-smearing. Cut again and again: under-smearing 
galore, layer after layer. This actually supplements the line rather than 
attenuating it. It thickens its composition rather than thinning it out. 
Because if all the “points” in the line are sliding into and over each other, 
then it stands to reason that the line itself is moving, in just as ceaseless 
agitation. In some of those agitations, it might well shift beside itself, 
forming a parallel to itself. Or it will slant, and form a perpendicular 
to itself. The parallel and the perpendicular might meet for a passing 
moment, to form a rectangle. You have now moved not into the 
dimensionless void, but into two-dimensions: you have surfaced. Keep 
shaking, and you get all manner of figures, in all dimensions. All of these 
translations of the line are included in the under-smear. The agitation 
constitutive of the line mutually includes in its event-space the absolute 
fullness of an infinity of potentials. Which is just what they are, potential 
or virtual figures. Were they actual figures, the line would not be what 
it is, a line. You could reverse perspective, and see the line as a cut-out 
from this complex plenitude. It amounts to the same thing.
The line is an included aspect of the plenum, and the plenum is an 
included aspect of the line: mutual inclusion of all in one and one in 
all.7 The mutual inclusion is asymmetrical, because the inclusion of 
the all in the one gives a line, whereas the inclusion of the one in the 
all gives a plenum: a continuum. They nest in each other differentially, 
off-balance. Cut into a line and “a continuum will result like a self-
returning line with no discontinuity whatever” (Peirce, cited in Zalamea 
2012: 24). You have to keep thinking the mutual inclusion in terms of 
movement, conceiving of the line departing from itself in all directions 
and dimensions, and then in no time (or at infinite speed) returning to 
itself. When the line departs from itself, it moves into a “continuous 
growing of potentiality” (Peirce, cited in Zalamea 2012: 67). When it 
returns to itself, the growing potential contracts into one dimension, 
limiting itself to a determinate figure, a simple line. A movement 
occurring in no time is virtual. A movement occurring at infinite speed 
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is at the limit of movement potential. Note that Peirce said a continuum 
will result. Continuity is reproduced at the same time as a limited 
figure of it emerges. Continuity is iterative, continually rolling over on 
itself into a new variation, as each limited figure cuts out from it. The 
essence of the continuum is movement. It has no fixed form. Any fixity 
the figure of the line might have is a virtual movement effect. Far from 
being the opposite of movement, the fixity of the determinate figure is 
a particular expression of the limit of movement potential.
The continuum itself “flows” (Zalamea 2012: 31). It is in a constant 
fluctuation of becoming-line (and all else and more, mutually included: 
potential continually growing). Needless to say, in the midst of this 
agitation, “the principle of the excluded middle does not hold” (26). 
What holds is the middle, mutually including. The simple figure of the 
line stands out from the commotion. It holds the line (holds to itself) 
amidst constant fluctuation, self-constituting as the linear in-between 
of a multitude of figures whose singular dynamic form of overlap 
describes it, characterizing the moment geometrically. To immediate 
is to “globally unify the different perspectives” held in potential, in a 
determinate taking-form (58). This is a local-global integration. The 
taking-form limits the growing potential to its simple local figure, at the 
same time as it continues the global growth of self-returning potential. 
Depending on the perspective, you can see the local figure as limited, 
not by points or a void, but by open-ended potential; or, you can see 
it as limiting potential to its own taking-form. These are two fused 
aspects of the being of the figure, and in the same stroke of the global 
reality. These are two coinciding inverse movements. The same two-
fold agitation swinging at infinite speed (or in a no-time that makes the 
moment) between, on the one hand, the singularity of a determinate 
definition, and on the other the so-overfull as to be encompassingly 
vague. Definition is an emphatic local contraction of vagueness bringing 
a complex globality of infinite potential to determinate expression in a 
simple limited figure (Peirce 1992b: 258).8
“The vague might be defined as that to which the principle of 
contradiction does not apply” (Peirce, cited in Zalamea 2012: 27). That 
is because what it is so-overfull of are “can be’s” and “would be’s” 
that are “not individuals,” yet are just as real as any determinate “is” 
(26). The vague is the mark of the immanence of an all-encompassing 
“supermultitude” (8). Of this supermultitude can be said what James 
said of pure experience, that it:
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is not yet any definite what, tho’ ready to be all sorts 
of whats; full both of oneness and of manyness, but in 
respects that don’t appear; changing throughout, yet so 
confusedly that its phases interpenetrate and no points, 
either of distinction or of identity, can be caught. … . But 
the flux of it no sooner comes than it tends to fill itself with 
emphases, and these salient parts become identified and 
fixed and abstracted. ( James 1996a: 93-94)
From the global perspective, the parts that become identified and 
fixed and abstracted from the flow of the continuum, the individuals 
populating process, are “no longer distinct … They have no existence 
… except in their relations to one another. They are no subjects, 
but phrases expressive of the continuum” (Zalamea 2012: 14-15). 
Determinate individuality is the differential mark of infinite continuity 
(13): the local sign of the global.9
A continuum is a collection of so vast a multitude that in 
the whole universe of possibility there is not room for 
them to retain their distinct identities; but they become 
welded to one another [fused]. Thus the continuum is all 
that is possible, in whatever dimension it be continuous. 
You have so crowded the field of possibility that the units 
of that aggregate lose their individual identity. It ceases 
to be a collection because it is now a continuum. … A truly 
continuous line is a line upon which there is room for any 
multitude of points whatsoever. Then the multitude or 
what corresponds to the multitude of possible points, 
–exceeds all multitude [it is a supernumerary infinity, a 
supermultitude]. … On a continuous line there are not 
really any points at all. It seems necessary to say that a 
continuum, where it is continuous and unbroken, contains 
no definite parts; that its parts are created in the act of 
defining them and precise definition of them breaks the 
continuity. (Peirce, cited by Zalamea 2012: 19)
Where the continuum is unbroken is in the fusional supermultitude of 
potential that is left-over the local act of cutting definitively into, in the 
smear to infinity afterneath the interregnum of taking-form.
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Existence is Rupture
“Peirce’s logic of vagueness hopes to control the transit of the indefinite 
to the definite, of the indeterminate to the determinate, and to study 
some intermediate borders in processes of relative determination” 
(Zalamea 2012: 25). Occupying this borderland are modes of transition. 
These constitute “an intermediate, or nascent state, between 
determination and indetermination” (Peirce, cited in Zalamea 2012: 26). 
Process is the perpetual rebirth of this transitional nascent state of the 
global becoming local.
Intermediate nascent state, Peirce said. That is: a nascency through 
the middle, constituting thirdness. Constituting relation. The 
individuality of the breaking-away into a becoming-determinate is a 
relational autonomy.
This way of thinking the global and the local requires rethinking them in 
a way that does not equate the local with the particular and the global 
with the general. You can continue to use the word general, as Peirce 
does, but only if you emphasize that what you really mean is generic 
(Zalamea 2012: 11). And that when you say generic you mean restless, 
rocked ceaselessly back and forth across the borderland of nascency, 
swinging between the singularity of the emergent individual’s salient 
marking of the indefinite continuum and the continuum’s genericness 
vaguely exceeding all mark. Process swings singular-generic rather 
than fixating on the general-particular. When we say that an individual 
figure is singular rather than particular, it is a way of underlining its 
belonging to process.
Repeat: the continuum’s “parts are created in the act of defining them 
and precise definition of them breaks the continuity.” In other words, 
“existence is rupture” (Zalamea 2012: 21). The borderland of nascency is 
subject to cuts rupturing the continuity of the growth of potential, which 
slips back-forth, afterneath, left-over determination. The continuum 
trips on definite taking-form, taking pause from its own globality. This 
is how it immediates itself. Otherwise, it would be vaguely intemporal, 
full of can be’s and would be’s without any is’s and will be’s. This is how 
it makes time for itself. This is how it marks its moment: with its cutting 
out into individuation, changing in nature as it divides.
To say that existence is rupture is a Peircean way of saying that the 
problem of continuity is not just a logical problem, but also a pragmatic 
one: a problem of coming to be, a matter of becoming. Rethinking 
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continuity by adding movement to the usual static schema and 
following the fork in the road to which this leads, is a way of wedding 
immediation to the question of ontogenesis in thought experiment – 
and in thought and experiment.
No End
There is, actually, only middle. The fork in the road taught us that what 
appears to be an endpoint is actually a superposition of a multiplicity 
of points that does not erase their difference. The points enter into a 
zone indistinction without losing their difference. Rather, they integrate 
it into one appearance (an appearing together). The fork in the road 
doesn’t actually look like a superposition. But from the point of view 
of journeying potential, that is exactly what its appearance is: a virtual 
overlap of potential trajectories. To see it this way requires an abstract 
view, but this is a different kind of abstraction. It is not the general kind 
of abstraction that simplifies thirdness. It is a singular-generic kind that 
virtually prehends the over-full reality (of potential).10
At such a juncture (and what locus of our live’s journeys is not one?), 
some of the superposed “end-points” are new points of departure for 
the onward journey. Even the ones that aren’t, are, if you come to the 
fork from a different direction. The superposed multiplicity of end-
points solves a thorny logical problem encountered by the attempt 
to fork off from Zeno. If you cut into a line, classically conceived, thus 
dividing it in two, which line does the point of division belong to? If you 
attribute it to one of the resulting segments, the other is left unlimited, 
so that it can’t not keep going infinitely, growing back into a continuum, 
like an endless amputated frog leg, rather than behaving as a properly 
hobbled discrete figure.
Peirce’s solution to this problem is as simple as it is ingenious: you don’t 
have to put the cutting point on one side or the other, because that 
point spontaneously reduplicates itself and goes to both segments.11 
It is as if the cut-point jumped in place, and from the slice there issued 
two of it, like twin virtual particles hopping out of the quantum void to 
take material form. When the cut divides the continuum it stirs it up. 
It agitates it into sprouting new parts of itself. Thus the twoness of the 
segments comes from a virtual superposition. It is the result of a virtual 
overlap that was potentialized by the cut-into-it to take the form of a 
separating-out: a distancing into disjunct forms united at a distance 
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by a shared genesis. The resulting points are genetically entangled, in 
nonlocal liaison across their separation.
This may not seem like a very technical solution to the problem. 
But philosophically it works wonders. For is not this reduplication a 
geometric expression of Whitehead’s processual concept of reenaction 
(or what in my own work I call reactivation)? The cusp of the present 
for Whitehead is just such a leap in place where an endpoint redoubles 
itself into a point of departure, the two in immediate superpositon 
for an immeasurable interval before process travels down a new line, 
adding a new segment to the world’s becoming, and this demonstrably 
(in two ways: first, it is directly registered in the immediate emphasis 
of its specious-present feeling tone; secondly, that intensity can be 
derivatively registered by a secondary apparatus of measurement 
translating its qualitatively singular coinciding with itself into a 
comparable quantity). Peirce’s reduplication solution to the endpoint 
problem opens up another way of articulating the geometrical 
reasoning that is so necessary to thinking cut and continuity with 
process philosophy.
Of course, the example of a line is an artificially simple one. Even 
in the example of the fork in the road through the woods, there 
was an indefinite multiplicity of other off-road paths also entering 
into superposition at the forking. These were less alluring and less 
accessible, but were still there in potential. If the fork of the road 
into two well-graded paths was the locus of a virtual reduplication 
of endpoints-cum-points-of-redeparture, their leaping in place 
was accompanied by a splash of an indefinite number – in fact, a 
supermultitude – of other less salient off-road points, less well graded 
(present in a gradation of potential shading off into an encompassing 
silvan vagueness). The line didn’t just split, it exploded into ontogenetic 
shrapnel. This is also part of Peirce’s geometric reasoning, when for 
example he says that any point might spontaneously “burst” into any 
multitude of points whatsoever, “and they all might have been one 
point before the explosion” (Peirce, cited in Putnam 1994: 6-7). He 
doesn’t trust points to behave. The possibility that “points might fly 
off, in multitude” (ibid.) at any moment gives a notion of the continuum 
as constitutively irritable (Peirce uses the same idea in his discussion 
of protoplasm; Peirce 1992a: 341). Prod, and it will throw off virtual 
points whose overlap in that occurrence will make the moment. These 
are not artifices, like geometric points, which are purely heuristic 
contrivances of reason. They are real, virtual event-particles (what 
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Deleuze and Guattari call “particles of becoming,” 1987: 269, 272-275). 
The specious present is a playing out of a select group of the potentials 
they release, following an arc of actualization co-produced by the 
past’s explosive reentry and the aim of the future’s attractive pull. The 
thickness of the specious present is in fact a selective thinning out of 
the explosion of potential that “energizes” (Whitehead’s word) every 
moment. Reenaction is ontogenetically explosive. The “reduplication” 
of the endpoints can be thought of as event-particle shrapnel that is 
caught by the forking road segments for their own constitution. Their 
segmentation is a limited capture of the potential released.
The explosion of reenergizing potental is ready to detonate at any point. 
Every endpoint is a spontaneous rebeginning, bursting with ultimately 
unlimited potential. This explosion of potential is our perpetual present, 
endlessly reduplicating. The determinate takings-form that shake out 
at each juncture are ontologenetically entangled, united in nonlocal 
liaison at whatever distance their segmentations take from one another. 
The self-returning line of the continuum of existence is an infinite 
tangle, globally uniting and irritably dividing in the same stroke of the 
ontogenetic clock. Such is immediation. No end, always in the middle, in 
the thick of things shaking out again.
Parenthetically, this notion of capture is the way this process thinking of 
cut and continuity can be integrated into political thought. The capture 
of potential is the fundamental operation of power (Deleuze and 
Guattari 1987: 424-473). The explosion of event-particles is a primary, 
ontogenetic resistance to power: the seat of ontopower.12
Experience Continues
The articulation of Whitehead’s reenaction with Peirce’s spontaneous 
reduplication of points returned us from geometry to the cusp of 
experience, where existence is rupture and the growth of experience 
continues across every delimiting cut. Moving on from there, let us 
reduplicate the point where the discussion of the co-implication of 
vagueness and taking-determinate form was cut off by the supervening 
arc of the preceding segment’s no-endedness:
“A continuum, where it is continuous and unbroken, contains no 
definite parts; parts are created in the act of defining them and precise 
definition of them breaks the continuity.” (Peirce 2009: 168) Precise 
definition, Peirce says. This implies that there are places where the 
continuum remains unbroken, and definition, while not necessarily 
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maximally vague, is nevertheless not precise. Vagueness also comes 
in degrees. If the “immediate fact” that is the process of ontogenesis is 
directly experienced, then the experience mutually includes a range of 
degrees of vagueness and preciseness.
To articulate the Peircean rethinking of the continuum to the qualitative 
differences of which experience is made, it is only necessary to think 
each point-smear as an overlap of sensings. Think of the way an object 
has a texture, and the texture is a way of seeing touching. Or the 
way a glint of sun includes a shiver of just-hinted-at colour as well as 
brightness variations. Think of these sense-smears as definite cut-outs 
from an indefinite continuum of experience. In them, we touch-see, 
in the case of the object, or in the case of the sun-glint see-see (see in 
different ways at the same time). We sense-smear experience defining 
its qualitatively lived moment, marking itself in the singularity of an 
individuation mutually inclusive of different sensings. Experience, 
definite in its emphasis, and at the same time smeared by the variations 
its salience mutually includes: more or less precise. More precise, in the 
case of the textured object, which breaks more completely from the 
continuity with the spatiotemporal background of perception, rupturing 
itself more forcefully into existence. Comparatively less precise in the 
case of the sun-glint, which flits with uncertain locality and indistinct 
moment. Still less precise in the atmospheres enveloping each moment 
and forming its periphery.
Peirce explicitly makes the connection between his local-global, 
singular-generic cut-and-continuum, and experience as mutually 
including an infinite gradation of sense-smear in far-reaching qualitative 
differencing:
There must be a continuity of changeable qualities. Of the 
continuity of intrinsic qualities of feeling we can now form 
but a feeble conception. The development of the human 
mind has practically extinguished all feelings, except a few 
sporadic kinds, sound, colors, smells, warmths, etc., which 
now appear to be disconnected and disparate. … Originally, 
all feelings may have been connected in the same way, and 
the presumption is that the number of dimensions was 
endless. For development essentially involves a limitation of 
possibilities. But given a number of dimensions of feeling, all 
possible varieties are obtainable by varying the intensities 
of the different elements. Accordingly, time logically supposes 
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a continuous range of intensity in feeling. It follows, then, 
from the definition of continuity, that when any particular 
kind of feeling is present, an infinitesimal continuation of all 
feelings differing infinitesimally from that is present. (Peirce 
1992a: 323-324; emphasis added)
Every experience encompasses a given number of dimensions of 
feeling, but if you shake it, you can obtain a plenum of all the other 
dimensions, in varying degrees of intensity (more or less vaguely). To 
shake it, you just have to think time – or better, eventfully make time 
– because time logically supposes the continuum of experience. When 
any particular kind of feeling is present, an infinitesimal continuation 
of all feelings differing infinitesimally from it is also present. The 
infinitesimal continuation is a self-returning line, no sooner cutting 
into itself than folding back on its cuts, superposing variations of 
intensities and different qualities of experience on each other and into 
the moment, as a function of an emergent figure. It is in its perpetual 
folding back on itself that the continuum is unbroken. Its unbrokenness 
comes back through the middle of taking-form, and also surrounds 
that taking-form with a gradation of potential shading off to a vague 
periphery. It is both at the center (the locus of determinate becoming), 
and forms its horizon (an encompassing openness to infinity whose 
surrounding the center is what makes it a center). The plenum is 
localized becoming’s everywhere, at once suffusing and surrounding it.
To say that existence is rupture is to say that the moment is a 
composition of this plenum of experience. The logic of the ontogenesis 
in question in immediation is more directly aesthetic than geometric. It 
bears on the composition of qualities of experience, more or less vague 
and more or less determinate, in two-fold splendour. At this point (of 
felicitous conceptual smear), we can leave Zeno and Euclid and points 
and lines behind, confident that we have a way to talk directly about 
direct experience without reintroducing the intervening third and all of 
the zombie concepts that come with it. Now, when we talk about fusion, 
we know we are talking about the “osmotic process” (Zalamea 2012: 22, 
64) of emergent experience taking-form, in the cutting-in and cutting-
out of its own continuity.
The relationality that is thirdness that was earlier said to be inseparable 
from the concept of immediation implies an ethics of tending relation, 
and that ethics fuses with a politics involving something like love, in 
neighborhood with giving. Peirce suggestively speaks of “sympathy” 
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(cited in Zalamea 2012: 57; see also Massumi 2015b), and reminds 
us that the individual, cut loose from the continuum, is a degnerate 
form of relationality, and that the given, as opposed the giving, is a 
degenerate form of possibility (Zalamea 2012: 12). Best to cleave close 
to the continuum of potential, composing with the plenum, marking to 
some degree, in some gradation, at every fork in the road, the full range 
of the qualitative intensities of experience, in a taking-definite-dynamic-
form delimiting potential and at the same time opening an indefinite 
osmotic continuation of it, for carry-over into the next moment’s 
self-constitution.
Such also is immediation: marking your time through transitions that 
artfully absorb a dollop of global potential, and pass a variation on 
that potential forward, in transmission, not of information, but of 
ontogenesis. Self-constitutively parsing life’s ongoing.
Medium Revisited
We are finally in a juncture, after many forks in the road and explosions 
of conceptual points, to get to the point, about transmission. There are 
still outstanding questions. For example, for a theory of immediation, 
is there a medium of transmission? There is the middle of transmission 
– namely, transition itself – but if it does not involve mediation in 
the conventional sense, as has been repeatedly argued, can we say 
there is a medium? What is a medium of transmission, if it can’t be an 
intervening third such as a technical appartus (as in the use of the word 
medium in the everyday sense)?
The two guiding authors of this discussion each hazard an answer. 
Peirce says that the continuum is the “global conceptual milieu” 
(Zalamea 2012: 23). The word “conceptual” in this answer emphasizes 
the ultimate abstractness of the continuum, as a self-returning line 
whose plenitude virtually folds back through the center of every 
determination of it, and at the same time bursts to the cusp with 
a virtual superposition of a multitude of points. This is a kind of 
“conceptual” reality that is immanent to the immediacy of experience 
(while at the same time, two-foldedly, the immediacy of experience is 
immanent to it). Its reality is attested to by its effectively contributing 
to the occasion’s becoming by arraying through and around it a range 
and splay of potential of which the moment’s taking-determinate-form 
may selectively avail itself (it is “conceptual” in Deleuze’s sense of “Idea,” 
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Deleuze 1990, 1994; readers of Deleuze and Guattari will also recognize 
their “abstract line” in the self-returning, infinitely zigzag line of this 
essay, Deleuze and Guattari 1987: 497-498).
Global conceptual milieu. That works. But – there is no other way to 
put it – it’s a tad abstract. Whitehead’s answer is more concrete. He 
says, simply, that “the world is medium” (Whitehead 1978: 128; Murphie 
2019, in Immediation 1). This implicitly repeats Peirce’s use of the word 
“milieu,” underlining that the best meaning for medium is the milieu 
of life, and that the ontogenetic immediation coming up through its 
perpetual middle is the “concrete fact” of life. This has the added 
advantage of extending the concept beyond the human sphere. The 
world is co-habited by many a nonhuman entity. The word “entity” is 
used advisedly, because a goodly number of these nonhuman factors 
do not exist, and that in different ways. I am referring to things that do 
not rupture into the discreteness of determinate being, some because 
they are just an idea (like geometric points) and some because they 
are the Idea, which zigzags a self-return through every rupture, in that 
no-time energizing the thickening of the immediacy of process into the 
arc of a duration (the continuum itself, replete with the virtual event-
particles it explosively throws off at every juncture).
Whitehead specifies that when he says that the world is medium 
he is referring to the “actual world.” Specifically: “each” actual world 
(Whitehead 1978: 226). By his conception, “the” actual world is in each 
occasion: the all of it is in each of them, asymmetrically included. In 
actuality, there is nothing outside each occasion’s coming into itself. 
The actual world as medium is the immediation of the world in process. 
The word actual is employed here in the sense of “in the act.” The actual 
world is the in-the-act of an iteration of the world redefininig itself. 
Even more specifically, the actual world is “the primary phase” of each 
occasion’s being in the act of becoming. That means in reenaction, 
where endpoints reduplicate into points of departure, virtual event-
particles burst forth, and the continuum self-returns. All of this is 
mutually included in the act. The actual world throws off virtual packets 
of potential, and shades off by degrees from the emphatic clarity of the 
distinct existence that is in the act of constituting itself, to the farthest 
and least accessible reaches of the global continuum of potential. 
The globality of the world, including what does not actually exist, is 
immanent to the actual.13
534 Brian Massumi
The idea that the world is each occasion as medium accords with a 
position I have developed elsewhere that medium could be redefined 
in terms of each event’s singular manner of coming about (Massumi 
2011: 102, 142-143). This way of putting it tilts the concept toward the 
dynamic form arcing out of the primary phrase of reenaction, to single 
itself out from the reduplicative point of overlap through which the 
continuum self-returns into the rupture of being its own self-completing 
world. While philosophically accurate enough, and while useful as 
a provocation to shake off the zombie concepts of mediation, this 
narrows the notion of medium in ways that limit its practicability. What 
“medium” means will have to be integrally reinvented for each example 
considered, in a way utterly adapted to that example. This can be well-
adapted to some philosophical purposes, but it doesn’t allow the notion 
enough span, in that it skirts around the issue of transmission. The way 
Whitehead develops the idea that the world is medium focuses on the 
thickness of the overlap occurring in the reenaction of the immediate 
past, and underlines the asymmetrical and differential nature of that 
fusional mutual inclusion as energizing a transmission of potential.
Consider two cars at an intersection. One is stopped at it, the other 
is approaching. The light turns red for the approaching car and green 
for the stopped driver, who steps on the gas pedal. The approaching 
driver, distracted by an incoming alert on his illegally unstowed phone, 
misses the signal. They crash. The cars’ entering the intersection is the 
immediate past of the crash. Each car followed a different path to that 
event. Both paths included the trigger of the traffic signal, but they 
aborbed it differentially. The difference was one of salience. For one 
driver, the signal registered. For the other, it was backgrounded behind 
the emphatic beep of his phone. Later, this driver will somewhat-recall 
half-seeing it, at the edge of his awareness, prevented from rising to 
the foreground by the interference of the beep and the allure of social 
media beckoning for an immediate future that was not to be. That 
immediate future was abruptly displaced by the actually occurring 
immediate future of the crash. It will hang forever in alternative, 
unfulfilled potential. The driver survives the crash. For the rest of his 
life, every time he hears a phone alert, an event-particle of crashing is 
thrown off by the phone. He fleetingly experiences a virtual crash. Even 
unfulfilled potential can reenact itself. Potentials, unlike drivers, never 
die. The potentials selected by the actual course of the event include 
a long recuperation. The injured driver takes advantage of the forced 
leave from work to start learning a new language using the Duolingo 
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app (the better to reconcile with his phone). Potential is transmitted, 
even grows, following a detour.
The entry of each car into the intersection can be considered an actual 
occasion in its own right. It can also be considered in its aspect as 
a component, or contributory formative factor, of the superseding 
occasion of the crash. Both cars deliver crash-potential into the 
accident. Each does this its own way, according to the different 
emphases of the immediate past of the immediately preceding 
occasions and how they led them to that juncture. The potentials 
in the two immediately antecedent occasions were differently 
complexioned. They were differently graded. Potential foregrounded 
in one was backgrounded in the other by the different ways the signal 
was absorbed. The drivers carried the crash-potential into the event 
differentially. The immediate past of the stopped driver effectively 
included the signal in its composition. It positively took it up as a 
formative factor. That of the driver who plowed through did not. It 
negatively took it up as formative factor.
If you follow back through the series of antecedent occasions leading 
to the crash in reverse order, you see the paths that converge in the 
crash diverging into the more and more distant past. As they diverge, 
the differentials multiply, and the pattern of inclusion becomes more 
and more variegated. They both heard a fire engine somewhere in the 
distance. But one passed through a school-zone before approaching 
the intersection, and this put her on the alert, and her alertness was 
carried over into her stop at the intersection. The lives, and potential 
deaths and injuries, of both drivers are mutually included in the crash. 
All the antecedent occasions leading up to it are also mutually included. 
They are effectively carried into it by the crash, whose occurrence 
determines them retroactively to have been its contributory factors. 
They overlap in it. But they do so in different patterns of inclusion. The 
overlap is not perfect. There are off-sets: there are things that belong 
to one path but not the other. The farther you go back into the past, the 
more off-sets there are. But the off-sets are in a sense still included in 
the event. The event wouldn’t have happened if the potentials hadn’t 
been patterned in just that way, all the way back. It wouldn’t have 
happened if the responsible driver hadn’t passed through the school-
zone and it hadn’t been during school hours. And that wouldn’t have 
happened if … You could make an insanely complex Venn diagram of the 
differential pattern of overlaps and off-sets characterizing the mutual 
inclusion of the past in the actual occasion of the crash. At the limit, 
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the diagram would include the entire universe (Whitehead 1968: 9-10, 
138; Whitehead 1978: 223). There is a “tenuous thread” – an infinitely 
complex zigzag abstract line – connecting every occasion’s actual world 
to the open whole of the universe (Bergson 2012: 10-11).14
All of that complex of potentials enters the event-locus of the crash 
through the immediate past. The potentials are enveloped in it. They 
all fuse into it. They accordion into the crash as the metal hulks of 
the car accordion into each other. They are integrally delivered to the 
accident. The distant past does not exist. Its actuality is gone forever. 
In themselves, the actual occasions belonging to it cannot make a 
difference. They can only enter in through the channel of the immediate 
past of the twin signal-occasions that carry forward the potential that 
these antecedent occasions bequeathed. Even the immediate past 
does exist for the present. Its reenaction doubles time, to make the 
present. The immediate past exists in reduplicative fusion with the 
rupture of the present entering existence, in the reenactive redoubling 
of the ghost of its already-goneness with a vivid now beginning. The 
transmission of potential from the many overlapping leaves of the 
remote past has to pass through the energizing immediacy of this 
reenactive overlap between the just-past with the now-present, thick 
with immediate futurity. The transmission has to be immediated by the 
time-differential mutually included in the transition. It has to ride the 
saddle of time.
This gives a conceptual schema for how transmission is not only 
possible in immediation, but can only actually be explained by it. 
Immediation, at first sight, seems to contradict history. The opposite is 
the case: it makes history possible. Without the transition it constitutes, 
nothing would come to pass. The serial actualization of the present is 
what grows history. Without that actualization, history would simply 
be gone. It would stay in the past. And the present has no access to the 
past as such. It is a ghost for it. Immediation lets the past be gone, and 
its ghost return. It lets it differentially overlap with the present, and that 
in turn allows historic routes, routes of transmission wending their way 
backwards from the immediate past into the distant past, to make an 
actual difference, and be schematized and diagrammed.
If you don’t accept the doctrine of immediation, you have to act as if 
you believe the past was not actually gone. You have to act as if the 
distant leaves of the past can somehow be inspected in the present. 
Denying the irrevocable passing of the past is hardly a solid basis for 
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history. But this is precisely what traditional historiography does when 
it edits out the ever-formative role of the immediate past in overlap 
with the present. It skips over the immediate past, on the grounds 
that the methodology mediating its practice enables access to the 
past – forgetting that the methodology must always be reactualized 
to have any efficacity whatsoever, and that this reactivation always 
presently transitions through the immediate past. Ideological theories 
of power, for their part, assume an overlap of the past and present, 
but in too gross a way. They act as if a general structure were a priori 
present, transmitted in toto into the present by mediatory apparatuses. 
The totality of the structure is considered to be effectively present 
at every juncture.15 Rather than energizing occasions, it constrains 
them, compelling them to play out in conformity with it, so that they 
repeat the structure from their particular positioning. The past, in this 
perspective, exerts a confining general causal influence. The ghost of 
past generally shakes its shackles.
From the process point of view, in contrast, each occasion is 
differentially conditioned by the unique patterning of potential entering 
it through the immediate past. The model is of singularity reduplicating, 
rather than structure repeating. The reenactive conformation of the 
present to the past is the transition to a new taking-form. The pattern 
of the past is infinitely variegated, and each present actualizes it 
differentially. Since the overlap of the immediate past with the present 
is also that of the present with future aim, there is always a potential 
for variation: a way out of confinement by given circumstance. An aim 
can always be off. Or it can be deflected by a sudden shift in emphasis 
triggering other potentials to effectively cut in. Or it can catch itself 
in the act and re-aim toward another attractor. The cut made by the 
rupture of existence constitutively carries the potential for change, as 
immediatedly as it dawns in the conformation of the primary phase of 
the coming occasion to its immediate past.
The historical lesson of immediation is to recognize, with Foucault, 
that history is always the history of the present (Foucault 1979: 31). As 
mentioned earlier, if you want to insist on speaking as if the past and 
the present are in a relation of mediation, you would have to say that it 
is the reuptake of the present that mediates the past. The diagramming 
of the historic routes leading to each present has to be tailored to that 
present. There is no general history. There are no a priori shackles – 
only reenacted ones. History is always in the singularity of the event, 
through which all of potential selectively returns. There is actually only 
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“effective history,” as Foucault also called it (Foucault 1977, 155). It must 
be further recognized that the present of the act of doing history is 
co-constituted, as is every occasion, by its immediate past overlapping 
with its immediate future. This means that aim is a constitutive factor 
in it. Whitehead insists that history includes what could have and would 
have been (Whitehead 1967a: 276, 286; Whitehead 1968: 89-90, 121).
There is no such thing as neutral history. It is always inflected by its own 
conformation with its immediate past under the formative spell of the 
allure of its future. This, along with the point that it includes could be’s 
and would be’s, means that history cannot simply be described. It must 
be problematized. Its potential must be re-shaken up, in the present. It 
must be asked, and asked again: what is at stake in this aim at history, as 
I, historian, am presently reenacting it? Why do history like this?
This is as much a political question as a methodological one. Can other 
stakes be activated by doing history differently? If writing history 
involves immediation, what does that say about living? Immediate 
that. Not-writing history puts you all the more intensely, reenactively, 
immediationally in the middle of it. Why write history, when you can 
actively become it? That, ultimately, is the political question of the past. 
It encourages standing up from the desk, and taking activist steps.
There are, of course, good reasons to write history. This is not an 
argument against history. It is an argument for the primacy of becoming 
in relation to it. The point is that although history is interesting, the aim 
at history is interested. That interestedness, or “concern” as Whitehead 
calls it, is a constitutive factor of every present’s parsing of potential 
(Whitehead 1967a: 176). The way in which the historic routes leading to 
the present are diagrammed changes the past. It effectively repatterns 
which potentials are transmitted to the future, with what determinative 
emphases. It alters what the past will have been.
It is important to remember that the historic routes, however they are 
construed, are abstract. They have no concrete actuality in the present. 
It is only their reactivation – their manner of making reentry into the 
present, crashing into it, fused into a differential patterning of potential, 
energizing arcings, bursting with event-particles, shading off into the 
ultimate vagueness of unbroken continuity – that effectively makes 
a difference. This happens in immediation. Immediation selectively 
reenacts the past, locally-globally. Any notion of lines of descent or 
historic routes is an image of the past, abstracted (extracted) from the 
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“immediate concrete fact.” The making of an image of the past adds an 
additional fold to the two-fold of the direct perception of relation that 
is immediation’s thirdness. This is the fold of reflective consciousness: 
the adding of a supplementary dimension of overlap to the affective 
commotion of thirdly reenaction. Conscious reflection is a a redoubling 
of reduplication, like an echo formed in the resonating chamber of the 
past and future, in the thickness of their immediate proximity to each 
other in the forming present.
Memory, of course is a privileged mode of the past making reentry. It 
is the way in which the dynamic forms of occasions from the distant 
pass (what Whitehead calls their “subjective forms”) can be reactivated 
and transmit their pattern of potential to the dawning occasion 
nonlocally, without having to ride in on an antecedent actual occasion 
belonging to the surroundings (that is, one that is external to the 
body). The brain, as Bergson, Ruyer, and Deleuze argue, is a bodily 
machine for the direct actualization of the virtual. Memories are like 
backwards event-particles: potential-packets that the brain throws 
into the actual from the virtual, as opposed to being thrown off from 
the actual as a spray of virtualities. In memory, the spray reconverges. 
It recontracts into the flow of becoming. If the rupture of existence is 
compared to an egg, memory would be the egg unbreaking: re-fusing. 
The re-fusing comes with spontaneoulsy generated differences, scars, 
sutures, and stretch marks. Memory is mildly Frankensteinian. Or, as 
contemporary psychology says, a memory is always a reconstitution. It 
is a perpetual reinvention, without an original. This is why it is so easy to 
fool ourselves about our pasts, or generate “false memories” or, more 
creatively, fabulations (memories truly potentializing the present with 
an immediating “power of the false”; Deleuze 1989: 126-155; Manning 
2019, in this volume). Habit and skill are similarly immediating, but with 
more regularity and with less of a penchant for fusional monstrosity.
The theory of transmission by immedation is applicable to 
communicational models of mediation. It can easily be applied to the 
“media” in everyday sense. Practically, the difference all of this makes is 
that it sends out an advisory that it is not enough to map the network, 
or describe the apparatus of transmission and the routes it comprises. 
It must be remembered that anything that can make a difference must 
presentify itself: it must effectively make ingress, under some mode 
or another, nested in some pattern of overlap, truly or falsely, but 
in any case reconstitutingly, and that all of this comes as an event. A 
screen is an event-surface. It includes many layers of nested potential, 
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audiovisually reenacting (especially as screen windows multiply and 
embedded links add multiple clinamantic triggers aiming to inflect the 
arc of the occasion’s immediate future). But it is not only what is on 
screen that is part of the event. The off-screen and out-of-frame also 
enters in. This includes memory again, and habit and skill. But also 
(as in the tourist walk and accident examples) the mode of attention 
inherited from the immediate past as it complexions the relation to 
screen-potential. It also includes any number of contributory factors 
converging from the past – an infinity of them, in fact, selectively 
patterned to present varying grades of more or less accessible, more 
or less compelling, potential. This should not be misunderstood as an 
argument for a return to some version of reception theory. That would 
put the event on the receiving end, when it has been said already, too 
many times, that what is at issue is an always-open-endedly in-the-
middle. It also complicates the habit that holds sway in many corners of 
media studies, not to mention in the media itself, to consider that asking 
what the “impact” of a media technology is constitutes an adequate 
problematization of transmission. The crash and burst of potential has 
no such causal linearity as that implied in this commonplace.
A similar question arises in relation to our screen-related immediations 
as arose with the question of history. Media studies is also always 
interested. Reproblematizing the screen-relation involves reenacting 
differently how potentials nest in the screen – but also how the screen 
nests with the off-screen and out-of-frame. The overlaps and transitions 
between the digital screen surface and the analogue off-screen are as 
much a part of how potential is transmitted as the transitions from one 
screen refresh to the next.
If the problematization of history allies it with activist becoming, the 
problematization of our media relations allies to what is called research-
creation (when it rewilds itself from its univerity domestication). 
Research-creation is the most intensely reenactive, most potentially 
energizing and changeful mode, of living the transitions between the 
digital on-screen and the analogue off-screen (which are always a 
part of every creative practice nowadays, through the constant digital 
searching, documenting, and archiving that occurs, formally and 
informally). The two problematizations, activist and research-creative, 
are made for each other. They naturally mutually include each other.
Final note: the appeal to memory and human practices should not 
be interpreted as limiting immediation to the human. It is by nature 
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more-than-human. As stated earlier, there are always multitudes of 
nonhuman contributory factors entering into the self-constitution of 
every occasion. In addition, the explosion of event-particles described 
earlier occurs spontaneously, without being willed as such. It is like a 
spontaneous memory of the world, a kind of spontaneous combustion 
of the world’s ontogenetic potential. Every occasion, involving a human 
or not, produces such a spray. This occurs most immanently on the 
quantum level. But it must also have happened any time the arc of an 
event takes a chaotic or unexpected turn. Chaos is the spontaneous 
multiplication of potential historic routes for the occasion’s self-
completion to detour down, with the selection self-deciding. Above the 
quantum level, there is no pure chaos. It is always filtered by the actual 
occasion as a function of its co-conditioning by its immediate past and 
immediate future. Chaos comes in doses, just as freedom comes in 
degrees (and it is the same coming).16 Take care for the “anarchic” share 
(Whitehead 1929: 34; Manning, forthcoming).
Returning to the human, the co-practice of activism and research-
creation involves a dosing of chaos through the artful co-conditioning of 
potential’s middling reenaction. This aspect of immediation is otherwise 
known as improvisation. Improvisation, like love, or the gift, constitutes 
a genuine thirdness. Like all genuine thirdnesses, it is integrally 
relational. Its individualization in seemingly unconditioned choices or 
decisions – in free association, through simulations of pure chaos or 
appeals to pure contingency, or from personal inspiration in the guise of 
“listening to one’s inner muse” – are degenerate forms of it.
Notes
1. The vocabulary around “internal relation” is confusing. Whitehead’s usage of 
the term actually equates with what Deleuze and and Deleuze/Guattari call 
the “exteriority of relations.” This is the doctrine that relations are autono-
mous with respect to their terms, in the sense that they have their own 
mode of existence, and in the sense that terms in relation do not precede 
their relation but are constituted by it (as in James’ radical empiricism). The 
“exteriority of relations” is a concept of mutual immanence (infra-activity), 
allied to Deleuze’s understanding of the “Outside” as “a different dimension 
… which is farther away than any external world” (Deleuze 1988: 86). The 
“exteriority of relations” is not to be confused with the classical empirical 
notion of “external relations.” External relations are accidental or cirumstan-
tial connections between pre-constituted parts (equating to “interaction”). 
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“Internal relations,” understood as pertaining to the Outside, must likewise 
be distinguished from “relations of interiority” (interactions between parts 
composing an organic whole).
2. Zalamea (2012), in his discussion of degenerate versus genuine thirdness, 
also employs a vocabulary of fusion (“melting”, 12; “welding,” 19; and “fu-
sion” itself, 21, 22).
3. Peirce seems to contradict himself on love. In “A Guess at the Riddle,” he 
says love is dual relation and opposes it to the genuine thirdness of giving 
(Peirce: 1992a, 252). But in “Evolutionary Love” he makes it the basis for his 
“synechism “ (philosophy of continuity), implying that it is a fundamental, 
genuine thirdness (Peirce: 1992a: 354). Evolution itself can only be form 
of thirdness.
4. Whitehead says that “reenaction” is another word for “the doctrine of conti-
nuity” (Whitehead 1967a: 183).
5. On process as constituted by cut/flow, see Deleuze and Guattari 
(1983: 1-50).
6. There are certain notions of information that are in fact consonant with the 
approach developed here. Prominent examples are Bateson’s definition of 
information as “a difference that makes a difference” (as in the trigger-cut in 
this account) and Simondon’s concept of information as a potentializing dif-
ferential, or “disparation.” In addition, the past can be said to “in-form” the 
present (formatively modulate it, immanent to its occurrence).
7. “The occasion is one among many, and including the others which it is 
among” (Whitehead 1967a: 180).
8. This overcomes the opposition between finitude (discreteness) and infinity 
(the continuum) while maintaining both, in their difference, by making them 
processually, asymmetrically, mutually including. The passage from the 
infinite to finitude is often said to be constitutive of modernity. If that is so, 
Peirce (and Whitehead and Deleuze) must be considered stubbornly amod-
ern in their embrace of both.
9. On local signs, see James (1950b: 163-166n) and Massumi (2011: 128, 148).
10. This is what I have elsewhere termed a “semblance” (Massumi 2011).
11. For an account of this reduplication of end-points, and of Peirce’s theories of 
continuity as they concern potentiality, see Putnam 1994.
12. Ontopower (Massumi 2015a) discusses how contemporary practices of war, 
expanded along the “full spectrum” between “hard” and “soft” power by 
strategies of preemption, contrive to capture ontopower itself.
13. “The ‘here-now’ … is a world also including the actuality of the past [the 
immediate past in reenaction], and the limited potentiality of the future 
[the selected potential of the immediate future], together with the complete 
world of abstract potentiality [the plenary potential of the continuum] … 
which transcends, and finds exemplification in and comparison with, the 
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actual course of realisation.” (Whitehead 1967b: 151-152) What is not actual 
is still a formative factor of the actual, and as such can be considered an 
aspect of it (Whitehead 1996: 89-90).
14. The complex, ever-changing variegation of overlap and offset prevents this 
account from falling into the conceptual dead-end of the “block universe” of 
idealist philosphy so roundly criticized by James (1996b).
15. This a priori positing of a general structure imports a version of the block 
universe into the theory of ideology, making it a form of idealism, however 
strenuously it waves its materialist credentials.
16. A target here are philosophies privileging a concept of pure contingency 
and over-extending it, such as Meillassoux’s speculative realism (2010). 
Whitehead’s theory of the immediation of historic routes is also an implicit 
rebuttal of the philosophical standing of Meillassoux’s central problem of 
the “arche-fossil,” and of the assimilation of process-oriented philosophy to 
“correlationism” that is taken as doctrine by many speculative realists.
Erin Manning, Anna Munster, Bodil Marie Stavning Thomsen
Twisting Into the Middle 3
Immediation does not offer any promises. It is not a moral concept 
though there is no question that its reach has ethical potential. It is 
less ours to mobilize than ours to compose-with. A simple mobilization 
would do nothing more than create a new mediatory structure 
with immediation as the object of study, positioning us on the 
edges, looking in.
What immediation can do is spark a technique, orient an already-welling 
event, turn our attention to processes already doing their work, without 
us, or with us in a different way. It can alert us to the fact that we are 
also processes underway, continuously immediated by gestures that 
exceed us even as they give us transitory form. From this angle we are 
no longer the perspective from which the world is made but a matter 
with which it composes, a matter-force that exceeds the composition we 
have come to know as “our” selves. And it is from here, from the force of 
this uneasy middling, that techniques can be made (or recognized) that 
alter what living can be, and what life can do.
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